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In 1923 Martin Buber published
his book
I

Aou

sad

,

in which he formulated

for-

the

firot time his concept of the two
fundamentally

different types of relation of which
man is
the

abl'-.j

I

0 r.p-

-Thou relation and the I- It relation.

In its formulation and in its
importance

for our time,

I

feel, this concept - which is

at the same time the central theme
of all of

Buoer

s t nought

-

is unique and outstanding.

It will be the purpose of this thesis,
f-i

o,

the

I -Thou

to give an account of Buber’s concept of

relation es opposed to the I-It re-

lation, and secondly
end interpret

-

and mainly

-

to elaborate

Buber’s views on religion and ethics,

social philosophy, epistemology, and ontology
in the light of

Ills

I -Thou

philosophy. Lastly,

a short comparison of the mentioned aspects of

Buber’s phlloso hy with the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Bergson,

l/hi teheed,

Buddhism will follow.

and with Hinduism and

PART

OE.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in

2016

https://archive.org/details/unityofbubersthoOOzuck

I-THCU and I- IT

-
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35uber holds that

nan is capable of two fundamentally

different attitudes, two radically different
types of
relation.

These can be expressed with the primary

words ’I-Thou* and *I-rt.*

*The spheres in which the

world of relation arises are three.

'

First, our life with nature. There the relation
sways in gloom, beneath the level of sue ch. Creatures
live and move over against us, but ca not come to us,
and when we address them as Thou , our words cling to
the threshold of speech.
Second, our life with men.
There the relation
is open and in the form of speech.
We can give and
accent the Thou.
Third, our life with spiritual beings. There the
relation is clouded, yet it discloses itself; it
does not use speech, yet begets it. We perceive no
Thou , but nonetheless we feel we are addressed and
we answer - forming, thinking, acting. We speak the
primary word with our being, though we cannot utter
Thou with our lips.
(ITh p. 6) 1

Au then tic personal Existence is Existence in the

I

Thou

A man can enter into an I-Thou relation only with

his whole being, as a genuine person, while the I-It

relation does not require such complete giving.

It is not

even possible that the primary word 'I-It* is sooken

with the whole being.
The primary word I- Thou can only be spoken with the
whole being. The primary word I-It can never be
(Ibid. p. 3)
s )Oken with the whole being.

The I-Thou relation - also called 'dialogical relation* or
•true relation* - is a relation of person to person, of

subject to subject.

It is characterized by mutuality, direct

)
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ness, presentness, intensity, and ineffability
The
,

I-It relation, on the other hand, is a relation
of indi-

vidual to thing, of subject to object, usually
involving
some form of utilization, domination, or control,
li.

the

,

I

in the

t

e

in t e two relations is not the same, While

I

in the I-It relation is an ’individual,* the
I -Thou

relationship is a 'person,

silent or spoken dialogue between the

I

1

2

*1'

Only the

and the Thou brings

personality into being. Although we all are different
from one another by virtue of heredity, we are not

necessarily persons. By virtue of our heredity we differ
only as individuals. Personalities come into being only

insofar as the individual enters Into dialogical relationships with others.

'Personality is neither simply an

individual matter, nor a social product, but a function of

relationship.

Our personalities are called into being

by those who enter into relationship with us... To become
a person means to become someone who responds to what

happens from a center of Inwardness,’

(Fried pp, 60-61

The Dlalorlcal keetlnr. Defies Causal! tv and Fate
In the dialogical meeting, l.e. in the I-Thou rela-

tionship, man is no longer subject to causality and fate.
Both belong to the realm of the world of It and receive

their meaning therefrom. Unlike the It, the Thou is not

determined.

’So long,*

says Buber,

as the heaven of Thou is spread out over me the winds

-

e

:
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of causality cower at my heels, and the
whirlpool
of fate Stays Its course. (ITh p. 9)
'he who goes out to /the Thou/ with
concentrated being

and risen -ower to enter into relation becomes
aware of
freedom.'

(Ibid. p. 58

)

'He who knows about the presence

of the Thou is capable of decision.'

(Ibid. p. 51

)

Only

in times of sickness .. ./when/ the world of It /is 7 no
longer penetrated and fructified by the inflowing
world of Thou as by living streams but separated
and stagnant,
then smooth causality rises up till
it is an oppressive, stifling fate." (ibid. pp. 53 - 54
)

The

I

Thou Is not in Grace and Time

Meeting the Thou is also not in space and time,
but space and time are in the meeting. While the

I

of the

I-It experiences moments which have no present content
since they are filled with experiencing and using, the

present of the I-Thou is something real and filling; it is
an end in itself. It is not the abstract point between past

and future, but the present filled with intensity and

wholeness. (Ibid. pp. 9»t2; Fried p. 53)
Mu tualltv of

I- Thou

If

In order to be fully real,

has to be mutual

.

the I-Thou relationship

This mutuality of the I-Thou is so

unconditional, that even God seems to be subject to it.
Buber says
You know always in your heart that you need God more

- 6-

than everything. But do you not know too that
God
needs you - in the fullness of His eternity
needs
you?... You need God in order to be - and God needs
you for the very meaning of your life. (iTh
p. 82)

however,

mutuality* in this context must not be confused

with unity or identity, neither is it any sort of
empathy.

Although i-ihou Is the word of relation and togetherness,*

writes Friedman,

'each of the members of the relation

really remains himself, and that means really different
from the other. Though the Thou is not another It, it is

also not another I. A man who treats a person as another
I

does not really see that person, but only a projected

image of himself

.

Such a relation, despite the warmest

"personal" feeling is really I-It.'

(Fried p. 61) The

dialogical relationship Buber is talking about always
requires two. Hie

I

and the Thou never melt into one

another.
Every Thou in th 1 s World has to Become an It

Buber realizes that although authentic existence
is existence in the I -Thou - in the life of dialogue -

living in this world does not allow the human being to
remain permanently in the I-Thou relation. For in order to
survive we have to know, control, and use things and even

human beings. We often have to de-personalize and de-humanize our fellow-men, have to treat them as objects rather
3- XI

than persons - make them to mere Its.

melancholy of our fate,' says Buber,

'This is the exalted

-7-

that ^aonetlngT' every Thou in our world
must become
an It...r.very Thou In the world la,
by its nature,
rateo t° become a thing, continually to
re-enter
C0
lt n of th lh 6 S,..The it is the eternal
cary sails, the i°
Thou the eternal butterfly. (ITh
p. 116)

^

The particular Thou, after the relational
event has
run its course, is bound to become an It.
The particular It, by entering the relational event, may
become a Thou. These are the two privileges of~the
world of It. (Ibid. p. 33
)

God

1b

the Eternal Thou

Even God we sometimes treat as though Ke were an
object, an It. Yet, Buber says, God is the only Thou that
never, by its very nature, ceases completely to be a Thou

for us. Everyone who knows God, knows also very well the

remoteness from God, but he does not know the complete

absence of God.

Z27 1 is we only who are not always there... By Its

nature the Eternal Thou is eternally Thou, only our
own nature compels us to draw it into the world
and the talk of It, (Ibid. pp. 99-100)

But by virtue of the privilege of pure relation to the

Eternal Thou in which 'potential being is simply actual
being,’ there always 'exists the unbroken world of Thou’
in which 'the Isolated moments of relation are bound up

in a life of world solidarity.’

Similarly, Just as man,

by virtue of the Presence of the Eternal Thou, can never

become a complete It, so
as a human bel
man,*

ig -

says Buber,

-

on account of his limitations

he can never become a pure Thou. 'No
'is pure person /.Thou/, and no man is

pure individuality /it/.

'

(Ibid. p. 65)

-8-

Relatlon is uooc

»

Alienation

ja

Evil

Since, as was stated above, our personalities
are

called into being through our entering into
relationship

with others, it is the relation of our Self to
the Thou
which, or Buber, constitutes the essence of
Selfhood.
j

Authentic personal existence emerges only in the meeting
of others. Entering into relation is the fact
through

which we constitute ourselves as human beings, as true
persons.

'

Through the Thou a man becomes I,*
(

'I

become through my relation to the Thou.’
It is,

(Ibid. p. 28)

*

(Ibid. p.

11)

thus, man’s true relation to the Other which

brings him into contact with reality. Lis

I

-It relation,

on the other hand, drives man into bare unreality. On the

basis of this fundamental belief, Buber holds that it
folfwa that the

I -Thou

relation is good, while the I-It

relation, that is, alienation from the Thou, is evil.

Complete alienation from the Thou, however - as was
stated above - is never possible. By virtue of the presence

of the Eternal

‘Thou

’we are not given up to alienation

from the world and the loss of reality by the
tion by the ghostly,’

world of

I -Thou

(Ibid, p.

I

- to

domina

100) Without this unbroken

there would be no assurance for man that

his relation would not fall into complete dualism o^ I-It;
there would be no guarantee of Lie being able to transform

any I-It Into I-Thou, and of evil's becoming radically
real and absolute,

(Fried p. 73)

-9jHhe

World of It is not an Unqualified Evil

Although, in general, alienation from the Thou is
evil, it would be incorrect to say that the I-It
relation
is con :letely bad, for the world of It — though
detrimental

when dominating the life of dialogue

- is

absolutely

necessary for man to live and survive. For example, man's
drive to possess things Insofar as it Is directed at things

which we need for survival is necessary; consequently it
is not bad.

Impulses in themselves are not evil. Only

when man lets loose his drives instead of controlling
(not suppressing) them, if he does not give them the proper

direction by the

I

-Thou , do they become It In the evil sense.

Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their
natural and proper effect so long as they are linked
with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation.
There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been
separated from the being. (ITU p. 48)
Thus, on account of man's limitation - he needs the

world of It for his survival - the I-It is unavoidable.
It is therefore not existence, but predominance of the I-It

over the I-Thou that is the source of evil. 'Without it,'
says Buber,

man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not
a man. (Ibid, p.
The more man, humanity, is mastered
by individuality, the deeper does the I sink into unreality (Ibid, p, 65 )..*Z-°e7 *11 real living ie meeting. (Ibid, p, 11)

Thus, although it is man's fate that he can never completely

dispense with the world of It, he must constantly strive

)
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for the subordination of the I-It to the
Hiylnp,

^

ee

I -Thou

n
and Meetl
Reou lres Personal
Single One, Making the Other Present,
Inclusion of the Other, Experien cing: the Other Side.
Mutual Confirmation . Direction and Responsibility

A.1.1

^

iol n ss
P -

y
go tal

-

J‘

tip*,

Si

.«

1

*

,

As against the exclusive life of I-It,

there is the

self-giving love of genuine relation, there is the going
out in order to meet the Thou. This entering into

I -Thou

relationship, however, must not be equated with emotions

or feelings which remain within the

I.

It is

l[also7 not a matter of intimacy at all; this
appears when it must, and if it is lacking, that’s
all there is to it. (FU pp. 144-145)

Rather, true relation is love that is between the
the Thou.

’That,’

I

and

says Buber,

is no metaphor, but the actual truth. Love does not
cling to the I in such a way as to have the Thou
only for its "^content," its object; but love is
between I. and rhou . ( ITh pp. 14-15)

’Feelings ,/only/ dwell in man; but man dwells in love.'
(loc. clt.

Love is 'blind,' and thus not real love or

relation,

'so long as It does not see a whole being.'

(Ibid. p.

16)

The Eros of dialogue has the ’simplicity of

fulness,’ in it the lover turns to the other human being
’in bis otherness, his independence, his self-reality.'

The ’erotic man' of monologue, on the other hand, is con-

cerned only with himself. He does not comprehend the be-

loved in his wholeness

,

but only mirrors himself in the

- 11 -

other, and enjoys big own feelings.

There a lover stamps around and is in love
only with
a8Sl
Th6re ° Iie ls vearln P
dif
ferentiated
rlli
?
??i*
feelings
like medal-ribbons. There one is enloyin*
ti e aaven tures of his own
fascinating effect. There
one is gazing enraptured at the spectacle
of hie own
supposed surrender. There one is collecting
excitement.
There one is displaying his "power. " There
one is
preening himself with borrower vitality. There one
is delighting to exist simultaneously as
himself and
as an idol very unlike himself. There one is
warning
himself at the blaze of what has fallen to his lot.
There one is experimenting. And so on and on - (
BM*
pp. 29-30)
The true lover, however,

turns to the beloved with 'all the

power of intention' of his heart. He does not assimilate
the other to his soul, but faithfully vows him to himself.

The essence of true love, of genuine relation, is
thus,

'experiencing the other side,'

(Ibid. p. 96) in

its wholeness. It ls complete inclusiveness of the other

person in his particularity, in his actual being.
Only an inclusive Lros is love. Inclueiveness is
the complete realization of... the "partner," not
by the fancy but by the actuality of being. (Ibid. p. 97)

Inclusiveness, however, must not be identified with 'empathy,'
for the latter entails the 'exclusion of one's concreteness,

the extinguishing of the actual situation of life,

the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which

one participates .

'

True inclusiveness, on the other hand,

has nothing to do with ‘transposing* oneself into the other
one or with suppressing one's Self, but It means the

- 12 -

extons ion of one’s own concreteness, the fulfilment
the ac tiial situation of life, the complete presence
of ,he reality In which one participates,
(loc, cit.)

ol

It means a relation between two persons,

perienced by them in common;
ting persons,

’an event ex-

it means that the participa-

'

’without forfeiting anything of the felt

reality of ^their7 activity, at the same time live

through the common event from the standpoint of the other.’
(loc. cit.)

A relationship that is not inclusive is not a true

dialogical relationship.

Only

a relation between persons that is characterized
in a more or less degree by the element of inclusion
may be termed a dialogical relation, (loc. cit.)

The stronger and the more mutual this common experience
is, the truer is the dialogical relation.

In true relation,

thus, it is not enough to include the other one in his

otherness, but to bring the totality of one’s authentic
being to the meeting too.

In order to make this possible,

man has to become a Single One,

a

true person; he must

not suppress his Self.

Man can have dealings with the /JFho'g/ only as a
Single One, as a man who has become a Single One.
(Ibid. p.

A

l

*3)

man of the ’crowd,’ a Mas semens ch . cannot

ent< r

into a

dialogical relation.
One can do this only as a Single One, through having
become a r arson with th complete and independent
t
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responsibillty of singleness. (Ibid.
p. 173)
Only the man who has become a Single One.
a self
1
3011
able t0 have a complete relation
t;/,!?
h?- to the
0
nlfl life
other self... It is true that
the child says Thou before it learns to
say
but on the height of personal existence one I
must be
trui.y able to say I in order to know
the mystery
01 the 'Thou in its whole truth. (Ibid.
p. 175)
’

.

•

hot before man can say 1 in perfect reality
... can
he in perfect reality say Thou. (Ibid.
p.

Only if authentic personalities enter

1

43)

to relationship

with one another can the dialogue in turn be authentic.
Once man has achieved personal wholeness,

’personal

unity, unity of being, unity of love, unity of action

unity of being, lixe and action together'

-

-

which, however,

'does not mean a static unity of the uniform, but the

great dynamic unity of the multiform in which multiformity
is formed into unity of character*

(Ibid, p,

116

)

-

man

is ready to enter into dialogical relationships with

others. For, by virtue of his wholeness and authenticity
the Single One will experience his uniqueness, his vocation,

and his direction as given to him by dad. (This awareness
of his unique way to God is neither conscious nor sub-

conscious but la at the very center of ourself as
the end It is a mystery,

I;

in

(cf. Fried p* 96 ))

This awareness of direction is absolutely necessary

along with man's wholeness, since only the actual union
of 'direction* ana personal unity will enable man to

achieve ccmple te authenticity and wholeness. True and complete wholeness of man is not exhausted by the ’totality

-

-14-

whlch comprises and Integra tee all hie capacities,
powers,
quail ties , and urges' (Ilv p, 175) - Buber calls
it Spirit

neither Is the mere awareness of ’direction' sufficient
for man’s perfect authenticity. But man’s full
realisation

depends upon hie entering into relationship with the Other,
that is, upon his actual living according to the God-given

direction with the united powers of his being.
l‘hio

state of man as a united being working into the

direction, Buber calls ‘responsibility.’ It is the essence
of man’s life, and without it man is not a man.

Being truly responsible means that man is ready to

respond to everything that addresses him, to every

ultimately God-given

-

-

’sign,' with bis whole being, that

he embraces it fully by making it completely present to
him, in its full reality, uniqueness, and otherness. It

means that man affirms his Thou in the middle of ’simple,
unexalted, unselected reality,'

(PU p,

135

)

that he accepts

what he meets as It is, with courage, net shunning any
problematic, danger, etc., that is connected with it. It

means that he answers from the depths of his sou] to the

mystery of the ether.
The monolog! cal man, in opposition to the dialogical

and truly responsible man, is not aware of the 'otherness*
of the other, but he attempts to incorporate the other into himself. This attitude of the non-dialoglcal man Buber

calls

’

RUckbiegung,

’

reflexion. It is a bending back on

oneself and not a 'turning away as oprosed to turning

-15-

towards.'

’Reflexion* le also different from egoism or

egotism. But it means man's withdrawal from the acceptance
of the other one In his particularity and otherness,
his

inability and unwillingness to see more in the other one
than those parts which correspond to himself.
It is not that a man is concerned with himself,
considers himself, fingers himself, enj ova, idolizes and bemoans himself; all that can be added,
but it is n t integral to reflexion. . . I terra it
reflexion when a man withdraws from accepting with
his essential being another person in his particularity - a particularity which Is by no means to b
circumscribed by the circle of his own self, and
though it substantially touches and moves his soul
is In no way immanent in it - and lets the other
exist only as his. own experience, only as a
’’part of ray self.”
(BtfK pp. 23-24)
As a result of this reflexion, dialogue becomes a fiction.

The mysterious intercourse between man and man becomes a

game, and through the re lection of real life ’the essence
of all re? lity begins to disintegrate.'
From this

it.

(loe, cit.)

follows that if the non-dialogical man

were to strive for being able to enter into true relation,
it would not be his self that would have to be given up,

but that false self—asserting instinct that makes
a man flee to the possessing of things before the
icr has
unreliable, perilous world of relati n
neither density nor duration and cann t he surveyed. (ITh p, 76)
He has to exchange this self-will for genuine responsibility.

For the truly dialogical response of man, unlike the conditional reflex of the self willed man, comes from the whole
of hie being, and it embraces the Thou in its totality, in

.

,

- 16 -

ita unreduced otherness.
'

or t’rmt reaeon it was said earlier that
the I-Thou

relation is not subject to causality and fate.
This does
not mean, though, that the dialogical man acts
without
external influences, but it means that his response
to

what he meets in the world is a free response with
his
whole oeing

to

the Other in its uniqueness. The dialogical

man is free from any psychological and social conditioning
which always entails a limitation of man's actions

-

-

he is

ire© to react with the whole of his being to each concrete

and new situation and is able to see in it

the new and

unique. Freedom and dependence merge here. In true relation, says Buber

,

you feel 'yourself to be simply dependent.,

and simply free. The unfree man, the monological man in the
state of reflexion, on the other hand, sees in what he

meets only the resemblances to himself and other things
and persons he already knows. His actions are determined

and defined by public opinion, social statue or psycho-

logical conflicts. He cannot respond openly and freely
but merely reacts to what he considers repetitions of

former experiences, ana to what he sees in terms of its

usefulness
Not only does the life of dialogue entail freedom but

also self-confirmation, which in turn leads to greater

authenticity and ever truer relation. Since every man,

according to Buber's anthropology, needs self-confirmation,
man - when he is not confirmed by others in hie innermost

e

'
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essence - has to resort to appearance.
He will try to be
«hat others want him to be in order
to receive confirmation.
By doing so. however, he has
to deny his authenticity consequently he is unable to enter into
true dialogue
since this requires wholeness and
authenticity of one’s
self.

DlffeAt

is

this, when men enter into relation
with

one another. For, since true relation means
the making
fully present of the other one in his
uniqueness and

wholeness there is no longer any need for denying
one's
self-hood in the aim of being confirmed, since
<

one is

confirmed in one's very essence.
Not always, of course, are we confirmed in our
essence.
And it is especially then when we have to have the
courage
to retain our authenticity, even If the price we have
to

pay

i

or it is high, ior only as a Single One, as a real

self, can we truly meet the Other. And 'all real living is

meeting,

World

Life of Dialogue has to Include God

,

fan, ano th

The dialogical life of man - if it is to be authentic

must be triadic

-

it must include God,

the Self, and God's

creation, i.e. men and the world. True relation is

essentlall y triadic. The responsibility of the Single One
thus, must not be directed exclusively either towards God

or Kan, but it has to include both.
Although God Is the Primal Source of all creation, to

-

r

.
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Uhom everything must be directed and
returned, and although
it is only through grace and with
His help that man
can be redeemed, God wants man to come
to Him
by way of

entering into relation with His creation.
It Is there that
He will address us and where we can
respond to Him and
enter Into relation with Him. Man, if he wants
to meet

and reach God has to hallow also His ci'eation
from the
depths of his soul.

Consequently the I- Thou relation among men, and of

man to the world, ie essential and not unessential
or
coincidental, or simply a means to some further end

which is thrown away once the end is obtained. It has
i nt

in sic v a 1 ue

Real relationship to God cannot be achieved on
earth if real relationships to the world and to
mankind are 'lacking* •* both love of the Creator and
love of that which He has created are finally
one and the same. (AT p. 33) hie man who loves
God also loves him whom uod loves. (I old. p. 37)

Man’s dialogues with God and his fellow-men cannot really
be separated from one another. For God is the

ternal Thou

in whom

the extended lines of relation meet. . Avery particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal
Thou. Gy means of every particular Thou the
primary word addresses the eternal Thou (ITh p. 75)
.

Life, says Huber, cannot be divided between a real relation

with God and an unreal relation to the world.
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“

oth tr ,ly pra y to aod and profit
by
the mrlf
world, ]j
he who !knows the world as
somethin by
to'
» ** al
‘he slmo
‘lb id!

W

£

- ^

Man’s relation to aod can be authentic
and ’raised to
constancy' only if he embodies in it ’the
whole stuff
ox life,,. if he realizes God anew
in the world according
to his strength and to the measure of
each day.’

(Ibid, p

1

14

)

ii.e

relationship between God and man is

one-to-

one relationship and an all-inclusive relationship
at
ul

e

e

j.

'o.

In the relation with God are unconditi n-

ec exclusiveness and unconditioned inclusiveness
one and

the sare.’

(Ibid. p. 7°) While entering in an I-Thou

relationship with a particular human being with His
whole being, Goc at the same time leaves room for, even
demands, an authentic relation of this man to his fellowmen. For him 'who enters on the absolute relation. . .every

thing is gathered up In the relation.'

(loc. cit.

)

For to step into pure relation /with God/ is not
to disregard everything but to see everything in
the Thoy not to renounce the world but" to establish
it on its true basis. To look away from the world,
or to stare at it, does not help a man to reach God;
but he who sees the world in Him stands in His presence. "Here world, there God" is the language of
It
"God in the world" is another language of It;
but to eliminate or leave behind nothing at all,
to include the whole world in the Thou
to give the
world its due and its truth, to include nothing
beside God but everythin/ in him - this is full and
complete relation. ./Ken7 do not find Him if they
leave the world. /Only/ he who goes out with his
whole being to meet his Thou and carries to it all
,

;

.

.
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bej.ng that la in the world, finds
Him who cannot
be sought. (Ibid. pp. 76-79)

flan

cannot have a more direct relation si ip to

God than the one via His creation. It would be
’foolish
and hopeless

,

writes Buber, for man to turn aside from

the course of life in order to seek a od.

’For there is

nothing in which Be could not be found.’ Even if a man
’won all the wisdom of solitude and all the power of

concentrated being he would ^atlll/

111135

God.’

(ibid. p. So

fhe real God lets no shorter line reach him than
each man’s longest, which is the line embracing
the world that is accessible to this man. For he,
the real God, is the creator*, and all beings stand
before him in relation to one another in his creation,
becoming useful in living with one another for his
creative purpose. To teach an acosmic relation to
God is not to know the creator. (BKk p. 52 )

The Single One, thus, must not hold himself aloof

from the crowd, rather, he is to spend his life in the
’body politic,’ for the ’body politic’ is the - at least

potential - ’reservoir of otherness.’ He has to do the

paradoxical work of making the ’crowd no longer a crowd.’
(Ibid. p. 65) Hie Single One, writes Friedman on -Buber,
is thus the truly responsible man who hears

’the unreduced

claim of each particular hour in all its crudeness and

disharmony and answer/s7 it out of the depths of ZFle7
being. This responsibility does not exclude a man from

membership in a group or community, but it means that
true membership in a community Includes a boundary to mem-

,
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beranip so that no group or person can
hinder one's perception of what is spoken or one's answer
from the ground of
one's being.
(Fried pp, 93-94)
'

similarly, as man’s relation to God is not
authentic
if relation to mankind and the world is
lacking, so is a

true dialogue with human beings and the world
possible

only if the respective human beings, at tie same
time,

have an

I -Thou

relationship with God.

Solitude, to be sure, is necessary now and then for
it 'frees oneself from the intercourse of experiencing
or

using' thus preparing man for the supreme relation.
But if solitude means absence of relation, if solitude
is the stronghold of Isolation, where a man conducts
a dialogue with himself - not in order to test and
master himself for that which awaits him but in
the enjoyment of the conformation of his soul then we have the real fall of the spirit Into
spirituality. The man can advance to the last
abyss, where in his self-delusion he imagines he
has God in himself and is speaking with him. But
truly though God surrounds us and dwells in us, we
never have him in us. (ITh p* 104)

It is only in the simultaneous meeting of God, man,

and the world that man can truly realize himself, meet God,
and realize Him in this world

.

Only by walking on the

'narrow ridge' of true responsibility does he encounter

r ea 1 1 ty and tru t h

PART TWO

a
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Ever since the appearance of

and Thou Buber has

X

been a very productive writer, and he h-s shown
an ex-

tended range of interests in different fields of
ledge*

w-

However, his later writings sustain an intimate

connection to his

and Thou ,

Buber has shown in them

the validity of the I-Thou for various fields; he has

explored the implications of his I-Thcu ohiloaophy for
ethics, reli&i n, education, community, sociology, psychology, oit, epistemology, ontology, and politic' 1 theory*

The I-Thou is an integral part of
Buber

hi;

11 of Buber philosophy*

self, mentions Frisdman, states in Halo, leches

Leben that the purpose of

r

.1

the essays anc talks in the

volume, written between 1922 and 19^1, is to show
that has been forgotten,

a

reality

a

rerlity

of which I am today, as in the beginning of this
work, certain that it is essential for the existence
. ...
in mi
of man* nighty in
’I and Thou* stands at the head while all the other-B
stand in an illustrative and supplementary relation
to it. (quoted by Fried p. 161)
i

Buoei

,

how vex, is no systematic thinker.

no inclination to system, tising’, Buber
1

a letter

to

.

Friedman*

(loc. clt*

spread out over a vast amount of

reader's task to search for
them together to

s

th

)

£

hrve

*1

in

id h-jnsnli

His t. series vi t

rltings

id is

ano.

ti

fragments am. then to fit

wuole.

It will be my aim in this second part of the thesis

to undertake this task with respect to Buccr

i

etnics

?.i>.
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religlon, social philosophy, epistemology,

one

ontology.

snail attempt to elaborate Buber’s
viev/8 and to Bhow
hov: he integrated the above
mentioned four disciplines
into h s philosophy of the I-l’hcu.
1

ETHICS and RELIGION
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An account of Buber' a ethical
and religious doctrine

can be documented more
thoroughly than any other field
of
knowledge Buber has dealt with,
such as epistemology. For,
more than with any other subject
has Buber dealt with the

nature and redemption of evil. This
is so, because for Buber
tne problem of evil is the central
problem of human existence.
In the eno,

the total attitude shown in

atari's

life is an ex-

pression of his concept of good and evil.
It underlies all
evaluations, which in turn, are the central
part of all
fields of human thought, of all of man’s
decisions. It is

decisive for man’s life after death. Tims,
although the
problem of evil may be most relevant to, and seen
most
clearly In ethics (as defined traditionally), for
Buber it
bears great importance in all other fields of
human enterprise, such as philosophical anthropology, psychology,

social philosophy , ano even politics. It receives concrete

application in all fields of life and is no longer, as it
was traditionally, restricted to ethics, metaphysics, and

theology .

bthics ,

1

thus, if it is to remain the label for

the problem of good and evil, has to become a broader

term,

including all of man’s life, since in the end, man’s concept
of good

arid

evil underlies all his evaluations and decisions.

Just as the concept of evil and ethics was widened
by Buber so to pertain to man’s total life, so does he con-

ceive of Religion as embracing man’s whole life. Consequently,
a close inter-relationship and Inseparableness between re-

ligion and ethics and tie problem of evil

-

defined in its
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broadest cense, as above

mg

- Is

necessitated. Religion, accord

to Huber, although not dealing
directly with the dis-

tinction between good and evil, is intimately
connected
with it, since religion, that is, the
binding

to Gk>d, is

possible only via the world, that is, it is dependent
upon
the good or bad life in this world. Only a
good secular
life allows for genuine religion. The redemption of
evil,
thus, - leading to a more complete relation with
Gnd, to a

better religion - is as much a problem of ethics as of religion.
It is this view of religion and ethics as embracing
the whole of man’s life and as being inseparable which
,

accounts for Buber 'e emphasis, in ail bis writings, on the
concept of religion and ethics.

According to these basic views of Buber

I

shall divide

the present chapter into three main parts. The first one
1

Intend to devote to an exposition of the nature and the

problem of evil as viewed by 3uber; In the second one

I

shall deal with Buber’s conception of the inseparableness
of religion from ethics - defined as being the basis of all

of man’s life; finally

I

shall give an account of the way

which Buber suggests for the overcoming ana redemption of
evil.

I.

Thg, Probler;

and Nature of gyji

Buber’s concept of evil

-

like the rest of his phil-

osophy - cannot be labelled with
traditional terms. Waging on the ’narrow ridge,* Buber
overcomes and yet retains
traditional and opposing views on the nature
of evil.

Ifoil in.

I

teal but

Redeemable

There are, on the whole, two major doctrines of
evil:
the first, reducing evil to an illusion, or to
objective

error of the mechanistic universe run by a first and impersonal cause, the second one, absolutizing evil as something

radical, pure, and unredeemable.

The first view sees good

and evil as part of a higher unity, the second one looks
at them as independent realities irreconcilably opposing

one another.

Especially in our modern age - where

roan,

as

pictured drastically by many existentialist writers, experiences a gnawing loneliness before

a

hostile universe and

men with whom he only associates but whom he does not meet,
where powers gained by scientific techniques seem to escape
man’s cability to integrate them into his life, where the

most cruel wars are waged and where human life is degraded
in a totalitarian system - man seems to be confronted with
evil in a more intense way than ever before, the belief in
the reality of evil is forced upon him, and consequently the
two opposing views of evil, as pictured above, are driven to

extremes.

Evil cannot be regarded any longer as illusion,
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rather, in order to escape the responsibilities
of evil,
Kan flees into a morgana more complete
determinism.
The

second view of evil, which conceives of evil
as an absolute
reality, either, if belief in God is retained,
falls into an

even more accentuated dualism between good and
evil so to be
able to maintain the Idea of God as being absolutely
good,

or it may lead to an atheistic existentialism like Sartre’s,

Nietzsche

’

a

,

and Heidegger s, which assigns the creation of
’

reality to man himself, here the absolutlzation of evil
is at xts peak,

Evil,

Sartre says,

’can in no way be turned,

brought back, reduced., and incorporated into idealistic
humanism, . .Evil. , .like Good

U^f

absolu te .

. .

In spite of

ourselves, we came to tils conclusion, which, will be shocking
to lofty souls: Evil cannot be redeemed.’

(Fried p. 14)

Buber’s concept of evil is different from the two views

indicated above. Its standpoint is in between, including
a dialectical view of good ana evil which sees evil as both

real and rec e enable

.

therefore not as something absolute,

or as an illusion, or an objective error. Good, writes

Friedman on Buber,

’cannot exist in solitary splendor,

nor is it opposed by a radically separate evil with which
it has nothing to do. Evil must exist in this middle position, but it is bound up with the good in such a way that

both are parts of a larger process, of a greater whole,

which is at once origin and goal. Thus evil is in one way
or another recognized as having reality, even if only that
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a temporary accompaniment
of unredeemed creation;
but
its reality is never permanent,
nor is it ever completely

divorced from the good. Hence it
is capable of redemption
by the process of the world
spirit, the grace of Ood, or
the redemptive activity of man.’
(Fried p. 14)

Mil

putuall^ dependent Upon Each

v.

u.er

Ihe redemption of evil, Buber feels,
is made

possible because evil - although it has
’emotional and
ontological reality’ (loc. cit.) - is not an
absolute

reality apart

rom the good. Rather, evil stands in dialec-

tical relation with the good.

‘Good and evil,’ writes Buber,

'despair and hope, the power of destruction and
the power

of rebirth, dwell side by side.’
root

(EG p. 21

)

and evil are intimately bound together, requir-

ing one another for their existence. Since evil for Buber
is lack of direction, and good the finding of direction,
jthe

one direction, the mutual dependence of good and evil

can readily be seen. For direction without something that
can be given direction is valueless, possibilities and forces,

on the other hand, that do not receive guidance are futile.
Moreover, the Thou, in order to be fully realized, has to

have another Thou with which it can enter into relation.
But it can only do so, if there ie an It (evil) which can

be permeated and transformed into a Thou.
Good and evil are thus 'strangely concerned with one

another,’

(EKK p.78) and therefore
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cannot be a pair of opposites like
right and left
or above and beneath. ^Good" is
the movement in the
irectlon of home, evil is the aimless
whirl of
numan potentialities without which
nothing can be
achieved and by which, if they take no
direction
but remain trapped in themselves,
everything
'° °
*
6 roes
awry. (Fried p. 103 from BMM
p. 78
;

Good and evil must not be thought of as
’two poles, two
opposite directions,
.as belonging to the same kind of
being, as the same in nature, but the antithesis
of one

another .

1

This ray appear to be so only if good and evil

are treated as ethical abstractions. In the actual
context

of life, however, where good and evil are 'existent
states
of human reality .. .the fundamental dissimilarity between
the
two in nature, structure and dynamics' is disclosed. (I3E
pp.

62-63) 'Good and evil could not be connected the way they

are if evil were a completely independent reality. The good

needs evil for Its development.
Buber,

’Good,’

says Friedman for

'can be maximized not through the rejection or con-

quest of evil but only through the transformation of evil,
the use of its energy and passion in the service of good.'

(Fried p. 15) Evil is not avoided or destroyed by the good;
'

the divine force, /the source of all good/ which man actually

encounters in life does not hover above the demonic, but

penetrates it.'

(EG p. 21)

Evil is Truly Encountered Only

.

1th in Oneself

Successful ’attack’ on evil, feels Buber, is possible
only if man knows about its nature and causes. The encounter
with evil, from which the necessary knowledge can be gained,

7

)
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however, la not possible as long
as a man remains a
stranger to himself. For, not from
what man encounters out
aide himself oan he attain the
knowledge of evil, but only
from his own inner experience.
••rtairiiy gain no experience of evil
when I meet
1 ^fow-men. For in
that case I can grasp it onlv
1
0”
hout
or with hatred and contempt,
iJT
?iJ case» ffltrangedly
in which
it really does not enter my vision:
or
else, I overcome it with my love ana in
that cas 4 I
have no vision of It either. I experience
it when I
meet, myself, a i thin me, where no element
of strangeness has divisive force and no love haa
redeeming
xorce, there do 1 directly experience that
something
whicn would force me to betray God and which
seeks to
use for t iat purpose the powers of my own soul.
(FSh
P* 57
I

Only when man comprehends the inner condition in
which
he is evil and knows what the condition was which now
is

lost and was considered ’good* formerly, does he attain
access to knowledge about evil. In the world apart from man,
i.e. in the world of ethical abstraction, evil exists only
in the form of quite general opposites.

This, however, as

pointed out above, is not the true nature of evil. It is by
Introspection only, that evil can be perceived in its true
nature,

that it can be encountered and afterwards made

demonstrable in the world. *A man,' writes tuber,
knows factually what

''evil**

is insofar as he knows about

himself, everything else to which he gives

mirrored illusion.'

'only

title

name is merely

(IGl p. 33 )

The encounter v/ith evil through introspection is really

first an address by an inner voice called
tells man in an unmistakable

'

conscience,

’

which

way when he is doing wrong, and

)
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alBo lets hln know what it is that
-takes him evil. By
*
’conscience’ Buber understands ‘that
court within the soul
which concerns itself with the
distinction between the
rl Sht and the wrong in that which
has been done and proceeds against that which has been
determined as wrong.'

(EG

Pr

)

It is the individual’s awareness
of what he is "in

truth," of what, in his unique and non-repeatable
created

existence, he is intended to be.’

(Ibid. pp. 95 - 96 ) It is

the voice that tells man where to go when
he 'confronts
the demo lie fullness of the possible conduct
and actions

given to the Individual in this moment.’ (Ibid.
p. 96)
Conscience, however, is not a 'book of rules which
can be looked up to discover what is to be done now,
in this

very hour,’ it is not
the routine conscience, which is to be used, is
being used and worn cut, the play-on-the-surfaee
conscience
,/but/ it is the unknown conscience in
the ;round of being which needs to be discovered
ever anew* , .in the single composure of every genuine
decision. The certainty produced by this consciousness is of course only a personal certainty; it is
uncertain certainty; but what is here called person
is the very person who is addressed and who answers.
(BMM pp. 60-69

Although this voice calling man to be what he has been
created for occurs *in the most varied strengths and degrees...
and for the most part is stifled,’ it is to some extent
'inherent in all men.'

(EG p. 95}

From this 'fundamental awareness* of one's vocation
(

Bestlmn-un

-,

) .

especially

t

,
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wh6n It is fully present, the
comparison between
one actually is and what one
is .intended to hr.
c r. emerge. What is
found is measured against the
C 1 e<3 1 oal la,a 6«. nor anything
,
lrnaglned
rtnld by
br°™S"
man, t
butt an ?
linage arising out of the
Eye ter y of being itself that we call
person.' (Ibid. p. 96 )
•

Wien this comparison coincides with a
discrepancy between the image of what one is called
to be and what

one

really is, the feeling of guilt arises.
ell one who knows himself
. .as
called to a work
f
which
has not beer, done, each one who has not ful_ Iliad a task which he knows
to be his own, each
who did not remain faithful to his vocation which
he had become certain of - each such person knows
what it means to say that ''hie conscience smites
,

his. ”

(Ibid. p. 87)

Guilt, thus, comes about as a consequence of one’s not

being true to one’s vocation, of one’s not taking the

direction indicated by his consciousness, a direction which
is always a direction towards God via the human and

natural thou. Guilt arisee when man avoids relation and

dialogue
If we are to discover the nature of evil in more de-

tail, then, Buber feels, we must not consult psychology

which tries to reduce conscience to a moral censorship
of society and explains evil in terms of ’inhibitions
'repressions,

1

‘

and

etc. Real encounter with evil ’is generically

different from what is called self-analysis In modern psychology. The latter... is concerned to penetrate "behind

11

that which Is remembered, to "reduce" it to the real elements

assumed to have been "repressed."’ The former, on the other

s
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hand,

Is to call to nind an occurrence as
reliably,

concretely

and.

completely remembered as possible, which

is entirely unreduced and undissected
rteal

.
*

(IGE pp. 64-65)

knowledge about the intrinsic structure of evil
is,

uhus, not gained by the psychologist who, in
trying to re-

main ’’objective'' undertakes ‘a specific division of
consciousness,' but it can be gained only with the 'unbroken

wholeness of events’ upon which only later on, after having
gained the indispensable distance necessary for objective
knowledge, he reflects, thus going beyond the 'psychological differentiations' accompanying the state of evil, to

evil as an ontological reality, (BKM pp.

Inte rpre t& tion o
standing of Evil

hy tb.

—

a

~

124-125)

ource for the ^ee oer

Unc er—

If the deeper meaning of evil as an ontological

reality,

’which transcends the anthropological' meaning, Is

to be grasped,

Buber feels, man must make use of the truth

found in the myths of the origin of evil, for in them 'the
experience- which has taken place (not "been gained") in

factual encounters with evil in the world and the soul is

directly embodied, . .without making the cetoui through conceptual or semi conceptual determinations.'

(HE

pp. 57 - 58

)

Cnly in form of myths can the meaning of evil be communicatee. to

the generality of mankind,

(Ibid, p,

12)

The precondition necessary for a right Interpretation

of these myths leading to an understanding of 'the human

constitution and pjovement of evil' is the accord of man's
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belief In evil, as gained from his
own encounter with it
to * rj0 recount of the myths.
(Ibid.
p. 58-51}

»e are competent to
interpret the myths of the
origin of evil only by virtue of our
personal exb t
onl y
it
the character
^ of the
of truth# Only out
conjunction of these two
primordial mythic intuition and directly
experienced
1 e^-xty
does the 11. ;ht of the legitimate concent
8
t00> probabi ^ the
obscure
of all °(lbid p^go!
,

Although this anthropological exposition of the
myths is
only an aid for man to understand them, 'its
construction
is indispensable.

(Ibid. p.

Sail

.

an/ needs the /conceptual/ bridge.'

12)

.P.l

in

linger:

hoc* rl ^nleasnero.

:

.

.iron

-

Lecj- ion

Buber sees evil emerging In two fundamentally different stages. In the first, which he finds typified in the

Biblical stories of Maza and Eve, and Cain, evil is decisionlessness, directionlessnesa

.

Adam and Eve and Cain, holds

Buber, did not decide between good and evil, but rather

indulged in the imagination of possibilities of action;
afterwards, almost without knowing it, they acted out one
of these imaginations.

Iheir action was, however, not the

result of a firm decision but was triggered off because of
an intensified indecision.

'In the vortex of indecision,...

at the point of greatest provocation and least resistance*
they acted. It was not baseness of the soul that caused
the sinfulness of Adam,

Eve, and Cain, but

s

-37the intervention... of the evil "imagery"
. . . The
wiG^eaness is derived from its, the imagery
wlc redness. . .Imagery is rlay with
possibility
as self-temptation, from which ever
and
again violence spring;s. , * This imagery of
the
possible, and in its nature, are called evil.
’

I

(Ibid. p. 36)

Imagery in Itself is not bad. It is good and
evil,

man's 'greatest danger and greatest opportunity at
once.'
(Ibid, p, 39) It Is the seat of man's urges and
passions

'without which he can neither beget nor bring forth, but

which lei

t

astray.’

(ibid. p. 42) It is thus directionle ssness of

to itself remains without direction and leads

possibility that causes man to be evil. In his confusion
and indecision,

'in the swirling, space of images... he

grasps at them like a wanton burglar, not with decision,
but only in order to overcome the tension of omnipossibility.'
(Ibid. p. 37) Every human being, Buber holds, becomes time

and again - usually in a period of evolution like puberty

-

aware of infinite possibility, in which the 'substantial
threatens to be submerged in the potential.' In this
‘swirling chaos of possibilities of action,’ in this 'dizzy
whirl,'

the soul cannot be fixed,

'it strives to escape.’

(Ibid. p. 67) inis escape can take on two

for..:s:

One is repeatedly offered it: it can clutch at any
object, past which the vortex happens to carry it;
or else, in response to a prompting that is still
incomprehensible to itself, it can set about the
audacious work of self-unification. In the former
case, it exchanges an undirected possibility for an
undirected reality, in which it does what it wills
not to do. what is preposterous to it, the alien,
the 'evil'; In the latter, if the work meets with

,
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in°?avor
of direction,

W.

Un lpecte<1 P lenltu

(ml ffg

?,
° C

^

type of evil involved in these
Biblical myths of
Adam and Eve and Gain is, thus,
lack of direction, unSulded and unbridled possibility and
'that which is done
out o it,..: grasping, seizing, devouring,
compelling,
.tie

seducing, exploiting, humiliating,
torturing and destroying of what offers itself.' (Ibid.
p. 71 ) This kind of
evil is not the result of decision or action,
it is the

reflection upon it, a playing with its possible
actualization.
Its execution is only an unessential part
in it. For the

final decision to the evil act is no real decision,
it is

only a pseudo-decision. A real decision is a decision

with one's whole being. But the decision resulting from
the

unbearablllty of the swirling chaos of possibility is a
mere flight, it is not made with one's whole being, and

therefore, is a pseudo-decision. It Involves only acts,
no real choices.
In the second stage,

typified by the Biblical stories

of the Tower of Babel and the fall of Lucifer, and the

Iranian myth of Tima, evil is no longer dccisionlessnees
but it Is wrong decision, it is a decision of self-

sufficiency against God.

'It is the existential lie in which

man sees himself as self-creator.'

(Fried p, 107)

According to the Iranian myth (which Buber chooses to
deal with In detail), lima

,

the primeval king, assumed dom-

ination ever the world at the order of Ahura Fazdah, the

,

.
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ect god. Alroafiy, previously,
had he entreated the God
head to make him immortal and to
attain power over the demons. Everything was granted to
him. rut lima 'a hubris
and self-adoration found no end;
finally, after an enorous
flood, he claimed
"i.-

that what was only vouchsafed to him
he had done
himself; he ^saw/^ himself as self-creator
through himself immortal and immortalizing,
/saw7
it as sell -established self -grandeur
that he held
sv/ay over the demons; he now
li ve/d7 and act/ed7
according to this viewpoint; he thus comit/ ted/
the inner untruth against dod and
himself v mere
exactly: ne comm lifted/ with his existence
the lie
against being. (ILG pp. 53-54)
The people of Babel , and Lucifer - who imagined
themselves

god-like - committed the same existential lie against
being.
The evil involved In these myths is different from

decislonlessness . here, evil results from an actual decision
to evil

Only in this second state does evil assume sub-

»

stance, it becomes 'obsessive and demonic.'

2M

Writ!

u

-a

of

j

art-in

Buber

,

p.

(Will Herbert.

18) While in the first

stage man is ’slipping and falling into evil,

1

in the

second stage we ’deal with an entry or descent into evil.'
(I EC p.

60) Thus, while the evil in the first stage involves

an element of chance, accident, the evil of the second stage
results fro.

3

pure deliberation

Although there is a fundamental difference between
evil as decision and evil as indecision,

tradiction between them.
to one another.

..

'In fact,

thre

is no con-

they are supplementary

They are not supplementary to each other

-40in the manner of the two Bides of an
object, but rather

In the manner of the two stages or steps
of a process.’

(Ibic. p. 62) Repeated experiences of
indecision ’do not

remain in /ma.n a/ self-knowledge as a series
of Isolated
*

moments of non-decision,’ but they ’merge into a
course of
indecision
into a fixation In it.’ Now, this self-

knowledge ie ’"repressed” a3

long, as the

will to self-

preservation dominates that to being— able— to— affirm himself.

’

But when the will to affirm himself asserts itself,

’because /hi a/ self-knowledge no longer enables him to

affirm himself .. .man calls himself in question.’ (Ibid.
p.
75) this inner rejection by one's self knowledge

either assumes a pathological form, that ie, the
relationship of the person to himself becomes fragile
and intricate; or the person finds the way out where
he hardly expjected It, namely through an extreme
effort of unification. called ''conversion.
(Ibid,
'

p. 76)

There is yet a third alternative - It is the decisive one:

to,

says Buber,

'is

requires confirmation
and himself.

an audacity of life... he therefore
’

in hi a

’

being- t 1*- an* by offers

’Again and again the Yes must be spoken to

him, from the confidant and from the stirrings of his own

heart, to liberate him from the dread o
is a foretaste of death.'

abandonment, which

For a short while man can do with-

out being confirmed by others, but ’tie encouragement of
his fellow-men does not suffice if self-knowledge demands

inner rejection.’ If then man 'cannot readjust his self-

knowledge by his own conversion,' and does not want to fall
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in to a fragile relationship with himself, he will
displace

his self-knowledge by complete self-affirmation.

’He must

render affirmation independent of all findings and base
it,

instead of on Judgement-of-oneself

willing-oneself ,

'

,

on a sovereign

He will choose himself as he la, and

the picture of what he is intended to be is extinguished

completely, Hie ’good’ becomes what he is, the eternal order

that established good and evil is, accordingly, denied.
(Ibid. pp. 76-78)

This absolute self-affirmation, involving the domin-

ation of one’s own self-knowledge, is the worst kind of
evil, It is the evil Yima committed, the lie against Being.
Adam, too, was guilty of self-deification. But while his

aim was the becoming-like-God.
evil,' Tina aimed at the

'

*

through knowing good and

being-1 Ike-God

’

(Ibid. p. 62)

’through proclaiming oneself as the creator both of one's

existence and of the values by which that existence is
Judged.'

(Fried p* 108) The evil of the first stage is not

yet 'radical

1

evil since

whatever misdeeds are committed, their commission is
not a doing of the deed but a sliding into it. In the
second stage evil grows radical, because what man
finds in himself is willed* whoever lends to that
which, in the depths of self-awareness was time and
again recognized by him as what should be negated, the
mark of being affirmed, because it is his, gives it
the substantial character which it did not previously
possess. If we may compare the occurrence of the
first stage to an eccentric whirling movement, the
process of the freezing of flowing water may serve as
a simile to illustrate the second. (IGF pp. 80-81;
A man committing evil of the first kind is a ’sinner;’ one
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comultting evil of the second kind
is ’wicked.’ The sinner
does evil, the wicked is evil.
While the sinner may stand
before God, the wicked one will never
be Judged by Him.

This, however, does not mean that
God's way is closed to
him ' lt is the wi cked himself who has
closed the way to God,

since he has negated his own existence
which initially wag
intended to have a relation with God. Unlike
the sinner,
he does not even wish to turn. He will be
his own Judge.
(Fried p. 109; GY pp. 51
In the end,

with no answer.

,

58)

Buber concedes, evil remains a mystery

human being can answer how it is possible

that an evil will

- a

man at the radical stage of evil -

can exist when God exists.

’The abyss which is opened by

tnls question advances onto the darkness of the divine
mys-

tery even more dreadfully than the abyss opened by Job's

question .

p* 60) Yet, however great the mystery of

the nature of evil may be, Buber Insists on one thing

throughout his writings: 'It must not be attributed to a

metaphysical or ontological dualism, which sees good and
evil as substantive entities or powers. Such a dualism would,
in effect, be a ditheism, and against every ditheism Buber

repeats the words of the Lord to the prophet Isaiah: ”1 am
the first and the last, and be3lde me there is no God.'”

(Kerbor

,

op. cit., p.

18) Despite his strong emphasis on

’radical’ and 'substantive' evil in hi a later writings,

Buber holds fast to his belief In God as the ultimate source
of good and evil. Fan is not evil by nature, what is evil

-43is only the use he makes of
that nature.

Certainly, there

are men who brln s evil to the
radical stage. But this does
not mean that this evil is absolute,
independent, and unredeemable; it only means that it has
become fixed in its
opposition to God.
0od does not abridge the free will he
has given to man
and, therefore, allows him to close
himself off from Him
and to end up in non-existence. Yet God
remains open to
man’s turning, to whatever 'radical' stage
he may have

brought evil. Certainly, a turning in the state
of complete
self -a iruat-lo - especially since God has 'hardened'
>.

in

response to man's decieion against Him

-

will be extremely

difficult and can be effected only through a conversion.
’3in is not an undertaking which man can break off when

the situation becomes critical,

but- a

process started by

him, the control of which is withdrawn from him at a fixed

moment.

'

(

TTF p. 34)

Thus, Buber has remained faithful to his dialogical

principle also in his account of the nature of evil: it is
entering into relationship that makes man really

eian,

and

it is failure to enter into relation that constitutes evil

or non-existence. The problem of man and the problem of
evil seem to merge here.

ing with oneself.’
into relation,

'Primal guilt consists in remain-

(BK& p. 166) Sin is the refus.al to enter

the turning away of man from God in self-

sufficiency and self will. Since the basic principle is
that 'all real living is meeting* the primary evil is estrange-
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ment, alienation from the Thou.
It consists In the depersonalization of life through the
predominance of I-It

over

I -Thou.

In the first stage of evil, man
Is without direction,

without relation, he is unable to make
the decision to
enter Into relation with his whole being.
In

the second

state, man deliberately decides to break
off any genuine
relation, he la not only unable t, 0 make up his
mind to

respond to

'oc

,

to

take direction towards him, to enter in-

to relation with him, but he freely chooses
not to have

dialogue

God. At the stage of ’radical’ evil, man Is

witlr

not ‘disabled

’

to take direction, but he deliberately

ables himself’ from entering into an
God or the world..

I -Thou

’dis-

relation with

TI

*

&&

Inaemrablll^y, of Ethics and Religion

Buber's view of evil, since it is also
based on the
tradition-breaking dialogical principle - which
demands that
man’s relationship to God be accompanied
by his having relationships with men and the world - necessarily
implies
a change in the traditional concept of
the inter-relation-

ship of ethics and religion. Up

to

now, Buber feels, there

has prevailed a rather severe ax>lit between
ethics and religion. Ethics, to put it in a very general way,
tradition-

ally has been, and is so now, concerned with the
distinction

between good and evil, in the moral sense, in this world,
while religion is concerned with the supernatural. This
division, Buber feels, does not really exist between ethics
and religion. It is an artificial product created by man,

and detrimental in its present form.

Pseudoriligiona - A dausc of the Traditional ^pllt Between
Ethics and .tell- ion and a Thr eat to the True Life of
Bialopue

Buber holds that a major cause for the traditional and
still existing split between ethics and religion is the

existence of pseudoreligions in their various forms.
First, it Is the false dogmatism of the theologians

that often is responsible for religion's gaining indepen-

dence

froJfl

ethics. The logical anc dialectical God of

the theologians, Buber feels, is not the God who meets us
as the eternal Thou in the dialogic life. God is merely 'met'
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but not 'sought*' The dogmatism of
the theologians la
a real threat to the dialogical
life, since

the 'once for

all’

contained in it makes unnecessary the
'ever anew' of
real responses to every unique
Thou that
is said to us.

The

once for all' of dogma is a hindrance
to the genuine
meeting with God In the ’lived concrete.'
Gnosis,

s

ringing from dogmatism, is an even greater

enemy to religion. In its attempts to
’raise the veil which
Glvid.ee the revealed from the hidden and
to lead forth to
the divine mystery,

’

(Pried p. 114) and in trying to resolve

alx contradictions of existence, Gnosis stance
as a great

threat to the life in dialogue.

’It,’

says Buber,

(and he is

in particular referring to the psychology of
C.3. Jung, accor

eing to which God is a projection of the human
psyche) ’and
not atheism which annihilates God because it must reject
the

hitherto existing images of God
of the reality of faith.’

Magic

,

- is

(EG p. 136

the real antagonist
)

another fruit of dogmatism is a further
,

threat to the turning towarcis God. In magic ’one celebrates

rites without being turned to the Thou and without really

meaning its Presence,’ (Ibid.

p.

125

)

God here

’

e comes

the

source of power which is possessed and used, a mere It.

Religious symbolism and ritualism too, are a danger to
religion:

'The religious reality,'

says Buber,

of the meeting with the Beeter* • .knows no image of
Him. ..It knows only the presence of the *resent One.
Symbols of Him, whether images or ideas, always
exist first when ana insofar as the Thou becomes Be,

>

’
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ere toward i?r t+
swell
He r'^ ovec Him ee If fro,: them.

desire
ana

h n signs
sifS

I

(Ibid?

T,

oint-

^45^46)

The philosopher, although he
’rejects both the image
and the God which it symbolizes’
and instead offers the
pure io ea* of God is equally dangerous
to the dialogic
life, Ubio. p. 46) for he holds
to another form of
gnosis. Philosophy’s 'primary art of
abstraction’ (Ibid. p. 38

and conceptualization are not adequate
methods for having
relation with God. Goa cannot be represented
by an idea,

or thought of as the Eternal Thought in which
all ideas
are contained. lie ’cannot be "inferred" In
anything, in

nature, say, as its author, or in history as
its master,

or in the subject as the self that is thought in
it.’ (ITh
p*

XLe real God is a living God and thus cannot
be

conceptually comprehensible like a thin
Since ’philosophy,

‘

1

among ether things.

according to Buber, ’is grounded on

the presupposition that one sees the absolute in unlversals,
(EG p, 41} it follows that it denies, or at least neglects,
the living with the concrete and the ’ever anew’ of

dialogue.

Religion ,

1

in opposition to philosophy,

6 nuine

’means

the covenant of the absolute with the particular, with the

concrete.’

(loc.

cit.

’Genuine religious expression has

an open or a hidden personal character, for it is spoken

out of a concrete situation in which
as a person,

(lbic. p. 37

ti e

person takes part

)

And lastly, neither is God met in the mystic’s ’divine-

)

,

-48nega' with which the self is united.
Mysticism Is an

obstruction to genuine relation with God and
the world.
true g
ys ter
Con ere tone-:
i'he

the

QlLk
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Xne real God is not the
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In

''ear

but
In tb e

of the theologians

philosophers | psychologists, magicians and mystics, or of
the dogmatic ritualistic religions, but He is a
cgsterv

and Cannes

g

oe known* He can only be net.

is intensely personal,

And this encounter

taking place in the fullness of life.

Huber's religion does not allow for any security
magic

-

in dogma,

or false gnosis, but he preaches a 'holy insecurity.'

,

'Woe to the man so possessed that he thinks he possesses
loci.

{

1

Th p.

1

06

)

All we know about God is that

lie

enters

into personal relationships with us. Thus, when Buber uses

the term

Eternal Thou,' he does not mean a symbol of God

but our relationship to Him. Conversely, when Buber calls
God the 'Absolute Person

'

then he does not mean to say that

God's nature is exhausted by his personality

;

he does not

want to reduce God to a person.
It is Indeed legitimate to speak of the parson of
God within the religious relation and in its language;
but in so doing we are making no statement about the
Absolute which reduces it to the personal, v/e are
rather saying that it enters into the relationship
as the Absolute rerson whom we call 'God. One may
understand the personality of God as his act. It is,
indeed, even permissible for the believer to believe
that 'God became a person for love of him, because in
our human mode of existence the only reciprocal relation with us that exists is a personal one. (EG pp. 96-97)

'
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3od only manifests Himself In the
world as person and as
such we have to meet Him. But he
cannot be reduced to one
of these manifestations. Buber walks
on the 'narrow ridge'
oetween the mystic who claims complete
union with hod
and trie Gnostic who claims complete
knowledge about the
nature of God, but removes Him into a sphere
transcendent
to that of human relations. Buber
neither claims union
with Gog nor knowledge about him but only
relation and

knowledge of one aspect of God's nature, better,
of one

manifestation

f

God

-

God as personality. If man tries to

through theology, metaphysics, or psychology, he

reac:.

~iod

will

Come to the unfathomable .

'you deny tie life of things

..

If,

as in mysticism,

.you stand before nothing-

ness, if you hallow this life you meet the living God.'
(iTh p, 79)

'God is the being that is directly, most near-

ly, and lastingly, over against us, but may properly be

addressed, not expressed.'
to me than ry I.'

(Ibid. pp. 80-81

(Ibid. p. 79

)

'God is

the-

)

He is 'nearer

"wholly Other,"

but he is also the waolly Game, the wholly Present .. *he is
the oyp teriur. Ire^enaur .... the mystery of the self-evident.'
(loc. cit.)

Magic however,

v/ith.

its desire to use and possess

God, all forms of gnosis which attempt to do away with all

riddles and contradictions of life, as well as the acceptance

of traditional douinas and laws as 'once for all,' and

mysticism

wl th its

endeavour to achieve union with God

-

all do not meet the real God, for all prevent man from say-

)
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lnS ^tlou to God in the concrete of everyday
life. They
effect a detrimental duallnm between the
religious lifo
and the life in the world. Mysticism in
its complete noglect
0i

tLj<3

world-* the Gnosis of theology and philosophy,
and

social science with its exclusively reflective and
contemplative

attitude towards dad, and pseudorellgion in its preoccupation with false symbols,

ill

disregard any concern with

the world. Consequently, all evaluations in most
fields

human enterprise are made apart from the religious
life
supposedly the relationship with God. Morality by

o-

,

-

this is

meant the distinction of good and evil in the
moral sense,
as well as good and bad in the natural sense, la
cut off

from religion completely.
If any connection with the truly religious is retained,

then it is done so by dogmatic religions only through tra-

ditional supernatural (revealed) laws which have really
become independent from the absolute and been reduced

'to

a mere symbolic -ritual requirement which may be adequately

satisfied in the cultic sphere.' (AX

p.

15) Or else they

have ’degenerated into a human convention' (loc, cit.

which,

in turn, is adhered to slavishly rather than being considered

general guides of action, requiring an ever new interpretation in each new concrete situation in life. They have

lost their religious (dialogical) character and retained
only the normative one.

Since any genuine personal relationship to the real

living God

1s

lacking in all those pseudorellglons described
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above, the philosophical doctrine
that the absolute

manifests itself in the universal can
creep easily also
into ethical doctrines. Ethical laws,
then, lose their
connection to actual religious experiences
and to revelation
even as far as their origin is
concerned. They are now
only

human conventions

-

in addition to the fact that they,
too,

like degenerated traditional moral laws, are
crutches for
people v^ho want to live in the pseudo -security of

the ’once

for all,

preventing them from the primary relationship with

man and the world. Consequently

,

also, from entering

into

an I- Thou relationship with God, since the meeting with

God requires the meeting with men and the world in the

lived concreteness, uniqueness and presentness of the human
and natural Thou, The god of the theologians, philosophers,

magicians, and mystics, however, is not met in the lived
concreteness, he is not met at all. Although their ’relation

1

to God is more exclusive than that of the cialogical

man, since man and the world do not interfere with this

’relation,’

it is much less inclusive as far as the genuine

meeting with God is concerned, ior, inclusiveness and exclusiveness in one’s relation to Goa go together, uvery
Thou in this worlo is a pointer towards God. There are no

short cuts.
The rtolipi mia and

-

jocular

(

wthlc 1

)

LI fa Second on

an-

other for Their Authenticity
The foundation of the problem which Buber pesos the alternative between a life In dialogue which ia the
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Eood life, or a life ln isolation,
in an I-lt rolationBhlp to th ® worla > Man, and
3ocl, which la evil - i
E> ln
the end, the question of the
relationship of religion and
Eoralitj (ethica). Since, for
Buber, people's concept of
6 ood and evil underlies, ultimately, to come
extent almost all evaluation and consequently,
almost all decision
In all fields of human activity,
the problem of the
dichotomy of the life ln spirit, l.e.
the religious life,

and

life in the world, including all
disciplines of
knowledge, is basically a problem of the
connection bethis

tween ethics and religion.
vt this

evil

and.

point the relationship of Buber’s doctrine of

his idea of the ideal relationship between
ethics

and .religion (which

I

shall expound In more detail in the

last section of the present chapter) may be
clearer. Since
’evil,

1

for Buber, is lack of relation, and relation, if

it is genuine, is always directed towards God via men
and
ti.e

world, the traditional split of religion

exclusively with ’God,’

and.

ethics

-

-

as concerned

as Independent from

religion and concerned only with man and the world by way
of a ’once for all’ pseudo -relation, falls itself into the

category of evil and consequently, has to be rejected and

replaced by a religion Intimately related to ethics (defined
as the basis of all of man’s life).

Religion apart from ethics, In form of magic, mysticism,
Gnosis, or dogmatic cult, is not ’real’ religion any lon-er,

for it cannot involve the whole of man’s existence in its

^

—

i

:
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relation to the absolute, but only one
aspect. Since
dialogue requires the giving with the
wholeness of one's
being to Gog and the world, the
separation of ethics (taken
in its broadest sense) and religion,
of the ’living

God' from

tile

in-

'living in the world’ is ultimately a big

obstruction to the life of dialogue.
ti’-i-

^

.c-nt'vl

n :/ 1X2L.

.

.u'cc to of the Lack of Ltalo "ue -

!

Life

-

Chaaia

in Our M.q

In our modern time,

Between the Hell

-le ns

and V/orldlv

"

1

1

says Buber, the chasm between

religion and the worldly life has grown huge. For modern
man, religion has become a little aspect of life, rather
than its totality. The radical absence of true relation

resulting from this dichotomy - in Buber's eyes the primary evil - has manifested itself in many negative ways

today
In general, it constitutes a real threat to the lived

concrete 'in its unforseeablenese and its irrecoverableness,
in which alone genuine relation i3 possible.

(EG p, 35)

Theology turns temporal facta into symbols; mysticism proclaims that all experience can be had at one; dogmatism

deprives new situations of their uniqueness; gnosis denies
all the problematic of the concrete moment, and philosophy

abstracts it from reality.
These extrareligious, better, pseudoreligious elements

exert not only active influence on the secular life, but
also passive Influence insofar as they cause the absence of
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genuine religion for which they are a substitute.
Freedom,
sayp Buber, today Is sought for its own sake
without the

necessary responsibility accompanying it, the responsibility

springing only from a personal relationship to God.

Purposelessness has become a problem, Hi rough the influence
of gnosticism which tries to overrun the realities of life,
the belief prevails that good ends justify the use of bad

means. This, in Buber’s eyes, is a gross distortion of
the trutf

.

endE man’s

For wherever there is a separation of means from
I -Thou

relation to God, man, and the world, is

in danger. For, a means, apart from its ends, by definition
is an object of X-It.

Today even people, since genuine

relation among them is absent,

ai'e

used as means to further

ends, whether on the individual or national level. Especially
in work this separation of means from ends has resulted in

most detrimental effects on the life of man? modern man
often performs dull mechanical work which is only a pre-

liminary step to, and thus removed from, the final product
of a chain of jobs. The attitude towards one’s work has

become that of I-It. Lack of responsibility makes men
strive for power, whether this be done in politics or

psychology or elsewhere. People deal with eaci

other, even

help each other, without entering into real relation with
one another. Help is often purely technical, and, as it

occurs in education and psychotherapy now and then, a means
for domination.
Real conversation between people has become rare.

Actual monologues are disguised as dialogues. People do

- 55 -

no t really have each other In mind
when they talk to one
another, but rather, abstract and general
opponents,
fictitious partners. hen no longer really
desire to communicate anything to the other or to learn
from the other.
The only desire is to exert a dominating
influence on the

othtr through which one’s self-reliance is
strengthened.
There is no real desire to search in the
other’s personality - one knows already everything about the
other, because
one looks only for what fits into one’s picture
of the partner. All mystery between man and man has dissolved.
Only
a reductive, analytic, and derivative glance
passes between

man and man* host nubile discussions are not real
dialogues
.'lain -^-It talk

wnich tries

to

win the opponent for

some cause, People are not addressed as unique persons

and in their wholeness, but are thrown in categories and
treated as specifications of those. Psychological and socio-

logical theories of ’seeing through’ have become the victim

of oversimplification and unjustified reduction on account
of their detached I-It way of seeing man. Social scientists
do not enter
to remain

1

to relationships with people tut attempt

’objective’ in their observation. This, Buber

feels, cannot yield anything but a distorted picture of man.
All science, social ae well as natural, has become exclusively

an enterprise of I-It, a constant severing of relation into
two parts - an object that is scrutinized by a completely

independent subject, i.e. of man from the world and his
fellow-men.

’The divorce between spirit and instincts’ whlc

*
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has driven whole peoples into a
pathological condition,
too ie nothing but a ’consequence
of the divorce between
man and man
.

If religion is cut off from life,
if the act of faith
is aubjectivieed and God becomes only
a small aspect of

one

s

life, then, Buber holds, the social and
political

bonds between people lose all their strength.
The consequence of the resulting lack of dialogue is,
in turn, a

basic mistrust among men.

lJian,

however, needs confirmation.

Since he cannot find it in true community

-

which alone

can give satisfactory confirmation - he seeks
it somewhere

else - In collectives or through himself. These two
types

of confirmation correspond to two types of social movement

which have arisen in consequence of the dominance of the
I-It relation among people in the world

and collectivism,

teal

-

individualism

community, based on true dialogue,

is substituted by centralized states and collectives, by

clubs, trade unions, parties, etc. Individualism and collec-

tivism are alike in that both do not know true responsibility
in genuine dialogue. Consequently the security and confirmation

they yield is a pseudo -security. While collectivism ’aims...

at reducing, neutralizing, devaluating, and desecrating
every bond with living beings,’

(BKM p, 201) individualism

leads to subjectivism which usually ends in atheism or
some kind of private pseudo religion , combined with a relative cation of values - thus preferring complete absence of

relation to the pseudo-relation of collectivism.
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and much more, Is the consequence of
man's turn-

ins away from God, of the split between religion,
the life

with Goo, and the life in this world. It
is an 'eclipse
oj.

God* which leaves man in a chaos created by
himself.

Gnce God is shut off, the I-It starts to grow into
huge
dimensions, for without

'God,

no genuine relation of man

to his fellow-men and the world is possible.

'In our age,'

writes Buber,
the I-It relation, gigantically swollen, has usurped,
practically uncontested, the mastery and the rule".
The I of this relation, an I that possesses all,
makes all, succeeds with all, this I that is un ble
to say Ihou, unable to meet a being essentially, is
the lord of the hour. This selfhood that has become omnipotent, with all the It around it, con
naturally acknowledge neither God nor any genuine
absolute which manifests itself to men as of nonhu pin origin. It steps in between and shuts off
fror us the light of heaven. (Ibid, p. 129)

What is the most tragic aspect of this 'eclipse of
God' is the 'silence of God,'

the 'hardening' of God Him-

self in answer to man’s constant turning away from Him.
'the eclipse of the light of God is no extinction.'

Yet,

Yee

'the I- Thou relation has gone into the catacombs,' but

'who can say with how much greater power it will step forth...

£ven to-morrow that which has stepped in between may give
way.'

(loc. cit.

)

'

The truth is that precisely at such

a time the great return and repentance which God. expects

of us becomes possible, in order that the redemption which
He desires for us, be a true self-redemption.'

(S*SK p.

116)

a

a

Hed?iP-tlon of

III.

the fcdenotlon o f Evil

Ml

ie

3ince evil is

’

Umkehr

raa n’s

*

(

furninr

)

to God

turning away from God, redemption

of evil is ultimately the turning back
of man towards God,
the gaining of direction as indicated
by his conscience,
the meeting of God and his creati n in
true responsibility
in the lived concrete.

The actual redemption of evil is

not effected by man, but by God’s grace, let
it is up to
man to initiate the redemption by going out into

life and

meeting Goa with his whole being - then He will cone
to us
ana.

t

Is

meeting will mean our salvation,

Ihe beginning and the beginning alone is Placed into
O' e
and. & o
men. But it ± placed in thci
.'’innly
make a beginning and at once' you will set all about
you, in the very circle of your personal activity,
all kinds of threads. You will have to n*rasr> but*'
single one of them and it will be, if God wills It,
the right r <ne. (F3H pp. 902-203)
i

;

.

ton, however, does not have the power to invoke Goa’s grac

by definite acts* God’s grace is unattainable, yet not

self-withholding, ton must first act and then, if the act
was successful, he will know that God has carried him,

ton's action, however, is as real In the act of redemption
as God's grace. But yet, they are not part-causes either,
’ton’s action,’

says Friedman for Buber,

’and God’s grace

are subsumed under the greater reality of the meeting between God anc man.'

(fried p. 133)
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Thi8 turnln ^ Awards God must
not be confused with
•repentance,' for this would be 'a
misleading attempt to

psychologize.’ What the 'turning'
really refers to
thl S hich ha PP®ns In the
secret recesses
u
?
of the !°f?
soul, showing
itself outwardly only in Its
consequences" and ^effects;" It is
something which
hprena in the immediacy of the reality
between man
an,. Goo.. . .It is as little
a "uayehic" we it as is
a man a birth or death; it
comes u^on the whole'
XS carrie d out by the whole
person, and does
not occur a? & man s self-intercourse,
but as the olain
realx ty o.t primal mutuality. (IU
p. 20)

fhe ’turning’

towards God arises when 'despair shatters

the prison wiich imprisons our latent
energies.' Then the

'sources of the primordial depths begin to
flow’ and man

turns with his whole being to God reaching,
out for His

hand by

wt

ich he lets himself be pulled up.

fiuc .Redemption

Ihc

uu 1 be

uecer. iticn

O'l

(FSH p.

if and not

116)

r

ror.

ovil

turning towards God has to be all-inclusive, con-

sequently, it has to include evil as well as good. Other-

wise the turning is deprived of its force. This, however,
does not mean that the dialogic man has to accept evil as
it is, but only that his attitude towards it must not

be one of complete unconcern.

It^is no more allowed to any man to live as if evil
did not exist. One cannot serve God by merely avoiding
evil; one must grapple wit* it. (Hasidism p. 29)
'This very world,’

says Buber in Israel and the World

.

this very contradiction, unabridged, unmitigated, unamoothea, unsimplified, unreduced, this w rid shall
be - not overcome - but consummated. .It Is a redemp,
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CTl1, tat

—

as the

^wer

whlob

0ur turning towards God has to be
done with all our
pasoi ns, wu.ich Keans that man,
In order to redeem evil,
must not deny or disregard his evil
Impulses, but he must
transform them into good ones, giving
direction to them,

direction towards God. Our passions and
our powers of phantasy are not bad by nature, they are
evil
only if they are

undirected. But if given right direction,

- and.

only if

given proper direction, since paaelon is a
necessary

element in all successful deeds,
from ran

’

s

- can real

good result

life. God wants to embrace Bit whole creation

and not only part of it. Man, therefore,
cannot achieve

salvation by trying to fight and extinguish evil, but
by

fighting it, defeating it, and

-

rather than killing it

-

turning it around into God’s direction, thus turning it
into good. Our phantasy must not be stopped but actualized,

instead of letting it remain pure phantasy which ultimately

will lead to the sin of indecision.
’we must not simply overthrow* but

i£ven

the worst idols

’in each cf these

images we must seek to discover what divine quality' we
sought in them. (F3H p. 117)
Heal dialogue does not mean the keeping of the light

pure by removing it as far from the dark as possible, that
is, it does not mean ’redemption from evil,’

but it is con-

cerned with casting light onto darkness and helping it to

pierce it, that is, it deals

v/lth

the redemption of evil.
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Our mission,

says Yehudi in For the Sake of Heaven

,

is not to the realms in which dwells the
purity of holi-

ness; it is to the unholy that we must pay
attention so

that it find redemption and become whole.'

(FSh p.

117)

The great danger is that the evil impulse continually

separates Itself from its companion, the good urge, 'and
/.that the latter/" in this condition of independence makes

an idol of precisely that which was intended to serve

him. Man's task therefore, is not to extirpate the evil

urge, but to reunite it with the good.'

(IGE pp. 40-41)

The evil urge and the good urge have to be brought to-

gether 'beneath the yoke,’ (Ibid. p. 41) Only this way do
we 'equip the absolute potency of passion with the one

direction that renders it capable of great love and of
great service. Thus and not otherwise can man become whole.'
(Ibid. p. 42) Thus 'the evil urge must also be included in

the love of God.'

(Ibid. p. 41)

The totality of man's passions was created by God

for its potential use for Him. Man has to attempt to
find out what the unique task is that God wants him to

perform with these urges. The way to fulfil his vocation
is revealed to him by his conscience,

i.e. by the essential,

not casual, quality of his inclinations.
As the totality of one's inner life - good and evil

urges, as well as 'imagery' - has to be included in the

turning towards God, so the totality of man's environment
really nothing else but the counterpart of his inner life,

-

)
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th ® ob<3ect of

eood and evil impulses, and of his
phan-

tasy - in short, everything man
meets in its concreteness
has to be included in his dialogue
with God.

IdjOm

in ’holy. Insecurity

’

-

and in

uenuine relation demands the acceptance of
every
concrete situation which man confronts .This
supreme principle of the truly religious man, which does
not allow
ior any convenient selection among the
situations

he meets,

places man in a position of insecurity. Buber's
religion,

although comprising a belief in the redemption of evil,
is in no sense a cult of reassurance. Just as
the prophets

of Israel 'have always aimed to shatter all security
and
to proclaim in the opened abyss of the final
insecurity the

un-wlshed-for God who demands that His human creatures
become real,'

(EG p. 73) so to Buber, any kind of reli-

gious security is repugnant. Instead he preaches a 'holy
insecurity,’ a life on the 'narrow ridge.’

'Oh you

secure and safe ones,' he exclaims,
you who hide yourselves behind the ramparts of the
law so that you will not have to look into G d's
abyss I Yes, you have secure ground under your feet,
while we hang suspended looking out over the endless deeps. But we would not exchange our diz^y
insecurity and poverty for your security and abundance... of God's will we know only the eternal;
the temporal we must command for ourselves, ourselves
imprint his wordless bidding ever anew on the stuff
of reality. (Herberg, op, cit., p. 19, from her
Heill^e Vveg pp. 67-68

,
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The man who tries to deny this 'holy
insecurity

'

who shuts himself off from meeting the world
in its

problematic contradictoriness, who avoids the ever
fresh
and exacting response in the concrete situations
of life,

has to set up religious dogmas, philosouhic systems,

a.

set of personal values and habits, in order to achieve

security, which of course is only pseudo-security.

He

falls into individualism or clings to collectivism in

order to find confirmation, and soon he ends up in blind
fear and hyst >ria since a perfect 'protection* against
the unpredictability of the future moment can never be

found.

The religious man,

'holy insecurity* of the

n the other hand, pref-rs the

'ever anew' in true dialogue,

he prefers the meeting of every new situation with the

whole of his being

-

although this is done vrith fear be-

fore the riddles and problems of ev ry new me tir
a

:

- to

pseudo-security and reality-phobia.
A counterpart of the blind fear of the non-religicus

man is the 'fear of God* of the religious man,

a

fear

wh ch results from the state of the 'holy insecurity*.
The religious essence of religion, says Buber,

'is the

certainty that the meaning of existence is open and

accessible in the actual lived concrete, not above the
struggle with reality, but in it.'

However, Buber is fast

to say,

that meaning is open and accessible in the actual

)

"

- 64 -

llveo concrete does not mean
It Is to bp wnn
possessed through any ty> e of
analytical or synthetic
investigation or through any type of
reflection
upon the lived concrete. Keanlng
to te experienced
living action and suffering itself, in the
r educed immediacy of the moment.
meaning who stands firm, without .Only he reaches the
holding back or
reservation, before the whole might
of reality and
answers it in a living way. He is
ready to confirm
lo iiie t e meaning he has
attained, (EG p, 35)
.

'

It is from this unquestioned
acceptance of every concrete

situation, involving problems and
suffering, that the
fear of God' of the religious man
springs. ’It comes
into existence’ for the first time
’when our existence...
becomes incomprehensible and uncanny, when
all security
is shattered through the mystery,’

(Ibid, p. 3 6) a

mystery which is not only relative, that is,
’inaccessible
only to the present state of human knowledge
and hence
in principle discoverable,’ but it is
the essential

mystery in its unknowableness and ’inscrutableness.’
(loc.
cit,

When man 'henceforth accepts the situation as given

him by the Giver,' he has to accept it in shattered
security
as a mystery.

’Everyday.

.

.is henceforth hallowed as the

place in which he has to live with the mystery,' This is

what Biblical religion calls 'fear of God,’ With it, 'all
religious reality begins,'

(loc. cit.)

fear of God does, thus, not mean 'to be afraid of God'
as one is afraid of evil, but it means man's awareness
’of his incomprehensibility. Fear of God is the creaturely

knowledge of the darkness to which none of our spiritual
powers can reach,. .out of which God reveals himself,' and
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Which we have t0

and endure in all the concreteness

of life. For that reason 'fear of
God* night also h e
called ’beginning of knowledge.* (IW
p. 31) Fear of God
is the fear of the unexpected demands
and addresses which

we encounter in everyday life ana which
come from the unfathomable God, It is man's enduring *in the face
of God
the reality of lived life, dreadful and ineoisrrehenslble

*
,

(EG p. 37)

'Buber has no patience with the self-deluding

sentimentalists who like to conjure away all that is fearful in the divine.

*

(Berbers, op. cit,, p. 18) A god who

isn’t met with fear is an idolatrous god.

'

The real God

is, to begin with, dreadful and incomprehensible,

*

(EG

pp. 36-37) for He shatters man’s self-sufficiency and

security, and confronts him with the contradictoriness of

life and the mystery of suffering and evil.

*

Fear

f God

1

Is the Gate to

1

Love of God

The 'fear of God,' says Buber,.

-

’

that is, the accep-

tance of every concrete situation as given to us by an

lncom rehen Bible, unfathomable, therefore dreadful, God
'is the dark gate through which ^wan/" must

to enter into the love of God.'

(Ih p. 31
r

)

t

-

ass if he is

Love which does

not also comprise fear is idolatrous. 'He who begins with
the Love of God without having previously experienced the

fear of God, loves an Idol which he himself has made, a
god whom it is easy enough to love,’

(EG p* 36

)
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0 * lsh ® s to avoid passing through
“f;
this iate
e
y:o begins oo provide himself with a'
"comprehensible
G?°» constructed thus and not
otherwise/ runs the
having to despair of doc in view of the"
?:
actualities o history and life, or of falling
in + o
Irne/ falsehood. Only through the
fear of God does
nan enter so deep into the love of God
that he cannot
again be cast out of it. (IW p. 31)
•

Arc in

i_o r

tne Sake o f Heaven Bober write?

:

It is dreadful, dreadful, dreadful
Bread is the
gateway to Him, There is no path to Him save
through
t.t*i b somber gate.
Only he who has vone through that
gate can truly love Him, Him. and In the manner in
which only He can be loved. (FSB p. 46
i

)

Fear of God, however, is only a gate and not a dwelling,
as

so’ c

theologians believe. Fear must flow over Into

love. Although God Is

incomprehensible,’

’he can be

known through a bond of mutual relationship.’ And although
he

cannot b© fathomed by knowledge, , .he can be imitated,*

(IW p.

3D

It is thus only through fear of God that we can

achieve love of God, and by the resulting union of fear
and love realize that both good and evil flow ultimately
from God, from His love, the holiness which is contained
in every concrete situation simply is a ’power capable of

exerting both a destructive and hallowing effect,' depending on how man meets it.
is,

'The encounter with this holiness

therefore, a source of danger to man.’ For those who,

like Jacob, Abraham, and Moses,
is turned into grace.'

'stand the test,., the danger

For those who don't, it is a curse.

(Fried p. 253) This is man’s predicament.
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ibe

.vay

Toward $ Red etc

Mien

i-

*

Ml- 3anctlf Ira

t.l

m

’

rrorn this

ambiguity of every concrete situation
it
follows that, when it was said above that
the fear of

God

Implies the unquestioned acceptance of every
concrete situation, this did not mean that every situation
has to be
acc®rted as it is, and approved of in its
pure factuality.

No , nan

rather, declare the extremes t. enmity toward
»
this happening and treat its Vivenness"'' as only
intended to draw forth his opposing force. But
he will not. remove himself from the concrete situation as i t actually is ... Whether field of work or
field of battle, he accepts the Mace in which he
is placed,
e knows no floating of the stir it
above the concrete reality; to "him even the sublirest spirituality is an Illusion If it is not
bound to the situation. (EG pp. 37-38)
raa h

One’s attitude towards evil net in the outside world
should

,

thus, be similar to one’s attitude towards one’s

inner evil urges and ’imagery.’ Evil must not be discarded but transformed into good. And this, like the trans-

formation of evil urges, which cannot take place within the

human

e

ul alone, requires relation, Man , in his endeavour

to penetrate the impure with

the pure, evil with good, thus

stands in between the man who in self-righteousness avoids
evil

ant.

the

me

who accepts it unconditionally, (fried p, 139)

Life then, should be a turning with one's whole being
towards God and His creation. It means the realization of

our vocation by God. This is true love. Love of God is not

possible without loving also

Ms

creation, and vice versa.

'
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For, to love God really means to
Imitate Him in His love

towards hi* creation. We have to love His
creation towards Him. (Fried p. 1>3) This true love
of God's creation*
however* is not a general love of humanity
and of nature
in general

*

but love for the particular individual through

loving act. .on* love of the concrete situations
in life. (BMM
F* 57

•

i}'

v en

’evil,'

God wants us to love as a possible good.

Everything In this world, the whole of God f s creation,

ultimately is to be included in the holy. The final aim
of redemption is the removal of the differentiation between the profane and the holy, it la 'all-sanctif ication*

Everything awaits being hallowed by man. Nothing is 'simply
and irreparably profane.'
The

profane is... only a designation for the not yet
sanctified. .Everything physical, all drives and
urges and desires, everything creaturely, is
material for sanctification. From the very same
passionate powers which, undirected, give* rise to
evil, when they are turned toward God^ the good
arises. One does not serve God with the spirit
only, but with the whole of his nature, without
any subtractions. (IW p. J4)
,

Whatever is hallowed in the name of God is sanctified.
'Hallowing transforms the urges by confronting them with

holiness and makin,- them rcsrousl tie toward, what is holy,'
(Ibid. p.

ISO) i.e. by giving them right direction.

This

'giving of direction' can mean an actual change of object

of desire or a transformation of the desire leaving the
same object. Then objects of desire

-

which could be sinful
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such as the purposeless killing
of a sheep - if they and

our relationship to

there

is hallowed in relation to our

relationship with God and fellow-men

-

need not be re-

nounce. Even the doing of evil, as far
as it is necessary
for the preservation of our life,
can become sanctified if
it i 8 hallowed and done with
responsibility And with
respect to evil in the world independent
of our desires,
especially with regard to the evil in
o tier people, God
.

,

gave us a mouth which can convey the
truth of our
heart to an alien heart and a hand which
can
icate to the hand of our recalcitrant brother communsomer
* wsrath of our very blood* it is for
this that He has mace us capable of loving
the sons
of Satan* ( FSH p. 121)
ri e pein

-

n of Evil
l th 1 c s and

ti'.

hetwee

Require s the Bridging of the Chasm
~*a—
Religion

The redemption of evil might also be expressed in

terms of the relationship between ethics and religion.
As already pointed out above,

evil in this world arises

due to an unhappy split between the 'living with God’
(religion) and the 'living with the world'

(ethics - taken

in its broadest meaning as being the basis of all value

Judgements and all decisions). It follows that the redemption of evil would mean a new interrelationship of religion
and ethics, of the

the world

'-llpinati
To

'living with God' and the 'living with

1

.

of All Pseudo rell; ions

this end, a radical elimination of all pseudoreli-
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S lon s has to be achieved: magic, mysticism,
dogmatism, and
the gnosis of theology and psychology.
These reduce reli-

gion to an aspect of life rather than
making it its totality , thus making any genuine I- Thou
relationship
to God

impossible since this would require the
hallowing of both
God, and men and the world. As a result
of this split between the religious and the secular spheres
in life,
and

the lack of true responsibility and true
decision, these

pseudoreligions

roust

lead either - as in a few cases - to

moral autonomy, to complete individualism or - as
they

usually do - to an outspoken moral heteronomy
accepting
the lavs of the society - whether these are
traditional

laws of revelation (as especially in dogmatism, with
its

pseudo-relation to God in form of a cult as an ally) or
self-created laws of society (although this implies moral

autonomy from the viewpoint of society, from the practical

viewpoint of the individual, however, this is heteronomy)

—

with which they guide their extra-religious actions, the
secular life.
Against Koral Autonomy and Koral heteronomy
Buber sympathizes with neither moral autonomy, nor

moral heteronom,

,

for they both are incompatible with his

dialogical principle with its emphasis on wholeness, decision,
presentnese, and uniqueness,
of’ and not 'freedom for,'

l

oral autonomy is only 'freedom

thus denying genuine dialogue

and true turning with one's whole being. Moral heteronomy,
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on the other hand, takes away all
genuine free decision
and responding toward the concrete
and unique situations
in life.

’The narrow ridge between the two,'
Friedman well

summarizes Buber,

’is a freedom that means freedom
to

respond, and a responsibility that means
both address from
without and free response from within.* {Fried
p.

199

)

horal absolutists consider values as absolute,
overlooking the fact that values are always values
for a oerson ratuer than for an absolute, independent
existent,

and therefore cannot have universal validity for
every-

body in every situation. Moral relativists or
'subjectivists'

reduce all values to the subjective interest of individuals

or cultural groups, rendering the 'is' and the 'ought'
identical, and therefore e iminating the normative element,
the characteristic element of morality, from all moral laws,

since it is identical with the objective fact.
201

(Ibid, pp, 200-

)

As a result of this absolute freedom given to the

individual to do what he desires, Individual Relativism

-

whether in form of atheistic nihilism or accompanied by a
pseudoreligion which is cut off from the ethical domain

-

leads into severe totalitarianism and collectivism, since
the individual cannot bear the insecurity of the complete

absence of norms, hence it leads again into moral heteronomy.
'Thus,' writes Friedman,

'whether the

I

or the It, the

subjective or the objective is stressed, the failure to see
moral problems in terms of the relation of the I-Thou ends

-72in the submission of the I to
the world of It.'

(Ibid, p, p 0 a)

Buber, with his dialogical philosophy
cuts beneath the

distinction between moral heteronoray and
moral autonomy
by walking on the ‘narrow ridge’ in
between. Values, for
Buber, do not exist apart from the
deciding person, yet
they cannot be reduce; to his personal
interests either,

since they are bound to the concrete,
God-given situation.
They lie in between the I and the Thou, i.e.
in the relation
of the I to tie Thou, which, in turn, is one
of genuine

responsibility,

7

1th this, the split between the moral

absolutists and the cultural relativist is overcome.
From the above, another step follows logically:
the

bridging

o'

the chasm between ethics and religion. According

to the above description,
eti.ic of

this

Buber’s ethic is a ’situational

responsibility.’ (Herberg, op. clt., p, 20) But

’responsibility presupposes one who addresses me

primarily, that is, from a realm independent of myself,

and to whom

am answerable.’

I

(

BKM p, 45) The One Who

addresses is God. Now, since In every concrete situation
there is an element of the divine, a genuine response to

any concrete situation, that is a genuine

ship with it

-

I -Thou

relation-

thus also to the ethical situation - must

include God, Since the ’ethical situation,’ too, is an
address coming from God, a genuine I-Thou relation with tt
will also be a relation to God; since God is the eternal
Thou in Whom all ’parallel lines of relation meet,’ all

genuine ethical decisions are at the same time religious
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decislons . The ethical now is bound
up with the religious,
toe chasm between ethics and religion
is overbridged*

—

iraditional

Laws arc only General Guides for
Acti on
ge -Interpreted in' ever Con crete~l ITFtq
tlon
•

Accordingly, as the ethical is bound up with
the
religious, moral laws, for Buber, as handed
down by tra-

ditional religion, even if revealed, cease to be
convenient
once-for-all' principles which deprive responsibility
and
spontaneity.

Ii

used in a 'once-for-all' way, they hinder

man fron entering into genuine

I -Thou

relationships with

God, creating a pseudo-security which covers the
actual

problematic and mystery of every concrete situation, the
uniqueness and irrevocableness, which, in turn, requires
a unique and

'ever anew' response.

I appreciate the "ob jeetive" com actness of dogma,
but behind /it/ there lies in wait the.,. war against
the situation s power of dialogue, there lies in
wait the "once-for-all" which resists the unforseeable
moment Dogma, even when its claim of origin remains
uncontested, has become the raoet exalted form of
invulnerability against revelation. Revelation
will tolerate no perfect tense, but man with the
arts of his craze for security props it up to
perfection. (Ibid. p. 18)
.

Buber renders moral laws only general guides, placing
the emphasis on the present and the concrete, rather than

on the past and the universal. Universale, although once

revealed, must be understood as symbolic expressions of the

concrete dialogic situation, (Fried p. 204) They may at

best be suggestions and guides of action, but the real de-
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cision must come from one's apprehension of the concrete

situation in its uniqueness,
the Absolute, but

concrete.

IT

e is

Universals may be pointers

to

found actually only in the lived

The ethical decision, thus, docs not start with

tho absolutely valid ethical code

arid

then applies it to

the concrete situation, but it starts in the concrete

situation, the response to which

:is,

with respect tc the

ethical laws, at best a unique interpretation of these

ethical codes, which certain most closely to the situation,
(None do so completely, in most cases).

The idea of responsibility is to be brought back
from the province of specialized ethics, of an
"ought” that sw ngs free in the air, into t nt of
lived life. Genuine responsibility exists only where
there is re 1 responding.
(BMM p. 16)

Whoever really unde

s

ands the nature of the

I -Thou

rel tion

to God and His creation will find that all traditional

In the end, thus, writes Bubor,

values are implied in it.

responsible person remains a stranger to norms.
But the corns .and inherent in a genuine norm never
becomes a maxim and the fulfilment never a habit.
Any command that a reat character takes to himself
in the course of his development does not act in him
as part of his consciousness or as material for
building up his exercises, but remains latent in a
basic layer of his substance until it reveals itself
What it has to tell him is
to him in a concrete way.
revealed whenever a situation arises which demands of
him a solution of w ich till then he had perhaps no
idea. . .Maxims command only in the third person, the
each and the none... /The concrete situation/ demands
nothing of what is past. It demands presence, espon(Ibid. p. 1l'*v)
sibility; it demands you.

3io

4

Moral laws, in other words, besides being normative, must

'

- 75 -

also be dialogical, i.e.
religious, in character. Values
are thus not simply imposed on
us, yet they are also not
self-created, Invented* Values are
discovered in the concrete situation*
'One can believe in and accept
a meaning
or value,* says Buber in connection
with Sartre's claim
of the atheistic self-creation of
values,
one can set it as a guiding light over
one's 3ife
if one has discovered it, not if one
has invented it.
xt can be for me an illuminating meaning,
a directiongj.vi.ng value, only if it has been
revealed to me in
my meeting with Being, not if I have freely
c ho son
i
far myself from among the existing
possibilities
and pernaps have in addition decided with
some
lellcw-creaturos. This shall be valid from cow on.
-

p.

V c>G

/0 )

In nis plea for values as discovered in the concrete

situation, Buber also warns against 'false absolutes'

wnich pooale now and then believe to

h-

ve received from

God directly, as plans of action, like Kierkegaard who
(-.alsol^i

)

t nought

tnat

cod.

w ntecx him tc sacrifice Regina as

He (actually) had wanted Abraham to sacrifice his son I~asc.
These •suspension^' of the ethical,* feels Buber, are to be
avoided, since it is usually not God Who reveals them, but

one of his 'apes,* Moloch, who prompts them.

Immediacy of one’s relationship to God is necessary,
but God is met directly only in the lived, concrete,

Man,

thus, must escape from the modern idolatry w ich leads too

readily tc the 'suspension of the et leal* (universal) on
account of ’false absolutes.
In the realm of Moloch honest men lie and compassion-

-76-

“

n
r tur 6
And th ®y really and truly
believe
f hn + >
i'?
that
brother-murder
will prepare the wav for
brotherb€
CSeape
evil of""all tSSSSSjT
ll

'

*

of

ZfLiVueTigt

ss

the Innermost power of their
soul.
coJ,^
n ° f th relative with the Absolute,
?
that
will
f !. J?
1
t €ir to see through
illusion and to recognize
1
+ht"
i
thls^ confusion
for what it is. To penetrate again
S 10 r? to the false
so lute with an incorrup+?vi
tltle, probing
glance until one has discovered its
lts limitedness - there is today
perhaps no
0
ei wa y
reawaken the power of the pupil to
a
glimpse the never-vanishing appearance of
t e Absolute. (Ibid. p. 120}
‘

‘

'•

Ml

f -oral it;

k2.hcr£lr in which the

are Combined and Wedded to the
Al solute Rani fee ts" Its el?"
'

ethical responsibility,* in its broadest meaning,
is
thus, in

t:.e

last analysis, a readiness to answer God's

words in the lived moment of existence. The religious
and
the ethical (as equated with secular) life merge.

Every moral demand is set forth as one that shall
the human people, to the sphere where
,
the ethical merges into the religious, or rather
where the difference between the ethical an the
religious is suspended in the breathing-space of
the divine. (Ibid, p, 104)
.raise ma

This fusion, however, ap lies totally only to the

ethical, since it is

nly part of the religious, better,

corresponds only to a part of the religious realm*

Religion has this advantage over morality, that it
is a phenomenon and not a postulate. The reality of
morality, the demand of the demander, has a place
in religion, but the reality of religion, the unconditioned being of the demander, has no place in
morality, Religion/ is more actual and inclusive.

[Bm

p.

18)
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Ethics,
(E 3 p.

iwfcer says,

'is an Inherent function of
religion.’

107) This, however, does not diminish
the value

of the ethical life. For it Is only
through It, and In

companionship with it, that our religious life
becomes
authentic. Only In the concrete do we meet

the eternal

Thou. And in order that this responding
to the concrete

situations of life be preserved, we must aim at
the elimination of all pseudoreligions which separate
their 'God* vo

lea Is a pseudo-goc, an Idol - and man’s relation
to him -

which is

a

pseudo-relation,

-

from the worldly life: magic,

mysticism, ritualistic dogmatism, and all forms of Gnosis.
By virtue of their pseudo-relation to God, these
pseudo-

rellgions try to evade the responsibilities in the existential dialogue of life, ending up with a structure of fixed

laws, rules, orders, programs, values, standards, etc.,

which stand between them and the concrete situation, and

which decide for the individual rat; er than leaving the
decision to the person. Whether pseudoreligions are
followed by the lack of genuine relation to the world or

whether the escape from the responding in the lived concrete
is followed by the establishment of a pseudorelirion

hard to say

,

,

is

Probably both directions of development occur.

Atheism with its moral autonomy has, like pseudoreliglona,

with the moral

l

eteronomy usually connected

to

them, to be

rejected on similar grounds.
God is found, and with this, evil redeemed, only by

way of an I-Thou relationship to fellow-men and the world.

7
-78The alternatives are thus
not religion and morality
(whether In form f moral autonomy
or moral heteronomy)

but religion combined with
morality and thus wedded to
the
concrete in which the Absolute
manifests Itself. ( C f. Fried
p. 206)

f a pei 60nal relationship
with the Aban)ntwr°
oo.„ute
/by way of; our relationship to
His creati nr

can the absoluteness of the
ethical co-ordinate’/^
V liCh the e is no
complete awareness
l
of seiX, men when
the individual colls an absolute
t€
n n n ed Gown by religious
tradition hie
owi
* ?
own, Tt°
it must
be reforged in the fire of the
truth
SSenti
r ® lation to the Absolute
if it is to win t
true validity. But it is always
ne re_ipi- us Atod as met. in the
concrete/ which
Destows,^ the ethical /.universal/
which receives.

^

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Buber’s fight against de-personalization and

V^rdinglichp^g through the predominance of the 1-It over
the I-Thou finds an essential application also in
his
oocictl p Kilo sophy •

Since the gem ine life of dialogue,

for Buber, comprises man*® true relationship to God, as

well as to men and the world, he feels that man can fully
realize his vocation only in a true community, for only
in it is true dialogue possible*

Buber holds that 'tc the essential Thou on the level
of self -being* there corresponds the category of the

essential
(BMM p.

1

on the level of relation ’to a host of men*
75)

1

Just as the primitive Thou precedes the

awareness of individuality out of which the essential Thou
grows , so the primitive We precedes the awareness of sep-

arateness from which only afterwards the essential

Vie

springs when independent individuals enter into relation#
ships*

The Thou, says Buber, includes tho We potentially.
’Only men who are capable of truly saying Thou to one

another can truly say he with one another,’ (Ibid. p. 176)
and thr s form a true community.

although it c

True co munity, thus -

not be reduced to a comple jC sy

tern

of

personal I-Thou relationships between particular indivi-

,
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duals - la based on the
I-Thou relation of concrete
people
v/ith one another, it
virtually emerges out of the
I-Thou,
Just as t, c individual becomes
a person, writes Buber,
’Insofar as he stops Into a living;
relation with other
Individuals' so does the social
'aggregate' become a
community 'Insofar as It Is built out
of living units of
relation
(Ibid, p, 203 ) 'And Just as the I
of the
authentic personality emerges only In
the dialogic "meeting" with Clod to Whom every other
Thou points, so does th
.

*

authentic Ve of community come forth only
out of the individual members of the group to the transcendent.'

(Herb erg,

op. cite, p. 20)

community is built ur out of living mutual
relation
^he individual members of the grourZ,
but the
Uu-lder ie the living effective Centre, /that
is,
rue community does not arise through re pie havincrQodZ.
o
^
peeling or one another (though indeed not without
it)
but, first, through their taking their
stand in living’
mutual relation with a living Centre, and second their
being in living mutual relation with one another. Tbe
second has its source in the first, but is not given
when the first alorse Is ~ive". (iTh p, AS)
j.he

‘

r

In the end,

*

‘

thus, relationship to God and relationship

to men in true community are inseparable. Neither one

can exist without the other; both

are essentially

necessary for man’s full realization.
As already indicated above,

the fact that true commun-

ity is based on, and emerges from,

the personal relation-

ships among people, does not mean that society is simply
the sum of, or a complex pattern of, dialogical relation-

.

s
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ship

assumption would imply an undue blurring
of
tae distinction between the ’social*
in general
*

T5lis

and the

actual dialogical relationships among people.

While, indeed,

society would be unthinkable without true
dialogical

relationships in it, not everybody in a society has
a direct rel tionship with everybody else in
the group to

which he belongs.

Society is only a social aggregate of

individuals bound up with each other according to common
interests, needs, circumstances, etc.

A1 thou

;h

personal

relationships are indispensable — and anyway do frequently
occur within the smaller groups of organic communities,
membership in a group does not necessarily imply personal

relationships to the rest of the members.

Rejection of Individualism and Collectivism
With his affirmation of true com unity, Buber
rejects both atomistic individualism and collectivism.

’or

individualism understands only a part of man /phi la/
collectivism understands man only os a parts neither
advances to the wholeness of man.
Individualism sees
man only in relation to himself, but collectivism
does not see man at all; it sees ’’society". With
the former, man’s face is distorted; with the latter,
it is masked.
(BMM p. 200)
Reality, says Buber, is not to be sought in the camps of
either individualism or collectivism but ’between* those
two alternatives - in the relation between man and man.

While for the individualist, interpersonal relations and
society are unessential and derivative, and while for those
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who make society the basic reality
the individual is only
of derivative value and interpersonal
relationships are

only essentially indirect, l.e., mediated
through their
common relation to society, (Fried
p, 209) for the

dialogical philosopher the basic reality is the
dialogue
between people from which both the individual and
the

society are derived and given reality,

’individual

man without genuine relations) as well as 'society

1

(a

1

(a

political order not based on dialogical relations) are for
h Ira

abc trac ti one

*

fhe fundamental fact of human existence is nett’ er
the individual as sue! nor the aggregate as sucl
Lach, considered by itself is a mighty abstraction,
-he individual is a fact of existence insofar as
he steps into a living relation wit! other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence insofar
as it is built up of living units of relation. The
fundamental fact of human existence is man with
man, (Bh? pp. 202-203)
.

,;

Individualism and Collectivism
Self - Confirmation

- Two

Forms of Illuaorv

All forms of individualism and collectivism, xdiber

holds,

'however differ nt their causes may be, are essentially

the conclusion or expression of the same human condition,

only at different stages.'

(Ibid, p. 200) This condition

is a decline of dialogue either as a result of man's fear
to go out Into the world and meet every situation, or as

an outcome of some kind of pseudoreligion which separates
the 'living with God

1

from the secular life. As a result

of this decline of dialogue, man's basic need for con-
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firmation finds no longer a natural
satisfaction. Consequently 'man sets out on one of two
false ways he
seeks to be confirmed either by himself
or by a collective
to which he belongs,’ In both cases,
however, his undertaking- is doomed to fail. ’The
self-confirmation of him
whom no fellow-raan confirms cannot stand,’
i

it is illusory.

*

With ever more convulsive exertions’ he has
to struggle

to save it, but

’

finally he knows himself as inevitably

abandoned,' On the other hand,

’confirmation through the

collective... is pure fiction.’ For although the collective

accepts and employs each of its members as particular
individuals, it does not 'recognize anyone in his own
being.
(xo

p,

,

*

lode 'ende^tly of

225

n i. a

usefulness for the collective,’

The self that is to be confirmed is actually

)

lost In the collect! viatic submerge. (Kerberg, op. cit., p.
han, thus, says Buber,

21

’insofar as he has surrendered

direct and personal mutuality with Lie fellows, can only
exchange an illusory confirmation for the one that

3.9

lost.

There is no salvation save through the renewal of the dialo-

gical relation.’
Indlvlchuii

l

a

i

(FW p, 225)

-

o n

into Ccllec t vin:
’

Individualism, Buber holds, when pushed

to

the

extreme, usually leads over into collectivism. For man,

when he has become solitary through the lack of courage to
live in ’fear of God,* to respond ’ever anew

’

to the problema-

tic, God-given world, becomes ’alien and uncanny, he can no
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longer stand up to the universal forne of present
being; he can no longer truly meet them.’
Consequently

he 'seeks a divine form of being with which,
solitary as
he is, he can communicate; he stretches his hands
out

beyond the world, to meet this form.' he falls victim to
a pseudoreligion — either self— created or one
taken over

for,

saying of the Thou to

the-

'

God* without the saying

of the Thou to men and the world is addressing an idol.
Finally, man reaches a condition when he can no

longer stretch his hands out from his solitude to meet
a c.ivlne.

for".

Tl

ft

solitude in which he is has become

’colder and stricter than the preceding' ones; that, says
Buber, is the basis of Nietzsche’s saying,

(BMK p.

1

£7

}

'God is dead.'

Kan abandons even his idol-god, thus falling

into atheistic existentialism, he now, in order 'to save

himself fro" the despair wi th which his solitary st^te
threatens him.
and

. ,

plunge/ s7 into an affirmative reflection*

'resorts to the expedient of glorifying' his solitary

state. This self-glorification, however, since it is,

like any self-glorification, illusory,

’is not capable

of actually conquering the given situation,' it falls
into the severest form of collectivism, in individualism,
says Buber,

’which has essentially an imaginary basis,'

(Ibid. p. BOO)
the person, in consequence of his merely imaginary
mastery of his basic situation, is attacked by the
ravages of the fictitious, however much he thinks,

~
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or strives to think, that he is
asserting himself
as a person in being.
(Ibid. p. 202
)

Individualism, thus, never has long existence;
it las to
founder on its very basis.
Here it may seem that the rather persisting
existence
of groups such as ’beatniks' or 'existentialists'
could
serve as a disproof of, or at least be an
exception to

Buber's characterization of 'individualism' as an
untenable position. This however, in my eyes, would
involve
a misunderstanding of the core of these
'individualistic'

movements. For, those who call themselves 'existentialists'
for example

,

are not individuals in the sense of atheistic

existentialism as Nietzscl

e

or Sartre understood it, but

in actuality they are just as much collectivists as all

the rest who left the road of individualism and took that

of collectivism without pretending to have gone to the

very end of individualism before. The last rung of the

ladder of individualism, that of atheistic existentialism,
ie real ly reached only by few people.

'Existentialists,'

'beatniks,' etc. are only pseudo-individualistic, for al-

though outwardly non-conformisto

,

inwardly they are the great-

est conformists since in order to receive the necessary

confirmation they do not exercise real self-confirmation,
as the truly autonomous individualist does, but they

receive confirmation by conforming to the absurdities

practiced by all the members of

tl

eir group as well as through

the attention of the masses which they attract by being differ
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ent

frorr.

the rest of society in absurd ways.
What is most

detrimental in this concealed and more
subtle conformity
is that it is unknown to the
pseudo-individual himself,

he does not realize that Instead of
being a real indivi-

dualist re is just different from the masses
in absurd
and superficial ways - so attracting
attention and receiving pseudo-confirmation - and looking for
confirmation
in a different though smaller collective.
The modern

individualist does not stand on the last rung of individualism (as opposed to, and a step to, collectivism)
but
his

individualism

'

is only a collectivist reaction of

a conformist against collectivism. The result is an
even

extremer conformity and collectivism.

)

The Decline of Ibce rn Individual 1
er
Collectivism

1

nto bode rn

The two forms of illusory
confirmation have appeared
iu ou,

,

cc

on the Individual level, in form of
individual-

ism and conformism, as well as to a
great extent on the
level of social life in form of the
dichotomy between

capitalism and collectivism. Both personal,
as well as
social, collectivism have resulted from 'a
union of
cos

‘

,!iC

anc social homelessness

/a.s

a consequence of the

lack of true dialogue and true community/,
dread of the

universe and dread of life, resulting in an
existential

constitution of solitude such as has probably never
existed
before to the same extent.'

(BMM p, 200}

Since, as was shown above, individualism in the end

has to founder on its own basis, modern personal as well
as social individualism have to break down sometime. It
is
now, in this century, Buber feels, that modern individual-

ism is on its decline.

vival,' he says,

'In spite of all attempts at re-

'the time of individualism is over.'

(Ibid, p, 202) Although, as will be shown shortly, in
the western world modern individualism still exists to a

small extent, Buber feels it has played its role.

'Collec-

tivism, on the other hand, is at the height of its devel-

opment.'

(loc. cit.

It is today's greatest danger to the

world, for It Is the detrimental expression of man's flight
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t xe

exacting *ever anew’ of persona l responsibility

into tne secure ‘once for nil* of membership
in

a

collec-

tive, whether in form of totalitarianism
comprising

personal as veil as social collectivism

- as

found in

Russia, or in form of loyalty to political
parties, state

policy of defense, or private capitalistic enterprises
on the social level, and in form of conformity with
respect to social behaviour, religion, art appreciation,

spending of leisure time, etc. on the personal level
as found in the West.

Modern man with hi

-

insecurity and

repressions is isolated from his fellows, and clings

desperately to the collectivity to which he entrusts his
own protection and decisions in life.

Pers nal individualism, which during the last few

generations had

raa

ifested itself in the form of an atom-

ized society made up of individuals who had no genuine re-

lation with others in true community, but yet were nonconforming with respect to their Weltanschauung, hos been
re laced today by individual collectivism, that is, by the

conforming of people with respect to taste, values,
social behaviour, interests, etc.

As a result of this

kind of conformity, true personal relations ios a ong
people have become extremely difficult, for
genuine persons.

A genuine person, however,

t

\c

(as

require
v.

pre-

supposition for his entering Into relation) has to be an
individual, that is, must have retained his uniqueness and
not have given it up

t

rough conforming.

Few people today are

,

c
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true persons, that is, P6sl individuals entering into

dialogue

.

That the existence of groups auct as the

‘beatniks’ or ’existentialists’ are more of a proof than
a disproof of the predominance of collectivism over

individual! sin in our age, can be seen from what has been
said above, in connection with these movements. For one thing,

these movements are mere reactions against collectivism,

and for that very reason are Indicative that collectivism

dominates our time. Secondly, the members of these

movements themselves are anything but true individuals
but

ey are, as already mentioned above, people who,

t!

in trying to escape conformity, fall into an even worse one
by conforming to a new collective, their own movement.

They thus conform to their own non-conformity. Moreover,
the fact that they try to receive confirmation from the

rest of society by attracting its attention also shows
that the members of these movements cannot be termed true

Individuals. For the true individualist seeks confirmation
only through himself.

Modern social individualism, in form of centralist!
capitalism, is also on its decline. In its place total-

itarian collectivism has entered upon the scene. Essentially,

Buber holde, collectivism on the social level too follows
upon the foundering of capitalistic individualism, Just
as individualism on the personal level leads over Into

widespread conformity. Before elaborating on this connection
between the decline of individualistic capitalism into

- 91 -

State collective sin, it will be necessary to sketch
very

briefly the development of society, as seen by Buber:
e

essential

o.;

all those things which enabled man

to emerge from Nature and to assert himself, writes
Buber -

"more essential even than the making of a "technical”

world out of things expressly formed, for this purpose'

-

was that be banded together with others in social life
for

'protection and hunting, food gathering and work.'

It was the 'creation of a "social" world out of persons

at once mutually dependent and Independent.* The line

of human evolution up to now has been 'the forming and refer? ing

of communities on the basis of growing personal

independence, their mutual recognition and collaboration
on that basis.' The moot important steps to the develop-

ment of human society were

:

the division of labor which

'recognized and utilized /every individualT’ in his special
capacity' resulting in an ever-renewed association of

persons.

The second step was the banding together of

people in quest of food and campaigns, so that 'as once

between individuals, so now between communities people
discerned and acknowledged, differences of nature and
function.' Wherever genuine society has developed, Buber
writes, it was based on 'functional autonomy, mutual

recognition and mutual responsibility, whether individual
or collective.’ When power center^

have split off, then

this happened only in order to maintain the security of the

community. Against the centralizing tendencies of the State

)

)
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th ere was

always opposed the organic, functionally
organized society as ouch, a great society built
up
O',
various societies, the great societv in which
men lived and worked, competed with one another
nd helped one another, (HJ pp,
30— 1 3 1
'

“1

This mutual dependence of increasingly independent

Individuals and communities within a society Buber calls
the

1

clecen trail stic social principle.’

Wherever advanced societies have existed, there was
the danger that the ’decentrallstlc social principle’

would be subordinated to the ‘centralists political
princl le’ with its emphasis on the necessity and standardization of the world of It in the State. The first real

overthrow of the ’decentrallstlc social principle*
meant first the development of centralists capitalism,
that is

,

individualism in the political sphere. This

took place in France. Although In the pro- Revolutionary

central is tic State in France there were totalitarian

tendencies inherent and the autonomous life of individuals

and groups weakened, society was still composed of different societies,
(Ibid, p,

139)

*

it was complex and pluralistic in structure.*

This complexity gave the State vitality

and powers of resistance against the totalitarian tendencies of the royalty.

broken b

This resistance, however, was

the French Revolution with its cry for Freedom,

and its bitter opposition to ’the special rights of free

associations,’

(loc.

cit.

besides its opposition to the

royal centralization. As a consequence centralization in its
,
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new capitalistic form succeeded by ’atomizing
society
and 'dispossessing groups of their autonomy.'

Every bod

(loc.

*

cit.)

now had the same rights and possibilities. The

success of the individual

vjas

dependent upon his own

initiative.

Accordingly as human beings differ in aspiration and
ability

,

a.

t

was once more an elite — this time not a royal

one but one of capable business men - who appropriated

most of the capital again, leaving the majority of the
people poor and without & fulfilling type of work. It is

at this point where individualism

- in form of

centralized

capitalism (rather than centralized royal government as
it was before the revolution, which at least allowed for

relatively autonomous small groups)
ed bp collectivism.

-

began to be poison-

The western world today still suffers

from it. Capitalism as an idea is only concerned wit!
the individual, but the practical effects of capitalism

always lead more into the direction of collectivism. The
people owning the capital, the alleged individualists,
become richer and fewer at the same time. This means that
their organisations attain ever greater dimensions, which
in turn, stifle the individual and smaller enterprises.

For example,

th«

cerj

shdps ere replaced

by the big chain stores. The owner of the little store
is forced to go out of business since he cannot compete

with the big enterprise. He enters a big organization

-

not

any more as an independent owner with individual relation-
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ships to people, but as a worker completely
dependent on,

and det rmined by, the company or corporation.

One could

sum this up by saying that in the capitalistic
systems man

becomes insecure since, by virtue of the great irresponsibility in the business world, his success is constantly
at stake.

Consequently he flees into the big protective

collectivity, into a big or anization within the

c

'tate.

This social and economic insecurity resulting from

capitalistic individualism (atomized individualism by
itself creates insecurity but

tills

insecurity is increased

through the rise of capitalism) has found, today also,
a moae radical and more detrimental reaction

t aan

that

of collectivism within a society in form of huge private

enterprises:

this is the completely centralized Ctate as

found in the

oviet Union,

Needless to say, in Buber’s

yes,

Soviet collectivism, much less than capitalism in Western

democracies (with its own kind of collectivism) can remedy
the pove ty in organic structure and true community of

atomized society.

Neither does it solve the problem of

capit lisrn for it lays stress on political centralize tion

w

lich is,

to an even greater extent than capitalistic

centralization, the arch enemy of multiplicity and freedom,
of the life of dialogue.

Both Marxism and the Soviet

regime have constantly subordinated the social principle
to the political principle.

Although they have been

tolerant of slight de-centralization in form of compulsory

co-operatives and producer soviets, and thus have we kened

*
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radical centralization, the
social principle has always
been subjected to the political
one, compulsion and donination have prevailed
place of free fellowship and
association in true eoimruni
ty

m

This existential and social
threat of atomized
society and its resulting centralietic
capitalism which
drives man into collectives, is
found not only within
societies but also on the international
level, between
wl.ole societies.

As a result 01 modern industrial
development and its
oraero. chaos, involving the struggle
of all against
all i or access to raw materials and
for a larger
c
in toe p or id-market, there grew
up, in 'lace
;r
ole struggles between States, at rubles
?* the
between whole societies. The individual
society,
leeling itself threatened not only by its
neighbors’
lust i or aggression but also by things In
general,
inew no way oi salvation save in complete
submission
to
„ne principle of centralized power...
In the
democratic form of society no less than in its
totalitarian for®*, it adc this its gui&ins
b prindpi©. (Ibid, pp, 131-132)
.

•:

Consequently the important thing in all societies is
tne

n-inute organization of power,

trie

unquestioning

observance of slogans, and the saturation of the whole of
society with the real or supposed interests of the State.’
(loc.

cit.) with respect to the democratic capitalistic

forms of government in the west, this means thus, that
tit.,

collective 8

:.

found within them is not only one resulting

from non-governmental private capitalistic enterprises,

but also one resulting from the centralizing tendency of
the State, here we find the link between the we a tern and

y

)
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Sovlet central lea tic

.

Nov the parallel Is:: between personal individualism

and collectivism

.

and sod

individual! sm and collectivism

.1

can be seen with respect to their causes, nature, and

inter-rel

•

tior'..el

ips

Just as the individual

*

-

when with-

out dialogical relationship to other people and to God
falls into solitariness, and when this state Becomes un-

bearable for

1-

eh of confirmation - seeks relief in the

collectivity, so capitalism

-

the correlate of individual-

ism on the x-olitical level - comes about when true community is destroyed (because of

r,eo

le’s not having true

relation with ore another) and then falls into collectivism on recount of lack of social and economic security
of the individual/'
The 'framed

of Collectivism

In Buber’s eyes the rise of modern collectivism

upon the foundering of individualism
as veil as social level
to mankind

today.

with freedom,

*

1

-

-

on the personal

constitutes the greatest danger

The last generation’s Intoxication

Buber writes,

’has been followed by the

present generation’s craze for bondage; the untruth of

intoxication with freedom has been followed by the un~
t ru tb o f

hy sterla.

*

(

3M

p« 7 0

The human being tries to escape his destiny of
solitude by becoming completely embedded in one of
the massive modern group format! ns* The more massive,
unbroken and powerful in its achievements this Is,

.,

-97U-ip no re that non is able to feel
V ,t he is saved
from both forms of homelessness, the social and
the
cosmic. There is obviously no further reason for
the dread of life, since one needs only to fit oneself Into the general will” snc let one’s own
responsibility for an existence which has become all
CO pl-Cci '.;ec he absorbed in collective reenonsibllity, which proves itself able to meet all comLikewise, there io obviously no further
1 .icatlons
reason for the dread of the universe, since technic 1 2 ed nature - with which society ag sue! manages
vrell, or seems to - takes the place of the universe
which fas become uncanny and with which so to
speak, no further agreement can be reached. The
i curity
There is nothing imaginary here, a dense reality
rules, and the general” itself a; gears to have
become real. (Ibid. p. 201)
I

,

Lut this security offered in the collectivity is a pseudo••

illnsor,

.
’

(loc.

ci t

. )

•

!

r,

1

tially

3

Today it is mankind’s greatest

danger, it imperils ’the immeasurable value weld

con-

stitutes man,’ for it destroys the dialogue between man
and God and man and the world.
tive ty

,
’

writes Buber,

(Ibid, p, 80)

*

The collec-

’cannot enter instead of the person

into the dialogue of the ag.ee which

the Godhead conducts

with mankind.' (loc. cit.) On the contrary,
the modern zeal for collectivity is a flight from
community’?3 testing and consecra tion of the person,
a flight from the vital dialogic, demanding the staking of the self, -tick, is in tie heart of t! e orld.
(Ibid. pp. 31-32)
,

?

The ’false

at! p

of

.-;ul

Jectivlr

’

(

modern individual' on)

writes Buber, ’have been left behind on the road of object.! v' s

’

(modern collectivism).

(Ibid, p, yf)

a

)

>
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the noblest hymns' on authority
standing. (Ibid. p. 32)
ev(-n

Collectivity la not a real ‘binding* but a
'bundling
together.* (Ibid. p. 31
fen in a collective ie not man with man.
Here th

n

k-

V.

iy

A V

V

V*-

i VJ —

neutralizing, devalue tin
and desecrating
every bond with living beings. That tender surface
personal life which longs for contact ith other
0
lii6 ifl progressively deadened or desensitized. Kan*
isolation is not overcome here, but overpowered and
numbed. Knowledge of it is suppressed, but the actual
condition of solitude has its- insuperable effect
in the depths, end rises secretly to a cruel tv which
become manifest with the scattering of the
illusion. Modem collectivism is the last barrier
raised by ran against a meeting with himself. (Ibid.
c.r>:

P*

20

,

1

’Based on an organized atrophy o° personal existence’

collectivism marches ’without Thou and without
th e

*

*

afey as.

Ex 1 a ten 1

1.

’

01

(

Ibid

h'ixO

.

I*

into

up . 31,33)

trus t

'

-

A
~~

Source of Ever Greater

Collectlvi tv
In our age,

social homelessness and the collectivism

resulting from it, are intensified by what Buber terms
’existential mistrust.’ This ’mistrust’ is of a new quality
it is no longer simply the age old mistrust which men

- 99 -

have always felt tow rds one another
:

such ae that directed against those with strange
ways, those who are unsettled, and those without
tradition - the mistrust th* t the farmer in his
Isolated farmstead feels for the tra p who suddenly
appears before him. (FW p, 222)
If ere have always been countless situations in which
a man in intercourse with a fellow-man is seized with
the doubt whether he may trust him; that is, whether
the other really means what l e says and whether he
will do what he says. There have always been countless situations In which a man believes his lifeinterest demands that he suspect the other of making it his object to appear otherwise than he is.
The first man must then be on his guard to protect himself against this threatening false
appearance, (Ibid. p. 223)

Today

,

however, this

r

is trust has

een replaced or been

overridden by a more detrimental mistrust resulting from
the disintegration of true community in rur age. formerly,

Buber writes, societies have

-

like our society

-

been

subject to cosmic insecurity, bit there has always been
some kind of social security resulting from ’the living
In real togetherness’
p.

in

*a

small organic community.'

19 f) And where this social security existed,

also reigned among people, and man did n

t

(BMM

confidence

have to repress

hi a wishes ’to such an extent that the repressions acqulre/d/
a dominating significance for his life,

’

although at times

he ha c. to subject his wishes to the demands of the community,

(Ibid. pp. 96-97) But for the meet part they co-

alesced with the needs of the community which were ’express

C

in its commands.’

(Ibid. p.

197)

Today however, where true organic community has decay-
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ea and been replaced by collectivism,

the ’agreement

between one’s own and the other’s desire ceases,
for there
is no true coalescence or reconciliation
with what is

necessary to a sustaining community, and the dulled wishes

o.rlescly into the recesses of the soul.* (loc. cit.)

ereu:

As a result we find ourselves in a community where
frustra-

tion, repression, anc sublimation rule, in which the in-

stinct is o ivorcea from the spirit, ’The divorce between

instinct and spirit,’ feels Buber, is in the end 'the consequence of the divorce betv?een man and man.’

(loc. cit.)

With this decay of true society and its pathological
effects th

former social security and confidence in one’s

fellow-ra n got lost.
.

rules over the world,

Today ’the demonry of basic mistrust’
’The abysses between man and man

threaten ever more pitilessly to become unbridgeable.* (PW
p.

222)

Today man no longer simply suspects that the other
one is consciously being dishonest, but he euspecte the

very being of the other. He
no longer merely fears that the other will voluntarily
dissemble, but one simply takes it for granted that
he cannot do otherwise. The presumed difference between his opinion and his statement, between his
statement and his action, is here no longer understood as his intention, but essential necessity , .It
is no longer only the uprightness, the honesty of the
other which is in question, but the inner integrity
of his existence itself. (Ibid. pp. 223-224)

ihe mask which one’s fellow-man has on and which one tries

.
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t° take off »

ie not one which the other has put
on

knowingly with the attempt to deceive, but Instead
is
mask that has, without his knowing it, been put
on

’a

him,

indeed positively imprinted on him /by his own
frustrations and its effects/ so that what ie really deceived
is
his own consciousness.’

(Ibid. p. 223) Consequently, man

does not accept what the other one says - in fact he hardly

listens to the words of the other. Rather, he devotes himself to

1

seeing through' and ’unmasking' the other, he

looks for the ’behind' of outward expression, for its
concealed causes.
This attempt, on the part of modern man, to 'see

through' those with whom he comes in contact results in

part from the ideas of those philosophers and psychologists
such as Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Jung who have given the

'scientific rationalization’

(FW p, 224) for the disease

of our time, putting forth the theories that man is not

what he thinks himself to be, that he has little control

over what he is in reality, but that he is a product of
his environment and his own subconscious psychic condition,

leople today grab onto these 'scientific rationalizations’
of psychology and the mistrust among men is pushed to
extremes
Man, thus, in this pathological condition where the

'immediacy of togetherness of man and man is destroyed’ (Ibid,
p.

224) has lost confidence in existence in general.
The existential mistrust is Indeed basically no longer,

)
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li*e the old kind, a mistrust of my
fellow-man It
the d etruCtlon ° f eonf ^«»ee
general,
f
That*™*?
lhat we can no longer
carry on a genuine dialogue
from one camp to the other Is the' severest
symptom
o.
the sickness of present-day man.
Existential mistrust is this sickness itself. But the
destruction
n human existence is the inner poisoning
°*
J ,
oi the total
human organism from which this sickness
stems, ( loc . clt,

m

As a consequence of today’s basic
mistrust people

feel more lonely and more insecure than ever before the flight into collectivism has become hysterical.
The

life of dialogue is threatened ever more. This existential

mistrust in human beings ultimately leads to a loss of
trust in God. The amount of atheism today la enormous.
If there still exists the belief in God in many indivi-

duals then, in most cases, this ie a belief in a pseudogod, in an idol, for no collectivist, since by definition

he has no true relation to his fellow-men, can have a true

relation to God. The atheistic psychological theories

which reduce God to a mere

t>ro

lection of the psyche are a

fatal aid on man’s way toward complete alienation from God.
The human race today has arrived at a stage where it can
‘no

longer stretch out /its/ hands from /its solitude/

Z>ts7 divine Thou.’ Nothing
communication with himself .

is left to man but his
'

(

to

’intimate

BMM p. 16?) Yet man cannot

remain with himself, especial!, today when he cannot even
trust himself since he too le a member of a frustrated,

repressed, and sublimating aggregation of people
steeps himself in the collective.

- so

he

III.

Necessity of

tl e

xe -

il;

e

flemedv

Structurlnr of Society

The alternative to collectivism, for Buber, is
no

i-

individualism,

i

or

tl

is woulo mean regression rather

than progression. Buber refuses to accept the 'elther/or'

proposition of our age

- the

demand that one accepts either

collectivism in form of the centralized socialized State,
on account of the defects of capitalism, or that one

accepts the capitalistic system, because of the drawbacks of collectivism. The false alternatives of our age,
that of Individualism and collectivism, have to be smashed
o.ll

together.

’Man,

1

says Buber,

‘is truly saved from the

"one" /the collective/ not by separation but only by

being bound up in genuine communion.'

(BMK p.

177) Genuine

realization is found only in a third alternative

- in

the relationship of man to man with his whole being.

Kan's salvation from the illusion of modern collectivism,
thus, is a question of the rescue of man's personal self,

of the rebirth of dialogue, and lastly, of the re-structuring
of society into a true community since only in it is true

dialogical life fully possible.
True community, however, cannot be brought about

through abstract ideas, political force, or new institutions, but the re-structuring of society has to begin with
the change of the basis of every true community - the
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relations between man and man. The remedy for the
complete

elimination of true dialogue in collectivlstic States, and
for the indirect and perverted relation between men
based

on a desire for exploitation rather than true togetherness

-

as found in the capitalistic States - is not a super-

society, but simply the strengthening of the will for

genuine relationships among people, (Fried p. 47) The
lack of true dialogue among men cann t be overcome
by

anything else but by the concrete individuals through,
their responding to the concrete situations which confront
them, by men who have the courage to live in 'fear of God,’

and who accept every situation with all its danger and

mystery with an open heart. The rebirth of true dialogue
can come on y through individuals

'vrho

mean community

in their innermost heart and establish it in their

natural sphere of relations,’ (Fried p, 146) through

individuals who are willing to stake their life in the

meeting with people and who deny no answer

to

the world,

'The erection of new institutions,' Friedman well summar-

izes Buber,
can only have a genuinely liberating effect when it
is accompanied by a transformation of the actual life

between man and man. This life between man and man
does not take place in the abstraction of the state
but rather there where a reality of spatial, functional,
emotional, or spiritual togetherness exists - in the
village and city community, in the workers' fellowship,
in comradeship, in religious union. (Fried p, h 6)

.
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fho
*

Poll tier ! Trine
Social brincl "TP~
*

°ne of the greatest obstructions in

our-

day againat

the rebirth of dialogue and the
development of true

community is the confusion of the political
principle
with the social principle, and the domination

of thec latter
1

by the former. It is this subordination
of the

de-centr&lietic principle

1

’social

meaning free fellowship and

association tc the ’central! a tic political principle'

meaning compulsjon ana control, which constitutes what
was called above social-political collectivism, and
the

overcoming of which will be an important initial step
on the way to t
oh®

ro/i

ox

t

of dialogue

,

.e

est&blist Blent of a fertile ground for

true dialogue, Although the actual rebirth,

as was said above, can start only from the

actual entering into relatln with

me

another, the first

step in the direction of true community will have to be
the breakdown of social -political collectivism, especially
in totalitarian States, since the presupposition for man’s

entering into dialogue is the destruction of any outward
control which would choke every attempt to dialogue at
its very beginning* In other words,

the presupposition for

the rebirth of dialogue - man’s ou twarc freedom to have

relations

-

must be fulfilled first. In totalitarian States,

where the whole life of people is controlled, true dialogue
cannot develop, even if certain individuals wanted true
communi ty

,
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reconstruct ton

1 ©
•

only

he;.-

jf

society

'• T

r* te r

Buber, can

'

in with

a radical

alteration of the relationship between
social and the political order. It es-n no longer the
he
a matter od substituting one political regime
for
but cof the emergence, in place of a
,
political regime
graf
ted^upon’ society
~
of a regime
w
j
expressive of society itself. (FI r. 07^
-

-

3

,

-

-

p

-

,

ir

While socialism, cased on the politics,! principle, starts

with an abstract idea and a uniform and rigid political
system true community based on the social principle must
,

start with the concrete persona with their problems and
tt

eir potentiality of forming a true community. True

socialism must grow from the urge in the concrete human

beings to form a community based on common needs, Interests,
language, tradition, etc.; it must come from beneath
the hardened mechanism of the State. The State must stop

being a

*

'-nac-.l

na roachinaruni that turns everything belong-

ing to it Into the components of some mechanism' and that

’strangles the individuality of small associations,' but
it has to become a

'

communi tas com muni taturn

.

the union of

the communities in community,’ within which the proper and

autonomous life of each community and all their members
can unfold.'

(Ibid, p, 39

)

Free associations must replace

the centralist! c State in which nothing or anic can 're-

sist "the rigidly centralized directive mechanism"' which
1

devour/s7 everything living j'

(loc, cit.) organic

communities which have sprung from common possessions,
morals, beliefs, interests, have to be exchanged for the

,

*

.
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mecharr cal association of Isolated

'

If-eeekS

S

idivi duals

’held together by force, compromise convention,
,
and public

opinion.'
froai

’

t:

e

(

'rlec

p. 45} Unless the

freeing
^ o

J

'

soclet”
</

pressure of the political principle’ through

e *de- centralization of political
see ial epontauei ty o

r

‘

a,

r.

over’

if-

effected, the

people will he endangered and

diminished and with it Its social vitalit;

.

For, writes

Buber
social vitality of a nation, and Its cultural
well, depend very largely
upor. the degree of social spontaneity to be found
there.,. the larger the measure of autonomy granted
to the local and regional and also to the functional societies, tl e
ore. re on is left for V e free
unfoldin of social energy. (PW p, 175)
the

fie radical abolishment of the centralized State in

favor of true community, which Buber advocates, does
not,

l

ow ever,

em

that any kind of State

destroyed, that the political principle k

1

s

s

to

to he

be sub-

stituted by the social prinolyle completely. In true
community, although it if based on free .association, there
has to be a certain amount of compulsion by the State, the

amount of this legitimate compulsion being determined by
the degree of incapacity/ for voluntary right order In the

eommuni ty
This difference between the strength of the social

and political principles Buber calls ’political surplus,’
and is defined by him In terms of the difference between
*

Administration’ and ’Government.

)

.
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•1
j

(Ibid, p,

174)

on ,
1 pc- c

the 11

1

ts

e

on t al oge
1

c xce if-.,,

rc

U

c

r

j

x

ep en t e

Justification
from the external and internal Instability, from the
latent state of crisis between the nations and
within every nation, which may at any moment become
an active crisis requiring more immediate and farreaching measures, (loc. cit.
The*

constant danger, however, in every State is that the

political surplus' becomes much bigger than

am

latent

crisis would require. Today, especially in collect! viatic
Staten, the political principle is in complete domination

of the social principle. It is therefore necessary today
despite all internal and external latent- crises

-

that

'efforts /are/ renewed again and again to determine in

what spheres it ie possible to alter the ratio between
Governmental and Administrative control in favor of the
latter.'

(Ibid, p.

175) The demarcation line

'between the

spheres which must of necessity be centralized and those

-

v

^

t
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whlch can operate In freed oir

he tween the degree of

(Government and the decree of autonomy'
has to

and It cr-o ed conti ru a 1 ly

»

historical circumstances .

*

end,

"be

revised

accordance with changing

i

(i oc.

cit.i

PTJ p.

134) In the

the change in the 'a~ror tl^nrscnt of
rowe r.

*

which

should always he accompanied by ’a continuous
change In
th€ - - w L re of power', should he a
transformation of 'Govern.

f

ment Into Administration as far ar the general and
particular conditions permit.'
41 though

this to eh is

a

difficult, strenuous, and

risky one, it is uncondlti

re-structuring of society as
reduction

a

*

sary,foi
a

rati

-

’a

League of Leagues, and a

the Otate to Its pro per function, vh i c h is

to maintain unity,

than a devouring of an amorphous

society by an omnipotent State:' better 'the right proportion,

tested anew every day according to changing conditions,

between group- 'reedom and collective order,* than 'an

absolute order imposed Indefinitely for the sake of an era
of freedom alleged to follow "of its own accord."’ (PD p.
1

48

)

Th e Overcoming of

'

Existential

M

s tru s

'

The elimination of central! a tic collectivism, however,
is only one of the two moot important presuppositions

for

the development of true dialogue and the development of

true community in which there is the right balance between
the powers

the political and social principle. The second
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one- concerned not primarily
with conditions outside
the individual person, as
was the first one with
the rigid
order of the centralis tic
state, but with man himself is the overcoming of the
'existential mistrust’ which
dominates the relationship among
people today.
The successful removal of the
centralists State is

not possible uless there are
truly responsible persons
who become bearers of the true
alternative - true community.
Otherwise, if the centralists State
is destroyed in a revolution by individuals who are basically
irresponsible,
the outcome will be an anarchistic,
atomized society

which finally will again develop into
centralized collectivism. Individualism is the false
alternative. The predominance of the social principle over
the political one
cannot be achieved by any devices of
political re-organization, (since community starts from the
bottom, with

concrete relations, and not from the top with
ideas), nor
by the radical destruction of political power
by

sible

'

’

irrespon-

peorle, (which would bring chaos), but only
through

basically changed relatl ns between men and between
communities, that is, by the concurrence of the abdication by the State of some of its power with the 're-

sponsible

activity of individuals who want genuine

community and who transform the political principle into
the social one. Since the political surplus is, in a way,

the expression of the extent to which there is lack of
true community in a society, the destructi n of the political

-Ill-

principle in a revolution would result in a
chaotic
atomized society (which formerly was held
together by

political power) which, in order to escape this
chaos,
would have to set up a political principle
stronger than
the one destroyed by the revolution. The
mechanistic

political principle, therefore, must not be destroyed
any faster than true organic community is actually

developing. The creation of real organic society itself will

eventually destroy the ’political surplus,' since it
will make it unnecessary. (In practice, the abdication

of power by the State

-

even if it would be replaced by

true community and not by chaos as in revolutionary

destruction - will naturally rarely be voluntary, but
usually requires the vigorous pressure of groups of people
capable of voluntary order which can force the State to

relinquish some of its 'political surplus.' While this is
thinkable in the western world, it is difficult to

imagine how this would be possible in Russia, where a
'vigorous pressure’ of a group of people who want voluntary order is very unlikely, since any formation of such
a group would be stifled in its very be inning in the first

place

.

)

In any event,

the re-structuring of society into a

true community requires the presence and responsibility
of true persons. True dialogue among people, however, is

possible only if they have confidence in one another. But
today the demonry of basic mistrust is rulinp the world

)
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and obstructing the rebirth of dialogue.

Nothing stands so much in the way of the rise of
a Civilization of Dialogue as the demonic
power
woich rules our world, the demonry of basic mistrust.
*hat. does it help to Induce the other
to Break if
basically one puts no faith in what he says? The
meeting with him already takes place under the perspective of his untrustworthiness, And this perspective is not incorrect, for his meeting with me
takes place under a corresponding perspective. (PW
p . 222
What is therefore necessary is that man overcome this
basic mistrust which separates him from his fellow-man

and which makes true community impossible. This, feels
Buber, must begin with a 'criticism of criticism!,' with
the showing, up of the 'fundamental and enormously in-

fluential error of all the theories of seeing through
and unmasking.

'

(Ibid, p. 226) This error is that the

newly discovered elements in the psychical and spiritual

existence of man are Identified with the total structure
of man instead of being assigned their proper place in
the context of a much greater organic whole. Consequently,

an 'uncritical acceptance of man's statements' is considered

absurd. But man, writes Buber,
is not to be seen through, hut to be perceived ever
more completely in his openness and his hiddenness
and in the relation of the two to each other, (ibid.
P. 227
)

This does not mean blind trust but clearsighted trust,
so that we wish to perceive the other's

)
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manifoldness and bis wholeness, his prooer character
without any preconceptions about this or that back- '
ground ano with the intention of accepting,
accrediting and confirming him to the extent that
hie perception will allow, (loc. cit.
,

I-

this happens, genuine dialogue between men can

be re-established. Accordingly then, the rise of true

community within States will be possible again, which in
turn, will eventually bring about an alteration of the

present relationship between the social and the political

principle in favor of the former. So can the capitalistic
central! zati n, which virtually forces thousands of people
into performing dull Jobs for some huge private enterprise,

be dissolved and replaced by a more intimate relation

between employer and employee and by a more satisfactory
work on the part of the employee, a work which will do

greater Justice to hie capacities. There will also be the

proper basis for a radical decrease In personal conformity
then partly due to 'responsible’ use of o-ass communication

with respect to social behavior, art a ppre elation, taste,
etc., which is enormous today in the west and presumably

also in the east.
The destruction of this basic mistrust is also a

necessary condition for dialogical international relation.
'Only if this happens'

(the destruction of mistrust), says

Buber, can a 'genuine dialogue begin between the two

camps into which mankind is split.'

(loc. cit.) Only men

who have 'overcome in themselves the basic mistrust' and
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ipable of recognising In their
partner in dialogue
the reality of his being,* can be
true spokesmen for
c

their countries. This kind of
representation is entirely
different from today's political
representation which has
reachec *a state of practically unlimited
representation'
and with this has brought about 'the
reign of practically
unlimited eentralistic accumulation of power.'
(PU p,

133)

It is a representation based on
far-sightedness, experience,

ano responsibility, free from the
'incrustation of catch-

words*

(Fried p. 221) and ’acquainted with the true needs

of lit s/ own people

’

as well as with those of other peoples.

(PV p, 228) These true representatives
will be able to

extract the true need from the exaggerations' and they
will 'unrelentingly distinguish between truth and propa-

ganda within what is called the opposition of interests.'
(loc.

cit.) Only when this extracting of the real conflict

between genuine needs from the alleged amount of antagonisms is done, will they procede to a solution of the

problems

casing it on the question;

,

What does every man

need in order to live as man? For, writes Buber, if the

globe is not to burst asunder, every man must be given what
he needs for a really human life.'

(loc.

cit.) Only if men

come 'together out of hostile camps* and enter into true

dialogue despite their opposing views, guided by 'unreserved
honesty'

-

is there hope for the rescue of man.

Once the mistrust among nations is destroyed, and true

dialogue is established, the fear with which every country
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tocay meets other nations and societies
will vanish. Tils,
in turn, will make any centralization by
the State in

the aim of national defense superfluous.
It is therefore

here, with the establishment of peace

amonsr,

nations,

that Buber finds the true start for the establishment

of organic societies.

Under rigorous scrutiny, thus, it is the elimination
of the basic mistrust among men which is the first step
towards true community. Everything else, even the destruction

of political power, which above was treated as being a

prerequisite for true community, as a simultaneously
necessary starting point along with the elimination of
existential mistrust, is secondary. Only from the viewpoint of a single totalitarian nation, as for example
Russia, the abdication of centralized power is as much a

prerequisite for true community as is the overcoming of
basic mistrust, since any development of true community
is impossible without the state's allowing for it. In

this case international peace on account of the elimination

of ’basic mistrust' would not mean any de-centralization
of the State since the latter has an internal ideological

basis, and is only to a smaller part the outcome of

international insecurity. From this point of view, the

difference between the treatment of the relinquishment of
centralized power as of the same importance as the removal
of basic mistrust as seen above, and the present treatment

of the elimination of basic mistrust as the only first
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step towards community must be
understood. But from the
international viewpoint, as well as from
the viewpoint
of a nation th- t is centralized only
for its own defense, the destruction of this
cetralized force is a

direct result of peace

- a

peace which, in turn,

c-

n

only exist when Individual nations have
confidence
in each other and people no longer
fear one another.

Or, this destruction of centralized power
is a result
/

of the pressure of organic groups which
have developed

as far as the State has allowed, and which
too are based
on blue dialogxcal relationshl s, whose prerequisite
is

that basic mistrust be removed.
The most efficient way, Buber feels, for society
to eliminate the basic mistrust among human beings and

to weaken the power of the political principle, is social

education. In contrast to political propaganda which 'seeks
to "suggest" a ready-made will to the members of society,'

social education attempts 'to arouse and to develop in the

minds of its pupils the spontaneity of fellowship which
is Innate in all unravaged human souls and which harmonizes

very well with the development of personal existence

and personal thought.' (PW p. 176) This, Buber feels, can
only be accomplished by a complete overthrow of the political trend, which nowadays dominates education in the world.

True ©due tlon for citizenship in a State is the education
for the 'effectuation

of society* towards a 'truly social
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outlook and
ic

it?

a

truly social will.’

(loc. cit.) In the end,

lie education ot peoele ready to respond with

their whole being and with true responsibility to
everything
they meet in life.

a

—— c
,.

km m dommuni tv of Communl ties

—

Buber’s trust in the capacities of aan leads
him to
believe that the complete elimination of the existential

mistrust among people may ultimately lead to the 'resolute
will of all peoples to cultivate the territories and
raw

materials of our planet and govern its inhabitants,
p.

132) This, for Buber , is the only guaran-

tee for prolonged peace. Only if there is co-operation
in the control of raw materials, agreement of methods of

manufacture of such materials, and regulation of the
world market will society be able to constitute itself as
such.
At this point, however, Buber clearly

rmli-es man

will be ‘threatened by a danger greater than all the previous ones: the danger of a gigantic centralization of

power covering the whole planet and devouring all free
community.’

(loc, cit.) Evermore, therefore, is it necessary

that with ’unwearying scrutiny’ society is given its proper

independence and saved from the depredations of the State.
(Ibid, p* 13^) Everything, sayo Buber,

depends on whether the collectivity in whose hands
the control of the means of production passes will
facilitate and promote in its very structure and in
all Its institutions the genuine common life of the
various groups composing it - or whether, In fact,
these groups themselves become proper foci of the
productive process; therefore on whether the masses
are so organized in their separate organizations
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(unc various communities") as to be as
powerful as
tbe common economy of man permits;
therefore on
wa ether centralist representation only
goes as far
as the new order of things absolutely^
demands. (Ibid.
PP« '33-»34>

On the other hand - while objecting to a regulation of the relation between centralization and
de-central-

ization by general political principles, Buber, in order
to prevent the development of society into an aggregate
of

independent communes or co-operatives, does not undertake
to solve the Questions as to the degree of economic or

political autonomy to be permitted these communes or co-

operatives alone, rather, Buber feels, this massive problem must be approached with the ’autonomy of the spirit,'
with a constant and tireless weigh’ ng and measuring of the

right proportion between centralization and de- centralization, The community process and attitude simply have to

determine the relations of the communes with

e-a

ch other

to a large degree since, says Buber, only a community of
{

communities deserves the title of Commonwealth. For if the

various communes fall to co-operate among themselves, the
devel pment to real community and to a world-wide com: on-

wealth will be barred. A certain amount of res onsible

centralization - of course based If^ely upon the Individual nature of each commune

-

will be necessary to insure

true community.

Buber's Utopian Socialism, of which the aim Is inter-

national co-operation in form of a confederation of common-

wealths which, in turn, are composed of communities made up
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of

^ommmQQ and co-operatives of all sizes,

is thus de-

pendant upon what he nails ’Full Co-operatives’
in their
various forms, and on various levels. And
’the more,*

Buber,

says

"’Utopianism’’ clarifies its ideas the more
patently

does the leading role seem to fall to' the
Full Co-operative
in form of a Producer-cum+Oonaumer Co-operative.’
’

(PU p. 81}

inis ^ind of Pull Co-operative (Yollgenosaen-schaft)
however,

must not be confused with the co-operative system as
found
in capitalistic

states in the West. For there, the Consumer

and Producer Co-operatives do not, in turn, form an organic

co-operation of production and consumption whether on
the level of the village, the district, or the State.
Ha tier,

the Consumer Co-operatives have become big cap-

italistic bureaucracies (Ibid. p. 65 ), and the Producer

Co-operatives have succumbed to the fatal desire of getting

other people to work for them. The Producer Co-operative,
however, is better suited in itself than the Consumer Co-

operative to take part in the re-structuring of society
since ’production of goods implicates people more pro-

foundly than a common acquisition of goods;... it embraces

much more of their powers and their lifetime,

’

(Ibid. p. 78)

Consumption, on the other hand , brings people together only

with a highly impersonal part of their being, yet both

-

the Consumer Co-operative in a ’technical and managerial

sense* and the Producer Co-operative in a

’structural and

adapt themselves to the capitalistic

psychological sense’

-

pattern,

'The militant capitalistic organizations,'

(loc, cit.

)

7
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e.g. labor unions and trade unions
'which the proletariat

erected against Capitalism,' since they
have 'no access
to the life of society itself and
Its foundations:

pro-

duction and consumption,

'

fall to solve this capitalistic

and non-co-operative trend of production
and consumption.
(Ibid, p,

139)

The remedy for all these deficiencies,
Buber holds,
is the 'Full Co-operative' which is a
synthesis of a de-

centralized production (including industry, agriculture,
and the handicrafts), and a non— conforming
consumption in
a confederntlve community.

It the principle of organic re-structuring
is to
become a determining factor the influence'of the
Full Co-operative will be needed, since in it
production and consumption are united and industry is complemented by agriculture . ./A
genuine ana lasting re-organization of society from
within can only prosper in the union of producers
and consumers, each of the two partners being
composed of independent and homogeneous co-operative units. (Ibid, pp, 78-79)
.

These Full Co-operatives must not, however, remain

isolated experiments but the ultimate aim is an organic

confederation of Full Co-operatives, for the vitality of
Socialism can only be

guaranteed by a wealth of Full Co-operatives all
working together and, in their functi nal synthesis,
exercising a mediatory and unifying influence. (Ibid
p. 79)

Thus, although 'genuine ’’Utopian" Socialism can be termed
’’topical” Socialism' in that

'it is not without toporranh
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lcal character* because it
e eks

to realize itselt in a. given olace and. under
Riven conditions, that is, ’’here and now,” and to
the greatest degree possible. .. It regards the local
realization, . .as nothing but a ooint of deoarture,
a beginning. ..that roust be there if this realization
is to fight for its freedom and win universal validity,
-

(Ibid. p. 81)

Then, maybe,

la more than a hundred years of struggle there
L* ill/ emerge a network of Settlements, territorially
based and federatively constructed, without dogmatic rigidity, allowing the roost diverse social forms
to exist side by side, but always aiming at the
new organic whole. (Ibid. p. 79)
I4ost

experiments of the establishment of Pull Co-

operatives up to now have been unsuccessful since they
have been based on feelings, or have been started from
an abstract dogma or idea without considering the local
needs of people, or they have been failures because of
their isolation from other communities, that is, because
of lack of federation.
The-

most successful attempts to achieve the Full Co-

operative so far, Buber feels, have

een the various forms

of the Village Communes, for there ’communal living is

based on the amalgamation of production /in form of an
organic union of agriculture, industry, and handicrafts/
and consumption.

’

(Ibid, p,

140) The gre- t value of these

village communes for society lies in their potential Influence to 'transform the town organically In the closest
possible alliance with technological develo ments and to
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tum
(

It into an aggregation composed of smaller
units.'

Ibid , p,

1

'

1

)

(If this development of smaller and Inde-

pendent communities In

big,

towns is to be possible, then,

Buber feels, besides the de-centralizing influence of the

village communes, it will also be essential that further
tochnolo ical developments will 'facilitate and actually

require the de-centralization of industry.’

(loc.

clt.)

For only de-cen trail zed industry can be an ally in the

endeavor of the social re-structuring of society.)
The most successful actualization of Buber’s concept

of the Village Commune today is the 'Jewish Village
Commune in its various forme, as found in Palestine.

(loc.

'

cit.) This 'signal non-failure,' Buber writes, can be

attributed in part, to the unusual approach of the founders
who

did not, as everywhere else in the history of
co-operative settlements, bring a plan with them,
a plan which the concrete situation could only fill
out, not modify; the ideal gave an Impetus but no
dogma, it stimulated but did not dictate. (Ibid,
p.

1^3)

This Commune is based on the response to a need rather
than being simply the romantic attempt to fulfill a

doctrine or ideal. Its movements, aims, and activities

never ’hardened into a cut-and-driec programme.’

(loc.

clt.) Its process Is one of differentiation which is yet

'intent on preserving the principle of integration.'
p.

(Ibid,

145) And while the men who make up these communities
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have exercised remorseless ’clear-sighted collective
self -observation and self-criticism’ and established an
'

amazingly positive relationship

-

amounting to a regular

faith - ...to the inmost being of their commune,

'

(loc. cit.)

they have at the same time, exercised a ’formative structural effect on the social periphery.’

(Ibid, p,

143) They

have also left freedom for the branching off of new forms
of communes. Each one of these new forms

grew out of the particular social and spiritual
needs as these came to light - in complete freedom,
and each one acquired, even in the initial stages,
Its own ideolo :y - in complete freedom, each struggling to propagate itself and spread and establish
Its oror-er sphere - all in complete freedom. (Ibid,
p.

145)

These men realized that each Village Commune with Its
special mode of being demanded its particular sort of

realization. According to the peculiarities of local needs
the Village Commune had its particular form which, in turn,

was molded with a change of internal or external conditions.

With the influx of refugees, the original character
of the founders of the Jewish Village Communes was altered.
As a consequence, real problems arose which had their

basis not in the alteration of the outward structure of the

communities

- idea,

work, etc.

-

but rather in the funda-

mental aspect of inter-human relationships. ’Where people
are ant to slip,

'

says Buber in this connection,

is in their relationship to their fellows.

.

.£Thig7 is

,

-125not a matter of intimacy at all... The
question is
one of openness
A real community need not
consist, of peorue who are perpetually together;
t-ut
it must consist of people who,
reclsely because
o/ ore comrades, have mutual access to one
another
and are ready for one another. A real community
is
one which in every point of its being possesses
potentially at least, the whole character of community. The internal questions of a community re
t' us
iu reality questions relating, to Its own genuineness,
hence to its Inner strength and stability.' (Ibid.
p.
rati.er

.

Again we see from this special

ca.se

that, in the end,

the

base of any true community is the genuineness of the rela-

tionship between men, based on mutual confidence and responsibility

.

true focialla m

1

c

l-..o

nell ^icue

-loci:.-

11 am

If men, as today, have turned away from God, and

have caused the hardening of Him, the only way bock to

Him will be through a renewal of the immediacy between
man and man through genuine relations in true community.

When man has become solitary and ’can no longer say "Thou”
to the '’dead'

1

known God, everything depends on whether he

can still say it to the livln

unknov/n God by saying ''thou”

with all hie being to another living and known man.
p.

16P)

’Then after lor

1

(BKM

silence and stammering, we shall

have addressed our eternal ’’Thou
'At its core,

1

says Buber,

11

anew.’

(FW p, 229)

’the conflict between

the mistrust and trust of man conceals the conflict be-

tween the mistrust and trust of eternity.'

(loc, clt.)

Religion and true community, feels Buber, are closely bound

)
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up with each other; ultimately, true
socialism is really

religious socialism. Genuine 'Utopian Socialism'
is the
latter’s most mature expression. Religious socialism,
therefore, does not imply the gathering of people
for the

worship of God according to rigid rituals. It Is not an
organized world church; neither does it mean that the

kingdom of God Is to be equated with true community; nor
must It be confused with the
joining of religion and socialism in such a manner
that each of the constituents could aci ieve, arart
from the other, independence If not fulfilment; it
cannot mean merely th't the two have concluded an
agreement to unite their autonomies In a comm n
being and working. (Ibid. 112)

Religious
socialism
that each
other for

socialism can only mean th^t religion and
are essentially directed to each other,
of them needs the covenant with the
the fulfilment of its own essence, (loc.

cit.

It means that man can truly realize himself only In the

true community, since only through his genuine relation-

ship to his fellow-men can he have true relationship to
God; and man is not fully man, unless he can say ’Thou’
to Him.

It means that only through men’s being open to

one another, helping each other, and being responsible to
one another, Is God

-

who is In all things

-

actually

realized and met In all his mystery. Only in between,
in the genuine dialogical relation between man and his

fellow-men and the world, only in true community, does
the Absolute manifest itself, only there is He realized.
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itellrious socialism,

therefore, Is based on community built

out of direct relationships among men and
communities, on
men who go out in the world and meet it with courage
and

responsibility and in ’fear of God.’ It means that the
center

o>

community must be the common relation of all

individuals to God. Although, says Buber, the Single One
'cannot win to a legitimate relation with God without a

legitimate relation to the body politic,
to God is the

'

the relation

'defining force' of all relations.

(BMft p.

70)

Community and Religion, thus, although not to be equated
with each other, cannot find true realization without one
another.

Beginning with Leonhard Ragaz's words, 'Any socialism

whose limits are narrower than God and man is too narrow
for us,' Buber writes in the first thesis of his short
essay on 'Three Theses of Religious Socialism,' stressing
the necessity of the covenant of Religion and community:

Rellplo

that is the human person's binding of himself
can only attain its full reality in the will
for a community of the human race, out of which alone
God can prepare Lis kingdom, ^oclalltas . that is mankind's becoming a fellowship, man’s becoming a fellow
to man, cannot develop otherwise than out of a common
relation to the divine centre, even if this be again
and still nameless. Unity with God and community
among the creatures belong together. Religion without socialism is disembodied spirit, therefore not
genuine spirit; socialism without religion is body
emrtied of spirit, hence also not genuine body. (P'w
«

to God,

p/112)
With respect to the gross confusion between true and fictitious religion and society, Buber says:

:
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re

^

mS lna titution8, and societies
are
ney serve as expression, as share
?
and bearer of real re! i, io - a real
self-binding o?
n FerS ° n t0 God *’* So * too, all
"socialist"*
f
tendencies,
programmes, and parties are real.
1 ” sofar a s7 they serve as
strength, direction,
and instrument of real so cla litas - mankind’s
really becoming a f ellowshlp. . At present
the prevailing religious forms, institutions, and
societies
have entered into the realm of the fictitious:
the
prevailing socialist tendencies, programmes, and
parties have not yet emerged from the fictitious.
(Ibid, p, 113)

/^ily

rg3 l

-p7

+?'

*

.

Finally, emphasizing that the point where religion
and

socialism can meet ia the ’concrete personal life,' Buber

writes
As the truth of religion consists not of dogma or pre-

scribed ritual but means standing and withstanding

In the abyss of the real reciprocal relation with the
mystery of God, so socialism in its truth is not
doctrine and tactics but standing and withstanding
in the abyss of the real reciprocal relation with
the mystery of man... It is presumption to "believe”
in something without - however inadequately - living
that in which one believes. . .Religion must know
that it Is the everyday that sanctifies or desecrates
devotion. And socialism must know that the decision
as to how similar or dissimilar the end which is
attained will be to the end which was previously
cherished is dependent upon how similar or dissimilar to the set goal are the means whereby it is
pursued. Religious socialism means that man in the
concreteness of his personal life takes seriously
the fundamentals of this life; the fact that God
Is, that the world is, and. that he, this human person,
stands before God and In the world. (Ibid. pp. 113-114)

Buber’

s

Uto la is not a Romantic Illusion
•

In his passion for ’Utopian’

Socialism, Buber is In

no way a victim of utopian, and romantic Illusions, for

he is well aware of the difficulties which would be in-

t
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volved in applying his social philosophy to any
largescale economies and societies. ‘Therefore, Buber

is not

giving only an ideal picture of society but also a
realistic suggestion for steps to be taken in tie
direction
Oi.

its realization — whether now the ideal state is

v,itf

in the realm oi

history or not. he emphasizes that he

is not suggesting a radical change from the rre sen

political system into a commonwealth along the lines of
the Jewish Village Commune, but he is presenting merely

an ultimate goal toward which man has to work if his

authentic existence is to be saved. He is suggesting only
a direction of movement toward this goal. Accordingly, he

does not speak for revolution which will break down the
central! stic State, or for mere rearrangement of political
power. Rather, he starts with the relationship between

individuals which, Buber feels, can best be achieved
through social education directed at the 'effectuation of
society.’ Buber is not advocating rapid and com lete de-

centralization, but only as much decentralization as is
possible in order to remain secure from other societies
and to maintain internal unity. Be is realistic in that he

does not start with a '"schematic fiction” which begins

with a theory of the nature of man and deduces a social

order which shall employ all man's capacities and satisfy
all his needs' but he 'undertakes to transform contemporary

man ana his conditions on the basis of an impartial and un-

dogma tic understanding of both,’

(Fried p, 211) Buber tries

.
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to preserve the diversity and contrariety of trends
in our

age up to the point that they are harmonious with true

community

Buber knows that the state of the ’original rightness'
of man is not an historical possibility and that 'in all

probability, there will never, so long as man is what he
Is, be freedom pure and simple, and

State,

/that^ there will be

that is compulsion, for lust so long*'

(PU p,

104)

Therefore, although he warns against the using of evil

means for good ends, he does not fall into utopian idealism in his social ethics, but he recognizes that living

entails suffering and doing injustice.

'In order to pre-

serve the community of men,' writes Buber,

'we are often

compelled to accept wrongs in decisions concerning the
community.'

writes:

'If

(IW p. 246) And in a letter to Gandhi, be

there Is no other way of preventing evil

destroying the good,

I

trust

myself up to God’s hands.'

shall use force and give

I

(quoted by Fried p. 145)

What matters is that in every hour of decision we
are aware of our responsibility and summon our
conscience to weigh exactly how much Is necessary
to preserve the community and accept Just so much
and no more. (IW p, 246)
However, although Buber's Utopian Socialism is maybe

not an historical possibility

-

and Buber knows this - his

ideas must not be discarded as utopian illusions, for

what Buber pictures is what man is ultimately Intended for
complete personal authenticity

o.nd

-

freedom, hie true cornmun-

,
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lty, therefore, has relevance as an ideal towards
which

man has to move, whether it can he reached or not. And
the ideal has reality Insofar as it directs man's response
to the concrete situation.

Buber’s Utopian Socialism has

practical validity as a guide to the re— structuring of
society - the only thing which will rescue man’s authenticity. However impractical and impossible the re-structur-

ing of society into true community may thus be, it is the

only means for the saving of our real personal self from
the fiery Jaws of totalitarian collectivism. It is also the

solution to the other alternative, that of carl taller.
which along with the centralization in the aim of national

defense, has created the rasa societies in the west
through large scale and highly industrialized centralistlc

mass production economy, mass consumption, and irres onsible use of mass communication. So is it the only true al-

ternative to the various drawbacks of present day democracy: political centralization in the aim of national

defence; centralization to the end of the social welfare
State;

tie presence of capitalists In form of single, pow-

erful owners, or members; of capitalistic producer and con-

sumer co-operatives

-

remnants of the alternative of collec-

tivism, i.e. individual lam; uniformity of work, brought

about by the capitalistic and large scale private enterprises and producer co-operatives which force reople out
of their own small enterprises, and by a large scale, highly

industrialized mass production economy also resulting from

.
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tfie

substitution of handle re. ts by huge
'

prlvr.tc.lv

owned

capitalistic industries; mass consumption, made possible
through mass production and intensified by the irresponsible use of mass communication
Man, if he wants to escape from de-personall ation
z
In collectivity, and from the empty subjectivism of

individualism, has to enter into relation with his fellowmen. And this, Buber feels, is possible to a full extent

only in true community

,

Consequently, the way towards

personal authenticity has to be the way towards true
community, regardless of whether the latter can ever be

perfected in the sense of Buber's Utopian Socialism.

KFIST&40LGGX

Buber

*

s

theory of knowledge differs from
all the

traditional theories essentially.

g hile

all the tradi-

tional forms of epistemology have been
based on the
reality cf the subject-object relationship,
Buber proposes a more humanly realistic account of
truth and of the
way in which we know, that is, a dialogical
theory of
knowing, and of truth, based on the reality
of genuine
dialogue, on the view that renllty is not"
moved Into
the systematic and abstract, but is to be
found in the

particular, in the concrete, in the real meeting of
the Other.

iTuth is In the

eetiiv; with the Other

Human truth, Buber holds, is to be found in man’s

relationship to God, fellowmen, and nature, in a relationship which is effected with man’s whole being. Human truth
is the making present

(

Vergegenwaertigung) of the

Other in true dialogue. Although, writes Buber, ulti-

mate truth is one. It is given to human beings only
as they enter into true life-relationships with the

Other. Human truth
(

Verwirkll chung )

,

s

ring 3 only from genuine realization

that is, from those intensified

momenta of existence in which the totality of one’s

being is brought to a single thing or ev nt.

t

•

-
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M&inst

the Correspondence
a Theory of Truth

Praprma tl s

1

Coherence

anc3

The dialogical concept of truth is naturally
in-

compatible with the traditional theories of truth.
Truth, for Buber, is not the conformity or
correspondence

between a proposition and that to which the proposition
refers. It is also not the coherence of an array of
pro-

positions

,

ness of 1 i T
truth’

since this is incompatible with the concretee

.

According to the logical conception of

(coherence theory), says Buber,

only one of two contraries can be true, but in the
reality of life as one lives it they are inseparable
The person who makes a decision knows that his
deciding is no self-delusion; the person who has
acted knows that he was and is in the hand of God.
The unity of the contraries is the mystery at the
innermost core of the dialogue, (quoted by Fried p. 3)
The pragmatic theory of truth la equally untenable in

Buber’s eyes, since it is not based on true reality,

which is lived reality here and now

.

Truth, for Buber, is

always in the present, and has value in itself here and now;
it is not a means to something that is going, to occur in

the future. The pragmatic

ti

the categories of ’means,'

eory of truth is based on

’usefulness,' and ’future;

1

Buber's

dialogical theory of Truth is based on the categories of
’presentness,’

'immediacy,*

'ends,' and

'value in itself,

5

Tru tin is not Subjective

Truth, Buber holds, is also not subjective. Stlrner

-

-136a German proponent of subjectivism
- Buber feels is wrong
in claiming that
Truth ... exists

only - in your head.’

'

'iou alone are the truth.’
I'rut!:

is what is Mine,’

’The truth is a - creature.’

'Human truth,* says Buber,

’is

here bound up with the human person's
lack of responsibility,’

i.e., hie lack of true relation. Truth
cannot be

suDjectivisedj it is not a ’creature,’ but can
only be
'discovered' in true dialogue.
Truth la Unoo sees sable

Although, writes Buber, Stlrner is wrong in declaring
uruth subjective, he is right when - in the aim of
making

truth subjective - he undertakes 'the dissolution of
ssco. i-ruth,

of ’truth’ as a general good that can

be taken into possession and possessed,

'that is once in-

dependent of and accessible to the person.' (BMK p. 46)
Possessed truth, /Buber says/, is not even a creature,
it is a ghost, a succumbus with which a man mav
succeed in effectively imagining he is living/ but
with which he cannot live. You cannot devour the
truth, it is not served up anywhere in the world,
you cannot even gape at it for it is not even an'
object.

Although truth is ’eternally Irremovable

'

(Ibid. p. 4?)

it can never be possessed.

Truth Cannot be Collectivized

Stlrner, thus, as can be seen from the above, was

aiming at the right thing

- the

dissolution of possessed

,
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truth - but he wae wrong In
Baking truth 'subjective'
Instead. And this is so not only
because truth is simply
not subjective, but because the
oubjectlvization of truth
leads to the concept of truth as
being psychologically

and sociologically relativized. Fcr,
says Euber, since
Stlrner s dissolution of possessed
truth Is based on
'the demonstration that
it is conditioned by the
person,'
what else does It mean to say
that "'Truth Is what
Is Mine". ..-'And what I take
as true Is defined by what
I am,"' than to say
that "What I am is conditioned
by
ay complexes'*... "And what I
am Is conditioned by the class
I belong to.'” (Ibid.
pp. 46-47)
'

'

*

he

c 1

solution of possessed truth

its substitution by

*

is right, but

sub jectivlzed truth’ is escaping
from

one trap, falling into another,
and falling into a third
one - one more vicious than the last into the psychological and sociological relativization
of truth. Here the

truth is neither created by the individual,
nor possessed
in a freely chosen way, but one is
virtually possessed
by a truth* which is in turn determined
by, and relative to,
a person's complexes and the psyche of the
masses. Truth

becomes, in the end, collectivized.
fo this
o ppo s ed

.

he

development of truth Buber is bitterly
v;

r i tes

.ihe sociological doctrine of the age
has exercised a
relatlvizing effect, heavy with consequences, on
the concept of truth, in that it has, in the dependence of the thought processes on social processes,

-

)

- 138 -

410 " of thou eht With
existence.
mrSmtlrtSM
aS Justified in that it
lH°V
Mmn
of “ “an to hla conditioning
,

reality.
realltv But
ftl its
l^. Justification
,
was perverted into
the opposite when its authors
omitted
lo draw the
basic ooundary line between
what can and wh t cannot
r,
8t °? d aR condlUoned in this way.
That is
thev
® y d?S not comprehend the
*5
person in his total real
, 4
6 in with the Single One as
a whole
g
®1
W:0 ?
1 ®h
t0 rsc ognl*e with hi a total
®%
beln f!>
v
,*
i
c
?f’c
-- ia
t toe iorce of
is desire for the truth
f
points burst the ideological*’
80
belns* Xh€ ®an who thinks
ic;
;\\ S ial
existentially
that Is, who stakes his life in
rin s lnto his real relation to the
?
?
tratn not merely
his
conditioned qualities but also
ie uii conditioned nature,
transcending them, of hi a
h
*8
raap
of
his
*
indomitable will for the
°,\
?
trut,'
which also
carries along with it the whole
personal power of standing his test. (Ibid,
p 81)
^

'

•

^

,

,

It is of course impossible, says Buber,
time and again
to determine whether a discovered truth
can or cannot be

derived from the social factor.
hu
.it is an ineluctable duty to accept
what cannot
be bo derived as a border concept and thus to
point out, as the unattainable horizon of the distinction mace by the sociology of knowledge, what
takes place between the underlvable in the recognizing person ana the underlvable in the object of
his recognition, (loc. cit.

Tru tu is ixlstentl illy Realized in

I

rue iialo.pue

Again we can see Buber’s philosophy of the ’narrow
ridge.’ Truth, for him, is neither subjective, nor collec-

tivistic, nor is it an independent good that can be possessed

but it is dialogical. It is found in the meeting of man
with the Other. Although, says Buber, truth cannot be
possessed, or created,

;

-139ther® does exist a partioluation
In the beino- of
e
l
man
who
stand fits test.
“; a real relation of
5 S! 2 exists
the
whole
human
; r ^;son to the
pei
unpossessed, unpossessable truth and
8
“?”? C t6<5 ? n i y la standing Its test. This
real relation, whatever
It Is caller,,
relation to the Present Being. (Ibid. la the
47

”

*™V

'

)

Although truth cannot be possessed, it 'can
be served...
by perceiving and standing test.'
(loc. cit.)
nere Buber is closely related to Kierkegaard
who
says

he who communicates it /the Truth/ le only a
Single
^ne» Ano then its communication is again onlv
for
tne^ingle One; for this view of life, "the Single
One ,1s the very truth, (loc. cit.)

Buber points out that it is not that the Single One
exists or should exist which is described as the truth,

but ’’this view of life'* which consists in the
Single One’s existing, and which is hence also
simply identified with him. To be the Single One
is the communication of the Truth, that is, the
human Truth, (loc. cit.)
•Stlrner'fs

’You alone are the truth' and Kierkegaard* a 'The

Single One is the truth* thus mean completely different
things . The Single One is the truth, not because he thinks
1

it, but because he existentially stands the

test of the

appearing truth by the personal existence expressing ’what
is unsaid.'

(Ibid, p, 48)

God is the truth because he Is, the Single- One is
the truth because he reaches his existence, (loc. cit.)

The

human side of truth/ e&ys
Buber, 'is in
human existenc e.' (loe. clt.)
luean truth U, therefore
not a having - tat a ^ooailty,
it
vital rather than
conceptual. It can be confirmed
only in the life
’

»

of man,

in the life of a community.
It loses its meaning if it
is
cut loose from its connection
with the life in true dlalogu
It has to become life If it is
to remain real truth. Buber

agrees with Kierkegaard’s claim that
‘the truth for the
Single One only exists in his producing
it himself in
action.
’Human truth,’ Buber says, ’is bound up
with the

responsibility of the person. . .ton finds the
truth to be
true only when he stands its test.’ (Ibid.
p. 82)

’Whatever the word ’’truth” may mean in other
spheres,’
Friedman well summarizes Buber, ’in the realm
between man
and man it means that one imparts oneself to
the other
as what one is.’ It means avoiding all appearance,
but

allowing the person with whom one communicates
take of one’s being.

ano

com inning

’

to par-

(Fried p. 86) It means affirming

the other one’s full being, by making him

fyll£ present, by becoming aware of him as a whole, single,
and unique person.

Living with one’s whole being, to be sure, is dangerous and strenuous

-

it always threatens the stability of

tne thinker. It does not allow for complete security

through the possession of a solid general truth. Yet only
the man who experiences with his whole being, using the

powers of true realization, will gain unch rived truth which

'
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ne himself has discovered.
t 0t

with

The realising man Is
unpro-

wlthout E county , yet only he

*

llty

re-

rJ ' D,
'

02

anfi.

la

able to ’meet

truth.

thls rePaon > ®uet have faith
In the truth

'as that which is Independent
of him... which ho cannot
-c,u.ic for hlcself, but With which

he can enter Into a

real relation of his very life.'

(

Bfs p . 82)

He rauBt hove

faith In truth os In 'Itself Inac
eeslble but disclosing
itself. In the fact of true
responsibility which awaits the
teat', (loo. clt.) as that which
c'n neither be possessed
nor expressed, but which can only ’be
existentially realised'
in true dialogue. (Ibid. p. 48)
Any genuine llfa-rel ticnehip to Divine
3einp; th-t is, -ny such relationship effected
with the man's
- is a human truth, and
m n has no other
tratu.
j.o realise this does not mean
to relatlvise
truth.
The ultimate truth is one, but it is riven
to man only as it enters, reflected as irj
a prism,
into the true-life-rel; tionsaipB of the
human persons.
a tv re it, and yet we have it not,
in its riultlcolored reflection*
'The True, which is identical
wiUi tne Divine, can never be perceived by us
dir
wo only contemplate it in its r flection/' in the etlv
example, the symbol.’ .. .(Hunan truth) is participation
in Being*
It cannot elalm universal validity, but
L
lived, and it can je lived exemplary, symbolically.
(PW pp. 79-80)
‘

-• lj

-'

Human truth and the way of achieving it seem to merge
into one.

e

*- •

,;

-'

a

r

v

In the following section

of

I

1

'

''nov/l ntr ^

shall attempt to describe

In more detail the ’dialogical’ way of
knowing, and its

relationship to the traditional views of knowledge.
j

j

^fflnatlon of Traditional Epistemolog ical Problems on
oS ^ ^ 1

*
1

t emo 1 o

lea 1 irloritv of I- Thou ovfcVT-It

As already mentioned at the beginning of this

chapter, traditional epistemology rested exclusively on
the reality of the object-subject relationship ano,

consequently, had to wrestle with the problems connected

with this dichotomy,
object?

s

'how does the subject know the

'What is more real: the subject or the object?'

'What is the nature of the object, of the subject?'

'

What

is the relationship between the subject and the object?'

These are the constant problems.

Buber’s dialogical philosophy of I-Thou cuts beneath
all these distinctions of the I-It epistemologies,

establishing an entirely different way of knowing, one
which avoids all the pitfalls of traditional epistemological theories and nullifies the traditional epistemological

problems in general.
This elimination of traditional epistemological

problems Buber bases - in addition to the view of the

ontological priority of I-Thou over 1-It

-

on his anthro-

pological belief that the I-Thou relation between men is
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"

rom a

<3eve l°Pffiental

point of view, prior to the I-It

relationship among them. Consequently
the I-It or subjectobjecv waj, of snowing must be based
on and derived from
the dialogical way of knowing.
The problems arising in
connection with the former become secondary.
This marks

a complete reversal of the
traditional view according to

which the relation between persons is
derived from the
relation of the knowing, subject to the external
world.
As

I

become I,

I

say Thou,'

says Buber. From this,

feels Friedman, it follows that our belief
in the reality
of the external world is based on our
relationship with

other selves. Consequently, Buber is opposed

to

the view

that we know the external world of the senses
directly
and other selves only indirectly by analogy, that
the

child ^lrst knows the material objects through hie eenses
and only afterwards, through the behavior of other
persons,

comes to knew them a t persons. Buber believes that the

child first, comes to know persons as persons, and then

arrives at a knowledge of the external world. A child has
the Innate potentiality of becoming a person. Its first

meeting with persons is prior to the knowledge of the

outer worlo, even prior to the child’s awareness of himself as I,
From this initial

I -Thou

relationship, Buber holds,

the child’s knowledge of the external world is derived.

The child, through the social relationship with others

gradually takes over the I-It relationship to people and
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things of the adult. Through
a constant comparison
and
imitation of the perceptions of
others and their way of
dealin with their environment,
with its own perceptions
ant, ways of action,
this transition from the I-Thou
to
an 1-1 t relation with the
external things is brought
about. Thus, on account of the
derlvatory and secondary
character of the I-It relation,
dialogue in later life
Which is often purely technical,
thus no genuine dialogue,
and Itself belonging to the world
of It, may yet produce
the strong belief in a reality 'outside.'
It
can do this,

however, only because it is based on the
prior meeting
with the Thou.

4-

Thie

LS. fL

Response to and a Becominr Aware

knowledge yielded through the reality of the

I-Thou relationship is not a knowledge of the other
one or
my 8 elf as an objective entity, rather, it coneipts
in a

genuinely reel pro cal meeting in which two brings enter

j

n to

*

The

relation with the fulness of their being. Dialogical

knowing is, In the end, a response to what Buber e^llr
the
ol

ei^np

these

which, address us,
si

gns

Alans are

,

signs of address,

*

It-

is

s imply

s

*

becoming aware*

every thins* we meet

Says Buber

are not something extraordinary something that
steps out of the order of things, they are just
what goes on time and again, just what goes on in
any case, nothing is added by the address .What
occurs to me addresses me. (BMM p, 11)
,

ihe direct n e 8s of the
dialogical meeting, writes
Friedman on Buber, is mediated by
the

senses but also by

the 'word,' i.e., all those
symbolic forms of communication
such as language, music, art,
ritual, etc. here, it
seems to me, Friedman makes a
distinction which is at
the same time right and wrong.
It is right insofar as there
are these two types of mediation,
but it is incorrect
to

the extent that it somehow puts
these two types of mediators on the same level. There Is a
difference not within one category, but there are,
somehow, two categories

on two different levels. Mediation through
the senses is
necessary in all responding to signs, mediation
through
the 'word'

is not.

For example, in the direct meeting of

a person, the dialogue need not necessarily
be mediated

by the ’word,’

say, in our case, by language.

I

would call

the mediation through the senses a ’direct mediation.'

ihe

mediation through ’words,’ through ’symbols’ a 'secondary
mediation.'

'lake

for example, a painting. It mediates

between the concrete reality, i.e., the creative act of
the artist and his experience, and the man who watches

or

meets’ the work of art, I e senses, In turn mediate

between the
1'bie

symbol,

f

i.e,,

the picture, and

the person,

way one can speak of the senses as a 'urinary*

mediator, and of

’

symbols''

as

’secondary’ mediators. The

senses somehow have the priority over ’symbols’ as mediators.

:
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cycLol,*' it Rsems to me, for Buber can
mean
three different things, and accordingly
serve three

different pu r po s e s
'

Symbols

in the world of

*

I

-It may be identified

witn subject-object knowledge of the world.
There they
are taken to be entities independent of the
dialogue

between man ana the world, expressing either
universal
ideas or denoting objective empirical reality. The
latter

way of seeing ’symbols* separates the object from
the

knowing subject, discarding any connotations and everything that is not empirically verifiable. The former

points indirectly to objects instead of the dialogue

between two beings. (Even these symbols, Buber holds,
i

which are taken to be completely independent of dialogue

have been derived sometime from actual dialogic meeting.
I-It knowledge

thus is really nothing but the socially

objectified meetings wnlch have been forced into the
categories of I-It. (Fried p. 166})
A

*

symbol

f

in the dialogical sense, as Buber under-

stands it, is not a conventional sign, a concrete mani-

festation of a universal. Bather It is

*a

mythical or

conceptual representation of a concrete reality. It is
the product of the real meeting in the actual present of
two separate beings,

5

(Fried p. 167) which always points

back to the reality of dialogical knowing.
The third kind of a ’symbol,

5

also a ’symbol* in the

dialog leal sense, yet different from the second kind, is a
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con Junction of a ’sign,’
l.ee .
>
.

and a

I

’

symbol

'

,

something addressing us,

of the first

have termed It ’primary mediator’

For example, a painting that

I

-

at

ti

e same tine,

have painted some time

ago and am looking at may point back to the
concrete act
of creating the painting (second type of symbol) while
it may also, though probably not at the same tine, become
a Thou for me with whin?

relation,
'sign'

"big third

enter into a completely new

I

type of

’

symbol

’

Is thus really a

that happens to have the form of a symbol (the

actual function of which is at the time of its becoming
a 'sign' only potential, and prevented from actualization

through the predominant functi n of becorai g a ’sign’).
Ida Ad arc- so Through

!

dim ns

*

Can.no V

r

e

b>xc

res sec anc

Communicated
Man is addressed all the time, yet he often coca not

know it.
Buber,

'The waves of the aether roar on always,'

says

’but for most of the time we have turned off our

receivers.

The

1

eason for our insensitivity is that we

do not consider these 'signs’ as something really address-

ing up, but only as objective phenomena.

Only by sterilizing it £the 'sign U, removing the
seed of address from it, can I take what occurs to me
as a art of the world -hap-* ening which does not refer

)
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to me. The interlocking sterilized
ay at era into
which all this needs onl to be dovetailed
is man
titanic work. (EMM p, 11 ^
4a was seen above,

for Buber,

c

'signs' are not Just

conventionally defined symbols from which everybody
may
derive the same meaning. Bather, a 'sign' in Buber's
sense is something that does not speak to everybody,
but
only to the one who sees it 'say' something to
him. Neither

need It say the same thing to different people. To the
•observer' or 'onlooker' the 'signs’ won't 'say* anything,

but only to a person whose 'way of perception
/Jsj
hg comic

aw are .

'

In other words, only to the

who

Tnan

stands in an I- Thou relation, whether in a reciprocal one

with other persons or a non-reciprocal one with nature *nd

works of art, etc., will the 'signs*

'say'

something. (Ibid.

pp. 8-1 C

It is difficult for us to let 'signs'

thin- to us by 'becoming aware' of them in true

ness

.

’

For we are conditioned to apply

some-

'say'
'

to all the

present'signs'

the categories of space and time or to interpret them in

terms of physics, biology, or sociology, etc. We feel

we can 'look /.them/ up in /a/ dictionary ... even if not

necessarily a written one,’ since we believe that 'things
remain the same' and ’are discovered once for all,* and that
’rules, laws, and analogical conclusions ray be employed

throughout.'

(Ibid. p.

12)

Dialogical perception, however, says Buber,

)
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WhGn ° n6 51 o Nonary is put down...
What occurs
to me says something to me,
but what it says to

c^ot

me
he revealec by any esoteric
information; for
never been said before nor is it
composed
i* Si!
have ever been said . It can neither of
be
~ ; x
ted nor oranslated, I can have
it neither
-

..

—i

'

-i,
!Rce

tuation,

-----

moment and cannot
v~e_ Isolated,
it remains the question of the questioner and will have its answer, (loc. cit,

Xmbolg age ?lytr ;cii xie to True Haloes If Thev
Cease
of Elal oglcal Know in
is. iM
T- r
~~ and
l- hLL '±LL aP.-ll- to hll •••qy-.’ro Fxocrirn,^
g

r—

•

.

Similarly, as ’signs' cannot be looked up in a

dictionary, so ’symbols’

-

the objectification of our true

meeting with the ’signs ’-must not become completely abstract.

B’or

if they do become abstract and universalized,

the original meeting is forgotten, the symbols cease
point-

ing hack to the reality of dialogical knowing. This, Buber
feels, is a great danger. If 'words' do not retain their

symbolical character in the dialogical sense, they become an

obstruction to true dialogue. Of course, subject-object
knowledge, along with the life of dialogue is necessary for

human existence, yet this knowledge should, even if only
to a very slight degree, retain the symbolical character

of dialogue. The dependent and mediate reality of the I-It

knowledge must not be forgotten completely. If symbols
are exhausted by their technical function, the world of It
is,

as a result of this, set up as the final reality. Here

lies the danger of our day. If the fact that the social

.
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and categorized world of I-It
is derived fro® the world
”' 3

13

’

"^gotten, the abstract symbols will not
only

not point back to concrete reality,
but they will be
applied to all future experience. Sociality
then degenerates into purely ’technical dialogue’
in which human beings
deal with each other and with nature as
mere Its,
and the

categories of I-it are taken to be reality,
instead of
being understood as the symbolic representations
of

what

'.as

become. The present is being Judged by the past

’as if there were no present reality until
that reality

had become past and therefore capable of being
dealt with
In our thought categories.’

(fried p,

169) The knowing

subject is abstracted from his relations*?!

Other a O'

'
,

eoones an

’

ob Jf ctive,

5

with the

impersonal observer

who automatically presses rls encounter with ’signs’ into
the I-It categories of language,

Character of which

lias

(the dialogic-symbolical

been forgotten conrcletel

-

)

PI a 3- or leal by uericncc is Chs meter! ge e by brlo ueness

aril

Pres entrees
The alternative to this pressing of our encounter

with the Other, with the ’signs,' into the I-It categories
of the past is not a mystical union with the Other. Buber's

assertion
nature

of

rm.u t

the reality of the

I -Thou

relation

ever?

with

not be understood, this way. It retains the

distinction between the knowing subject and the object,
the betweenness of dialogue. But in distinction to the
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aclentlfic approach to nature, the
I-Thou relationship
to nature is characterized by
uniqueness and presentness.
Mature ceases to be the passive
object of our thought
categories o the past, but is made present
so that it

may

1

say

!

something to us, and in this way has an
I-Thou
relationship with us. We realize that we know
objects only

indirectly and conceptually through the categories
of I-It,
an.; therefore see things in
their uniqueness and presentness and not already filtered through our
categories of

knowledge and use. We then can

i’eel

the 'impact' of the

relation in the present moment between us and the noohuman, but active, reality which has become a
Thou for
us, an ‘impact’ which we cannot describe anart from
this

relationship, (Fried pp, 169-170)^
The presentness of the Thou is most important in

man's dealing with other persons. In our modern time the

awareness of one's fellow as a whole, single and unique
person has become extremely rare, bather, an analytic,
reductive, and derivative

lance predominates between

man and man. The whole body-soul being is tre tea as

something composite and thus dissectible. The mystery

between man and man is undergoing a radical dissolution.
Personality, once a mystery and motive ground for stillest

inspiration is levelled out, (Fried p, 125

)

But, the psychic stream, Buber feels, can never be

dealt

with, a r

on object, and reduced to

a

generally

describable and repetitive mechanism. The individual,

g

1
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central, dynamic principle of a person can
not be replaced
l>y a general one.

distinction to things, defies complete
object! flcati on • he can, naturally, also become
an

object of observation and scientific investigation,
but
xn

i

is existing wholeness he can be experienced
only as a

partner in dialogue. It is man’s ’person defining'
spirit that sets up this insurmountable limit to objectification. Only through pc-rsonale V e r,v e

,

-

e n wa er- 1 i gu n

.

through

the awareness of the dynamic wholeness of other persons,
can man be understood as man.

(Ibid, p.

1

7

)

Of course,

psychology, for example, has shown that many human relations

are simply neurotic projections of relations in the

past and thus belong to the world of I-It. Nevertheless,
Buber feels, this does not disprove the ontological
reality of the I-Thou. Since psychological knowledge

belongs to the categorized, knowledge of the past it cannot
possibly disprove the reality of the I-Thou which is
always in the present. Insofar as it is scientific, and
thus ’objective,’ it excludes the present knowing of
the I-Thou, it judges the present by the past 'as if there

were no present reality until that reality had become past
and therefore capable of being dealt with in our thought

categories.’

(Ibid, p,

169) Since the I-Thou knowing is

prior to the I-It knowing, a criticism of the I-Thou on
the basis of I-It is a logical impossibility. The I-Thou
in its uniqueness, and

resentness can never be disproved,
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it can only be proved by actually entering
Into it.

dories of I -It are Indispensable but They Must
dominate So Stronrlv as to Eliminate I- Thou
xv er-ience
"
In Its Ineff ability

~~~

.

;i£LL

~

ihe

acceptance of the I-Thou epistemology does of

course not imply a rejection of science, its techniques,
and its findings. Science, even the social sciences,
will

always have

to

objectify. Buber recognizes the indispensa-

bility of the ’emergency structures of analogy and typology’
for the work of the human mind, however, holds Buber,

'to

step on them when the question of the questioner steps

up to you,’ that is, when the sign addresses you, ’seems
to me, would be running away.'

deference

to the

he also writes?

Buber also shows great

’world continuum of space and time.' But
'I

know as a living truth only concrete

world reality which is constantly, in every moment,
reached out to me,’ Concrete 'world reality' is

'

inseparable,

incomparable, irreducible, now, happening once only.' (BMM
P.

12)

What has to be recognized, therefore, is that the
I-It relation is itself* based on 'confrontations’ and
is thus not the primary reality. The I-Thou and the I-It

types of knowing have to be integrated. This means the

recognition that I-It knowledge has to retain its symbolical quality of pointing back to the dialogical knowing
from which it derives, if it is to fulfil its true function.
It also implies the realization that the essence of the
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Cther, especially of man, cannot be discovered
as a

scientific observer, who la as distant from the
object
"

e

observes as possible, but on y by somebody participating

in the Thou, who gains the distance from the object
only

afterwards so that he can formulate the insights he has
attained,

v

or man is an integrated whole and not a sum

of parts, anc therefore cannot be understood by science

whose meth d is to investigate Its subject matter not as
a whole, but in selective aspects.

The essence of tnancan

be discovered only by entering into a relation with him,
a relation which is more than just 'a poor combination

of "objectivity” and ’’subjectivity” in which subjective

emotion corrupts the otherwise objective power of reason,
(Fried p,

1

173) Lastly , this acceptance of the I-Thou way

of knowing means that man should try to gain or regain
the courage and the ability to respond, at least now

and then, to nature, man, and God as a genuine Thou in
relation, and

to

listen to a ’saying’

from,

this Thou, a

saying that cannot be put into the language? of I- It

knowledge. It means that man in his experience allows
for uniqueness, for something outside the categories of the
I-It - even if this threatened his security and stability -

something beyond repetition, typology, categorization,
objectivication, etc,

For example, writes Buber, such

an experience can occur

when in a receptive hour of my personal life a
man meets me about whom there is something, which

I

g
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cannot graep in any ob^ ective way at
',11, that
says something” to me. That
does not mean, says to
me what manner of man this is, what
is going on in
him, and the like. But it means,
says something
to no., addresses s
ui i
ng to me, s pea ks son’: e tb. i n
ontcre my own life. It can be something
-.bout
U1 is man,
for instance that he needs me. But it
can also be something about myself.
The man himself in his relation to S36 has nothing
what is said. He has no relation to me, to do wi th
he has
Indeed not noticed me at all. It is net e
wl o
Bays it to me, as that solitary man
silently
confessed his secret to his neighbour or; the
seat
but it, says it... The effect of having said
this to
me is completely
y different from that of looking on
,
and observing. I cannot depict or denote
or describe
the man in whom, through who m, someth!;
has been
t
said to me. Were I to attempt it, that would
be
thr crci of saying. (EKM pp/ 9-10)7
v

-i

•

;

!

CivTCLGGY

- 157 -

Buber's ontology is the least developed
of all the
four fields I am dealing with. In
fact, the 'ontological
statements' in Buber’s writings are
very few.
Yet on the

basis of these few statements, and by
implicrtion from the
rest of his I -Thou philosophy, an
ontology in Buber’s sense
might be inferred, an ontology, however,
to be sure, that
is altogether secondary to the immediacy
of the I -Thou
meeting.
A Personal 1st 1c Ontology

/.ill

Herberg suggests that Buber's hidden ontology

might be called
does

tJ

'a

personallstlc ontology.'

ot help to sustain you in life,

helps you to glimpse eternity,

’

’

’"/The Thou7

Buber s^ys,

'it

only

from which one might infer.,

that whereas the I- It attitude gives access only to the

world of appearance, the I-Thou gives access to the world
of

r

eality ... It is in the I-Thou relation thst man in his

authentic personality emerges. "Through the Thou a man becomes an I." The primal reality in which men receives his

being is the

><1 schen-menschl i ch:

.

the ’’between man and man,

(Will Herberg;, op. clt., p. 15) and the 'betvreen God and man

Access to reality cannot be obtained except by entering into relation with the Other. For only ’between' the

I

and the Thou, in the meeting of two persons, is true reality

Only the person, one taking stand in relation, can share in

true reality and thus become authentic. True being is always

primarily personal being, it emerges in the dialogical rels-

,
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tion of man with man, In the I-Thou.

'The I,' acya 3uber

is

real in virtue of Its sharing
/that Is, entering Into
true relation/ In reality. The
fuller Its shoring the more
real it becomes.' (iTh p. 63)

Reality# for iuber, is therefore neither
in the

I

nor in the Thou, but somehow it is in
between, it is something 'that neither merely belongs to him
/the person'/ nor

merely lies outside him.’ (loo. cit.) 'All
reality,' says
Buber,

'la an

activity in which

I

share without being able

to appropriate for myself, Where there is no
sharing there
la no reality.

Where there is self -appropriation there Is no

reality. The more direct the contact with the Thou,
the

fuller Is the sharing,
Reality
itself

.

u;ius,

,

1

(loc. cit.)

is really the meeting of two persons

But since, by definition, the meeting consists in

the 'sharing

of two persons, by virtue of this sharing

activity, the

I

i

or the Thou can never appropriate reality

or themselves. For if they try to do so, then, by necessity

they cannot share any longer. Consequently there is no

reality which can be appropriated, since the sharing activity constitutes reality. The meeting, of the

I

with the

Thou brings about true reality, and a® it brings it about,
the

I

and the Thou themselves, in a reciprocal process,

obtain reality by sharing in the reality which they have
created through their meeting.
since the meeting is sharing.

(This is really tautological,
'

Raring' (which brings about

true reality, better, is true reality), is Identical with

-159sharing In reality.' clarity of
exposition is here
prevented by the limitations of our
language.) 8
'•

j-.

1 1 y is
->

r circle cf i?iue
r

Reality

Accordingly as only a person, that is, one
in dialogue,
shares in true reality, the individual,
that is, someone
who does not enter into true relations
where he
can share,

does not have access to reality. In
separation, that is, In
an I-It relation, man is devoid of true
being.
However, says Buber,

relational

event,

’the

I

that steps out of the

into separation and consciousness of sepa,-

ration, does not lose Its reality. Its sharing is
preserved

in it in a living way...

''the

seed remains in it."

1

(ITh p. 63)

This state of a person, not being in relation but
willing

to enter into it, Buber calls the state of ’subjectivity.'
In it, the person is still connected to reality although

the snaring is not very lull; yet he is not completely remote

from reality ns is tne man in the state of pure individuality.
In.

complete Individuality there Is complete separation from

other persons, while in subjectivity there is only lack of

actual relation; nevertheless in It 'the

I

is aware with a

single awareness of its solidarity of connection and of its

separation.

.

./and/ the desire formed and heightened for ever

higher, more unconditioned relation, for the full sharing in
being.'

(loc

.

cit .). Genuine subjectivity Is the state of a

person, of an I, conscious of itself as partner in a relation, or as a potential partner of a fhou. It is only pure
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individuality in differentiating Itself from
others
/completely thr t/ is rendered remote from true
’

being...

/Only/ individuality neither shares in nor
obtains any

reality.

1

(Ibid. p. 64}

However, b cause individuality is remote from
'true'
being, sc remote that it does not have any
‘true’ being
at all,

(this never really happens because of the eternal

presence of the Divine Thou), it need not necessarily
have no being at all. From Buber’s constant qualification
of dialogical reality as 'true' reality It can be seen

that for him also other modes of being exist, besides that
of

’true' reality, that is, that individualities too have

some kind

0

i

being, that objects of perception

they are not in dialogue

-

-

even if

have some sort of being. This

being which individualities have, for Buber

,

is that of

ontological (not only epistemological )9 abstractions,

derivatives from the original dialogical meet In
Thou. All I- It, Buber holds, is derived from

with the

I -Thou.

In reality, of course, there is no simple split in

Gog's creation between I-Thou and I-It, but there are

indefinite amounts of degrees of participation in true
being, just as many as there are beings in the universe.

Buber's philosophy thus
this himself

true reality,

-

'

-

although Buber never expressed

seems to imply the notion of 'degrees of
the degree being determined by the amount

of sharing of the Individual being in true dialogue

indlviauality, accordingly, since it lacks dialogue

.

Pure

V

’
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corapletely, would (If It could exist) have
no true reality

at all. However,

I

feel, despite its complete lack of

true reality, Buber would not deny its plain
being, as It,
thfit

is, the being of an ontological derivative
from I-fhou

that has cut all its bonds to the latter

1

.

Tru J ..g-allty is not Unity of beliy?
c

Just as true reality cannot be found in separateness,
there is no true reality where there is ’unity of being,
This unity of being can be twofold; first, thrt of man
wit)..'

nimsclt

second,

,

tn< u

ol

man with God, fellow— men, or

nature, in mystical union.
ban's unity with himself, Buber feels, Is a colossal

illusion of the human spirit bent back on Itself.
mar reduces God
soul, whereas,

a nd

In.

it

the world to functions of the human

in reality, the world and

,

od

have separate

existence. The image of the world may be in man, but not
its reality.

'All modern attempts,' writes Buber,

interpret this primal reality of dialogue as
of the

I

to the Seif, or the like

-

:•

r

o'l

'to
•

tier

as an event that Is

contained within the self-sufficient interior of man
futile:

thy

-

are

take their place In the abysmal history of

destruction of reality.

’

(Ibid.

o.

Similarly, a mystical union

85 )
bet’,

een man

arid

God,

other men and nature is an illusion. Unity between the
and the Thou does not exist.
•hat the ecstatic man calls union is th"

I
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U in

dyr!
1
of relation,., the relation
f+
?
* ts vl ° al unity ie felt
so forcibly
o.t its parts seem to face
before it. and ir
ce of its life, the I and the Thou,
between
? t f
v/aich
it is established, are forgotten.
(Ibid.

r
\ts^?r
®~{. in

M

i-.

.

p.

.i-ven

if mystical union, union of being,

87)

could exist,

reality could not be found in it. To be sure,
’in lived
reality there is... the becoming one of the soul,’
the

concentration of all one’s powers and urges, ’but this
does net involve, like absorption, disregard of

the real

\

person.

True reality, even inner reality,

’exists only in

effective ^mutual/ action,' and ’the most powerful and

deepest reality exists where everything enters into the
effective action, with ut reserve the whole man and God the

all-embracing
p.

-

the united

I

and the boundless Thou.’

(Ibid,

89)

Is God Self-Gu.f f lelent?

Ultimately God is a mystery, consequently no statements ab ut his nature, his self-sufficiency, can be made.
All we know about Him is that He is the Eternal Thcu of his

creation.

From this it would follow, that the question as to

whether the absence of man’s relation to God or vice versa
would render God imperfect or not, that is, not ’truly'
real or not, cannot be determined by man.
Buber, though, makes a statement which at first

glance seems to imply that he holds that God's perfect! n defends u on the reality of His relation to us.
•

'
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H© writes:

t*d .needs you - In the fulness of His
eternity
n
the very ™ 6Enins of your

n^.

(ma!°p: 82^

Yet, this sentence may he interpreted
in such a way thrt
God's perfection apart from a relationship
to us is not

questioned. For God, according to the above quote,
does
not need us for the very meaning of His
life, but only for
the very meaning of our life. This is like
saying, »i need
a dog so that the dog can run.
However, there definitely is Illogicality involved,

since the word 'need' has no connection to the consecutive
sentence,

’for the very meaning of your life.’ Consequently,

even If Buber really wanted to express that God needs us,
Go-c

*

,

ccordlng to the abovs quote, would not need us. The

qualifying consecutive sentence,

’for the very meaning of

your life,’ renders the first one,

'God needs you,' mean-

ingless.
The question remains unresolved.

Traditional Categories such as latter,
'Spirit,' etc..
are Abstractio ns from the Primary Meet lit of th I with
the Thou
'

'

It is difficult to say what Buber's view is with

respect to traditional categories such as matter, spirit,
suostance, process, etc. Buber simply isn't concerned with

these traditional ontological problems. This unconcern, it
seems to me, though, Is not due to unjustified indifference,
but to the fact that Bubor meant to cut beneath all these

- 164 -

traditlonal distinctions with his I-Thou philosophy,

which doesn't fall into any of these traditional
categories. Thus Buber is not unconcerned with
traditional

ontological problems, rather, he somehow overcomes them.

According to Friedman, Buber agrees with Kant thet
we cannot know the world in itself apart from its rela-

tion to the knowing subject. This way Buber avoids re-

moving reality into the knowing subject as the idealists
have done, but he does not agree with Kant's assertion
that we cannot know reality but only the categories of
our thought.

(Fried pp. 163-64) Buber believes

do actually get in contact with reality

-

th^t we

not by way of

scientific investigation, however, but by entering into
genuine relation with God, men, and the world.

'Matter,'

and similar categories, for Buber, seem to be abstractions
of encounters with the Other, abstractions which are

acquired in early childhood when the child moves from its
initial I-Thou relation to its environment, to an I-It
relation.

q

Later in life, the abstraction is intensified

through education or active scientific Invest igation,
(which la always I-It). One could thus say, that categories

such as 'matter' are epistemological derivatives from man's

truly dialogical relationship with people

anu:

the world,

Whether , however, these categories are also abstractions, derivatives, in the ontological sense, Buber never

states. For example, he never expresses his opinion as to

whether he believes that there are atoms or not, as he

•
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claim that there are trees, which do
have some kind
oi he in
even if man does not enter into relation
with
tnem, the being of an ontological
derivative from I-fhou.
juber neither affirms nor denies the
plain being of ’natter,
w°ulo.

,

spirit,' etc. One thing seems to be certain:
if they do
have some kind of being, it is not ’true
reality' in the

dialogical sense.

PART THREE

BUBLR COMPARED

.
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Buber'a philosophy snows great similarities
with
the philosophies of modern existentialist
thinkers

-

(although non© of them anticipated or repeated him,
or

defined the I-Thou relation with his precision)
v,

-

especially

ith the philosophies of the other three outstanding

existentialist thinkers of cur timej
ariu

Berdyaev*

Marita in, Tillich,

The similarities here concern es ec tally

the social, existential, porsonaliatic, and ontological

aspects of the respective philosophies.
a' T initios

Despite the
three

t

<i

kers,

I

between Buo

i

and theoe other

hove decided to attempt a comparison of

Buoer with Kierkegaard, Bergson, Whitehead, and Buddhism
and Hinduism.

The main reason for this choice was that

I

believe a comparison with these philoso hies to be more

illuminating, especially since the latter philosophies
are somewhat closer to traditional philosophy than those
of the three religl us existentialists mentioned above.

Consequently, Buber’s philosophy will be set better into the
context of traditional philo ophy and the relative novelty
of his thought will become clearer than if compared with

the religious existentialists.

The other reason for this choice of philosophies for

comparison is the fact

th- t

Buber himself ha

contr

sted

his philosophy with those of Kierkegaard, Bergson,

Hinduism and Buddhism (although not with VL teheed
1.

As a result,

'e

)

the following comparisons will allow for

greater authenticity than would a

cc

pp.rlson of Buber
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with other philosophies chosen at random.

,

I

•

yi

^.Ahrd s Oabegoi y 01
1

v

bho

wl.i;

f...

Cite

Kierkega rd was probe oly the greatest single influence
on Buber's thought « It is virtually on Kierkegaard's
category
of the single Dug, that Buber bases one develops his persona—

listic philosophy

.

jut although Buber was influenced so strong-

ly by Kierkegaard , and despite the strong affinities of

his philosophy with the one of Kierkegaard, one would do

injustice to both men if one wore to lump together their

philosophies. The differences between the two philosophies
are essential - and the point where these essential differences lie is exactly where there are the strongest affinities
the category of the Single One. Buber took over Kierkegaard,' 3

category of the single One, but transformed the

concept essentially;

setter, he expanded it, thus giving

It an essentially different meaning.

According to his own interpretation of Hi rkegar rd's
philosophy, Buber himself, in Between

I

:.n

and,

dan, dis-

tinguishes his philosophy very sharply from the one of
Kierkeg- ard

Buber agrees with Kierkegaard
able to enter into an

I -Thou

tin t

in order to be

relationship with

fod -

which

for both men, although in an essentially different way , is
the ultimate aim - man 1ms to become a .Ingle One, a uni-

fied whole.

*A man,

*

says Buber,

'can have dealings with

God only as a Single One.' (3MM p. 43) Consequently Buber

stands with Kierkegaard in the latter '3 insistence on re-

-

J
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fusln 6 to b © swallowed up in the

^as7 a real person,' he says,

'is

'

crowd *

'

’only

/b.b

a self,

/man/ able to have a com-

plete relation of his life to the other self.

1

(ibid. p. 175)

Buber, as Kierkegaard, knows that without being and remain-

ing oneself there is no love, no genuine relation. Lastly,

both men also agree that being a Single One 'means to let

oneself be helped by God.

*

(Kierkegaard)

Buber goes along with Kierkegaard in these respects.
However, he disagrees with him insofar as he thinks thrt

being a Single One in Kierkegaard's sense is not enough for

being a full person in a truly dialogical relationship with
Bod.

'And yet,’ says Buber in this context, being a Single

One in Kierkegaard's sense 'is not the way,' (Ibid. p. 50)
for becoming a single One in Kierkegaard's sense

means to be made ready for the one relation which can
be entered into only as the Single One, the one,
the relation for whose sake man exists. This relation
is an exclusive one, and this... means that It Is the
exclusive relation, excluding all ethers j more precisely, that it is the relation which in virtue
of its unique, essential life expels all other
relations into the realm of the unessential, (loc. cit.)
not
Thus,

'the dingle One has to do essentially

“chary”

-

only with Pod,

*

-

is A to be

and with himself. (Ibid. p. 51;

underlining mine)
To this interpretation of Kierkega- rd's category of

the Single One Buber la radically opposed. He refuses to

Unit

the interpersonal relation si ply to relatione between

God end man, to the exclusion of other human beings. As
against Kierkegaard's assertion that 'everyone Bhould be

'
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chary about having to do with the
"others" and should essentially speak only with God and with himself,'
Buber claims
that true relationship Is triadic, including
the
self,

uoo

»

nw uod

'°

crertlon, that is, fellow-men and the world.

'This joining of the "with God,'" he says,

with the with himself is a serious incam oat
ibility
tnrt nothing can itigate. . . Speaking with God is
something ^pto
i
different from s oeaking with
oneself, whereas, remarkably enough, it is net
something teto
different from soeaking
v:ith another human being. For in the latter coBe,
thei e is in common the fact of being approached,
grasped, addressed, which cannot be anticipated in
any depth of the soul; but in tho former, there is
no such common fact In spite of all the soul’s
adventures in doubling roles... only when I have to
Go with another essentially - that is, in such a way
thft he is no longer a phenomenon of my I - but
instead is my Thou - do I experience* * .the irrefragable uniqueness of mutuality. (Ibid. pp. 50-51)
l

-

'

'

Real relationship with God cannot be achieved on earth

if real relationship to the world and mankind is lacking,
(AT p. 39) just as real relationships with other human

beings are possible only through a relationship to God.
'Kierkegaard,

'

says Buber,

'the Christian concerned

with "contemporaneity** with Jesus. . .contradicts his master.'
(BMM p. 51) For he misunderstood the Great Commandment!
'Love God with all your might' and 'Love your neighbour
as you love yourself.*

'God and man,

1

says Buber

are not rivals. Exclusive love of God ('with all
because He is God Inclusive love,
ready to accept and Include all love... /God/ limits
Himself In all His limltlessness; He makes room for
creatures, and so, in the love of Him, He makes
room for love to creatures. (Ibid. pp. 51-52)

y our heart') is,

,
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Bubcr disa Greea violently
with Kierkegaard * s statenc-nt about his renunciation
cf Regina Olsen: Mn order
to
cor.e to love, I had to
remove the object.’ Kierkegaard,
Buber feels, here sublimely
misunderstood
God.

‘Creation,*

he writes.
Is not o hurdle on the road
to God; it is the
ro^ .tself. i/e are created along
with one another
0
t0
R
life
with
one
mother,
:
creatures
-ire
r- Placed
nl-erJ ?
In ray way sc that I, their fallow
creature, by means of them and with
them, may find
+° G°?u A °° d reached by excluding them
wrniJT^ ot bo tj e
*11 beings in whom all
V
f llod * A God in vh<m only the
parallel
~t single
fVi J
j...nwS cf
approaches Intersect 13 more
n
oc of the philosophers’
than to
°,
fn:
? AbraJiam
,? l
jl -"
u°
0.,
and Isaak and Jacob, God
'

n

.

i

:

’

to

me

him by means of the Reginas
<J
ne h s Cxor ted,
and not by renunciation of them.
We
ove
object, then - we have removed
It
o,?e object altogether.
Ithout an object, artiIleially producing the obj ct from the abundance
of the human spirit and celling It
God, this
love has its being in the void. (ibid.
p. 5?)
c

*>0

,

Aim cannot reach God unless he embraces the
world that
2.Q

given to him, unless he serves in God's plan of
creation

and redemption. In this embracing of the world it is
not
essential
that we should see things as standing out from God,
nor as being absorbed in him, but that we should
'pee things in God, “ the things themselves
Onlv
w hon all relations, uncurtailed, are taken into
the one relation, do we set the circle of our
life’s world round the sun of our being. (Ibid. p. 54
)
. .

.

r

The Single One

’

corresponds

’

to

oc only when he.

in his human way, embraces the bit of the world
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Safe “,=!)

not to' be^found by
loved by reduction, (role.
PP
rhe ,0thic ^ 1

»*

to be
tt

.

that is 5 man's relation to
fellow-

men and the world, for Buber is not,
as it is for Kierke<rrrdj a morality belonging to a
realm of
'

tiiD©

relativity,

and ag in overtaken and Invalidated
by the religious;

it is not

’a

religious,

'

"stage" from which a "leap” leads
to the
but

'It means essential acting and
suffering

in relation to men, coordinated with
the essential relation. to God,' Neither religion nor
ethics, writes Buber,
is aut-

r.;i,

neither can bo freed from the other 'with-

out Of sing to do justice to the present
truth.* (Ibid,
p. 56)

Accordingly, as man can have a true relation to
^oci

only if he embraces the bit of the world given to

him, Buber disagrees with Kierkegaard also on the
latter's

view on marriage and the 'body politic.’

hile, in Buber’s

opinion, Kierkega rd thinks of marriage as of a symbol,

and while he considers marriage to be an impediment for
a true relation with God, Buber believes that marriage
is not only symbolical - thus essentially impersonal,

but essential. Although the woman, says Buber, stands
'in a dangerous rapport to finitude,

'

(kierkegarrd)

and finitude certainly is a dnger. . «our hope of

•

j

,

.
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snlvation 13 forged on tk-I s very
human way to the'inf inito' leads danger, for our
only through
-ul fillo f Initudo
( ibid
-I)

?

'

.

And while Kierkegaard is sharply
opposed to the 'body
politic, Buber believes that the ’body
politic
1

,

how-

*

ever degenerate it may be, should
not be rejected*
r

n

0ne 13 aot the man who has to do
e3 -©ntlally, and only unessentially
J,potnere,
who is unconditionally concerned
w:ltn God and conditionally with the
body noilj o •
.’ha dingle One Is the man
for whom* the
re lity ox relation with God as an exclusive
relation Includes and eu compasses the osslhiliof relation with all otherness, nd for
v
•

V®

i

i

:le

;

!r

:

.

•

bony politic, the reservoir of oh
—
ness offers just enough
otherness for
him
1 &
* X
^
to pass In
hie life with-it. (Ibid. p. 65)
J*

r*

i° be sure*

»

.

Buber too

z

•

•

I

.3

/

_

the

1

c-

crowd* as it is,

since it prevents many people from being true persons.
3ut his rejection differs from Kierkegaard’s,

Klerkeg

1 cl

a imply

ihile

does not want to have anything to do

with the crowd - except maybe where it is useful in daily
life, Buber rejects the croud in the sense that he does

not want the crowd to remain a crowd* That Is, he does

want to have something essential to do with the crowd,
namely , to change it into a community In which the
life of dialogue can prosper. Thus he rejects the crowd,
If I may say so, in & positive way, while Klorkegarrd

does it in a negative way, rejecting the crowd completely
or dealing with it only if it offers itself as a suitable

means for something higher.
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Certainly, Buber admits,

'monastic' solitude Is

necessary from time to time, so that our
relationships
>.r

lt.u hum.-

n beings will not become Encapsulated*

'

However,

solitude must not for ever be exchanged for the
life of
dialogue* a. i ter a while we have to leave solitude and

participate again in ’Present Being.’
4HMfr

Buber stresses that h© Is not criticizing Kierkegaard as a person.

'I

do not say,’ writes Buber,

’that

It is forbidden to Kierkegaard on his rock, alone with

the mercy of the Merciful.

I

say only that it is for-

bidden to you and to me.’ (Ibid. p. 56) In Buber’s eyes

Kierkegaard 13 wrong only in saying ’Lot everyone do so,'
in his trying to ’win over the beloved Individual into
"his” world as if it were the true one.’

(Ibid. p. 55)

Kierkegaard’s view of the Single One, Buber says, ’is
based

on personal nature and destiny,'

(loc. cit.)

and must not be extended to all other human beings.

Buber also feels that Kierkegaard, although wanting
to 'let every one do so,' was at the

oa:

e time

’dee ly

conscious of the dubiousness which arises from the negatia
vising extension of the ctegory of the Single One.' (Ibid*
p* 52 ) Bo, for example, feels Buber, does Kierkegaard

refute his own idea of the category of the Single One
by describing the ’ethical'

communlc-tos with "man**

1

'

a.s

'the only means by which God

(Kierkegaard) This, says Buber,

-177dceB Of course not mean that Kierkegaard
absolutizes the
ethical , but it means that the ‘religious*
cannot be
*

'

autark y and that the ‘ethical* is no longer a
'stage
irom v ich a leap leads to the religious.’
it means that
man 'is forbidden to speak essentially only
with God and
/hlm/self .
(Ibid, p, 56
‘

)

At another occasion too, Buber remarks, Kierkegaard

brilliantly refutes himself. In 1843 he confessed in a
journal j

‘Had

I

had faith

I

would have remained with

Regina.' Buber translates this into his own language:
'Had

I

really believed that “with God all things are

possible,” hence also the resolution of this

-

my

melancholy, my powerlessness, my fear, my fateful aliena-

tion from woman and from the world

-

remained with Regina.' (Ibid. p. 57)

then

I

would have

II

.

Bergson's Bonce

Buber’s

I -Thou

.t

of In tuition

relation, involving a participation

of the knower in the situation which
he knows, must not
be confused with Bergson's concept
of absolute intuition
which yields to man a sympathetic knowledge
of the world

without any separation from it.
Bergson, unlike Buber, does not differentiate
between
the subject and the object In the act of
knowing, he fails
to see the difference between the
I and the Thou, postulating an act ol intuition by which one
transposes oneself
j.nto

the interior of the object. He abolishes the
duality

of observer and observed first by plunging
into the

immediate process of the experienced happening, there,
'where we no longer see ourselves act, but where we
act.’
(her son) The rot of knowledge must coincide with the

act that

reduces reality. Once this Is accomplished

within a person - that Is, that acting and knowing fall
together - then also intuitive and absolute knowledge of
the world around him can be obtained.
Bergson, writes Buber, attempts to bridge the cleft

between being and knowing through showing that intuition
develops out of instinct. In Its relation to the environment and to Itself the life principle has

split into

instinct and intellect. But the intellect yields only an
image arising under the influence of utilitarian aspirations

Instinct gives no image at all. Consequently, the intellect
has to liberate Itself from the mastery of utilitarian
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In dolns so, however. It will
find that It cannot

find a better alternative except
by taking refuge l n
instinct. Sow 'the task devolvoa
uoon It of raking Instinct
self concclous, of bringing It
to the point where it "Internalizes Itself In knowledge Instead
of externalizing itself
in action; " (PW pp. G4-85) where
It reflects on Its objects
and upon Itself. The Instinctive and
absolute knowledge
of one being of another is given through
the unity of
Life Itself.
Buber, in c

osition to Bergs on, holds that ’life can

only know itself through the act of knowledge
of living

individuals* and that 'no way leads from instinct
to intuition.’ (Ibid. p. 86) Consequently, the identity
of observer
and that which is observed is impossible. Any kind
of

knowledge, whether
it ds

It,

is a

’seeing oneself act' or whether

’Intuitive' will influence the act. Thus it is

something outside the act, it cannot be identical with
it. Similar is it with man's experience of beings other

than himself. Intuition of, say, other people does not
overpass the duality between the beholder and the one
beheld. The beholder transposes himself into the posi-

tion of the beheld and experiences his particular life,
his sensations and impulses from within. 'That he can do
so is explicable /oriLjj through a deep commu ity between

the two*' (Ibid. p. 81) But this does not mean that the
f^ct of duality is thereby v/eakened. On the contrary,

feels Buber, it is exactly this cleavage of the primal
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oommmlty that

is tho foundation of the act
of intuition.

The intuitive way of knowing is,
like all other ways of
knowing , based on the undimlniahed
dual presence of tho
observer and the observed. The being
that is perceived
and ’known is never identical with
the actual existing
being. Intuition may diminish the
difference, but it cannot
abolish it.
1

Tnls tension between the image of the
person whom we
have in mind In. our contact and the actual
existing person
Is, ho ever, not to be understood merely
negatively. Rather,

it often makes an essential contribution to
the dynamic life

among men. Just as, for example, the tension between
the
meaning of a word as

I

see it and the meaning it has for my

companion can prove fruitful and lead to a deeper personal
agreement, so a genuine understanding between two people
can spring forth from the tension between the image of the

person and the existing person. The fruiful meeting of two
persons issues in a break-through from image tc being.
The Thou whom I thus meet is no longer a sum of
conceptions nor an object of knowledge, but a
substance experienced in giving and receivin'. •
(Ibid. p. 83)

Intellect, writes Buber, operates where we know in

order to act with some purpose; Instinct rules where we
act purposefully without requiring knowledge} intuition,

however, prevails where man’s whole being becomes cne in
the act of knowing.
The Intellect, which divides the self, holds uo
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ro from t ie world that It assists
us In util I'M m-G *
JO a us t0
world
but
To ££.one?
not
,
;?
through
vision,
binds
us
as
persons with
f
13 over a S^inst us, binds us to
lu
-tuout oeing able to make us one with
through a vision that cannot be absolute. It
This
vision is a. limited one, like all our perce
tlcns.
u Y^^'^sal-hiiiiian ones and our personal
ones.
5J f
i t
n.fiords us a gli
ae in unspeakable intimacy into hidden depths. (Ibid. p.’86)
•

•

.

L

Buber, thus, considers intuition an imrluble

ala in xli e, in the life of dialogue; but
he does not -

in distinction from Bergson

-

ascribe to it the powers

of oft cting unity betvreen the observer and the
observed.

He emphatically denies that Intuition yields absolute

knowledge, for all knowing is subject to the duality of
the knower and the known,

jergaon, Buber writes , defi-

nitely ‘raised a claim for intuition that cannot be due
it nor any mortal knowledge whatever.’

(ioc. cit.)

x

i

•

It has been

hi tab,- u

'

a

?i

ocess i-hllo sophy

attested to assimilate Buber’s ontology

to Whitehead's process philosophy.
This,
I

I

feel, and here

so along with a remark made by Will Herberg,
has been

done on utterly inadequate grounds. Buber's
ontology
simply cannot be classified as a substance
or process

philosophy, ior It cuts beneath these ontological
distinctions
.

Whitehead is concerned in his writings with the sub-

stitution of the traditional and classical categories
of
substance and mass by the more adequate concepts, (so

Whitehead feels), of process and field.
as well as

spiritual substance* for

'Material substance

hitehead become mere

abstractions which have only practical value. In reality,
the world around us cannot be defined in terms of certain

constitutions of matter and spirit, but only in terms of
successions of events. The latter are exemplifications of

non-existing eternal essences, and come into existence
through God, the principle of concretion. Everything is a
process (with the exception of God and the eternal essences
trees, atoms, etc. Consequently, the universe, at a given

moment, has no reality. What Is perceived by men, here and
now, is an epistemological abstraction which depends in
its existence upon the activity of our minds, and which,

consequently, ceases to exist as soon as our minds cease
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to produce It.
Buber

on the other hand, is not concerned with
the

,

elimination of the traditional substance-process
dichotomy.
He is in no way arguing against the traditional
concept

of the

'''torn*

(matter), against the existence of a concrete

Independent reality, here and now, in favor of a process
philosophy.
t.r'.:,.-

oi

He does not think of men and of the world in

Processes, In terms of successions of events.

oertainly Buber , like Whitehead, consider® the
categories of ’matter* and 'spirit* as being
abstractions
of the human mind, only necessary for
man's practical
life.

Yet Buber cannot be lumped together with
Whitehead

as far as their proposed alternatives
to the traditional

substance philosophy

Whitehead

concerned.

in

replaces

substance-philoso

>hy

by

process-philosophy, thus remaining within a
traditional
die. otomy

,

namely the division betv on suostance and flux.

He merely switches sloes, excluding substance,
that is,

concrete reality, her

process as real.

e

and now, as unreal, and declaring

Buber, on the othei ha n

,

never commits

himself to a substance-process dichotomy, or to a substance
or a proce

s

philosophy, although, m^ybe, a modified

substance- process dichotomy is implied In his philosophy.
But if so, then It Is epistemologically and, if it has any

ontological st-tus at all, else ontolo, Ic-lly derived
from the primal reality of the I-Thou.

Like al] dichotomi s,

so also the substance-process dichotomy, Buber overpasses.
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yet retaino, by a third principle

-

the dialogical prin-

ciple. (If the elimination of
dichotomies were an aim
In the philosophies of both
Buber and Whitehead (it la
not for 3uber) , then Buber's
philosophy. In my eyes,
would be superior to Whitehead's,
Insofar as Buber does
not fall from one side of a dichotomy
to the other.
For a dichotomy , In my opinion, cannot
be overcome by the
exclusion of one component of the dichotomy,
but only by
a third factor, one that combines the
two under a wider
principle. I air. not concerned here, however,
with the

question as to how satisfactorily Buber
eliminates the
substance-process dichotomy, but only with showing

that

Buber's philosophy os.nnot be lumped together with
Whitehead's process philosophy.)
iiu kipt

ctlifore from Whitehead also with respect to the

latter's views on the ontological status of the world
as peroeiv

-d

here and now.

Accordingly, as for

reality

-

V hi teheed

process, events

-

there exists only one

the world as soon at a given

moment has no reality* It is an abstraction of the human
mind, and vanishes as soon as our mind ceases to generate
it.

bo,

for example , a tree, for i.hlt ahead, as given at a

cert; In moment is only an epistemological abstraction.

For Buber, on the other hand, entities other than dia-

logical ones are not all mere abstractions in the sense
that they are only creations of the mind and will cease
to exist if the mind ceases to exist. To be sure,

-
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a tree, for Buber,

is an abstraction from dialogical
reality,

as a tree is an abstraction from
process

’hltehead.

for-

But for Buber a tree has some kind of
be Ing in itself,

apart Irom cur minds, here and now; it is
more than just
an appearance (although it is also not
dialogical reality),
V.hile

t

or whitehead a tree is only an epistemological
abstrac-

tion of the primal reality, that is process, for
Buber a
tree is an epistemological abstraction of the dialogical

reality

our

Oi

ice

ting with the tree, and also a being

apart from out mind , here and now, as an ontjological

derivative from the I- Thou.
Moreover, a tree, for Buber, has

-

besides the onto-

logical status of its own which it has in sedition to

being an epistemological abstraction as granted by
-

.hi tehee

also the potentiality of becoming truly real by virtue

of becoming a Thou*

For Whitehead this is an impossibility,

since r nlity, he believes, cannot be found in the isolated

present*

A

tr©v.

to it or not.

remains an abstraction whether one responds

For Buber, however, ultimate

the lived concrete, here and now.

r

allty is in

For Miitehead, whose

process cannot be divorced from prehension, the lived

moment in its isolation is

:

n epistemological sbstr ction.
1

Whitehead’s philosophy of process :n the only and
hi,

host existing re lity
r

cr.

not be

.

ted with Buber's

philosophy of dialogue not only jecause (according to the
latter's belief) everything, so also process, is an abstraction, a derivative, from the reality of the dialogical

,
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mee-t

lr.fS

in U>;

,

but because In Buber's philosophy
th.

I * Th0U

static eleme

r:latlon “ust not be foreotter,
.

Consequently

the exclusive status of 'process'
is abandoned.
This
static element is not the 'true
reality , however, It is a
necessary element for the 'true reality 1
to emerge.
For
Buoer, it seems, there has to be
something that is in
1

dialogue, in process.

Process is relational end thus

cannot exlat by itself, but requires a
counterpart.

exclusive process (if this were possible) the

In

and the

I

Thou could not be kept apart from each other,
that Is,

the

I

and the Thou could not exist (at least

how they cold

)

I

do not know

and dialogue and dialogical reality

would be made Impossible*

What, for Buber, this

element is, he never explained.

1

static'

It probably differs in

different dialogical relations, depending who constitutes
the

I

and the Thou, God, man, or the world*

Although proc as one a static element seem to be
repair eo xn human dialogue, it would be wrong to conclude
that dialogical r ality is

Dialogical
categories.

r

*st‘

tic element in

'rocess.

’

lity cannot be reduced to traditional
Rather, it comprises all of there, at the

same time going beyo d there.

It gives all of them their

derivative ontological st bus 10
.

IV.

ill

nchtnn and Buddhism

Both Hinduism and Buddhism deny
the reality of
material substance, the reality of
the material world.
Buddhism, in addition, denies the
reality of spiritual
substance. As far as this denial of
substance

Goes, Hin-

duism and Buddhism are very akin to
'whitehead’s philosophy. But , like Buber, they differ
from

hiteherd with

respect to their alternative to this denial
of substance.
Therefore, I do not think it appropriate to
assimilate

Buddhism or Hinduism to a kind of process philosophy
like
tne one of Whitehead. Rather, these Oriental
philosophies,
liku Buber’s philosophy, cut beneath the substance
-process

dichotomy. The unifying principle, however, is altogether

different in Buber's philosophy from that in Buddhism or
Hinduism. While for Buber tho primal reality is dialogical
reality, requiring the meeting of an

ultimat

I

and a Thou, the

reality for Hinduism is Brahman, the One besides

which nothing exists, and for Buddhism Sunyate

,

Nothlngnes

Ultimate reality in Buddhism and Hinduism means all-

embracing unity, while for Buber it implies duality. (In
this respect Whitehead is closer to Buber than the two

Oriental philosophies, since for Whitehead there Is still
a distance between Bod and man, thus duality, although the

Whiteheadian God-man relationship Is not quite an I-Thou
relationship In Buber's sense.)
Hinduism, with its doctrine of true being and
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°f absorption, has nothing in common with Buber b
doctrine
1

of lived re lity, since it reduces lived reality to
a

world of appearances

.

Consequently

,

since only 'dlalo. ical
;

oein^ is true being, Hinduism, Buber feels,

^annihilation,

'

'leads... to

where no consciousness reigns and whence

no memory leads.*

(iTh p. 88)

One might possiuly argue that Hinduism is not alto-

gether different from Buber's philosophy, since It puts

emphasis on the realization of one’s self, which, for Buber,
is the

resup posit ion for genuine relation. This argument,

however, would oe overlooking the difference between Hinduism and Bub r's philosophy with respect to the motivation

for the endeavor tc realize one's self. While for Buber
the unity of the seif is necessary for true dialogue, ne-

cessary for the saying of the Thou, the realization of one's
self for the Hindu is, paradoxically enough, necessary for
y

the realization that one does net neve an individual self,
but that the self, at man

Brahman

.

,

is identical with the World Soul,

This doctrine of self-being as being identical with

universal being, Buber says, makes impossible the genuine
saying of the Thou, and by that denies that dialogical

reality exists and is identical with ultimate reality. Consequently, Hinduism stands in radical opposition to Buber's

views exactly where a superficial look might detect similarities

-

in the demand for one's self-realization. In oppo-

sition to Hinduism, Buber says:

'I

bear within me the sense

of Belf that cannot be included in the world,

'

or in a

t

)

-189World Soul,

subject

’

'a

aense of Self ^thatf is not a
“knowing

but simply the total status of the

no further ''reduction” is possible.’

I

ae I. here

(ITh p. 94) The doc-

trine of absorption, he says, demands
refuge into the
One Ihinking Essence, refuge into pure
subject. ’But in
liveo reality there is not something
thinking without
sot ©thing thought, rather is the
thinking no less dependent

on the thing thought than the latter
on the former.'
(Ibid. pp. 89 -. 9 C)

tt,an

Buber is somewhat more sympathetic
towards Buddhism
towards induism. For, Buber feels, Buddhism
’

con-

tains at least a few, although weak,
dialogical elements.
In distinction to Bincuism,

Buddhism does not propound

a withdrawal from the world, a monkish
life that is turned

inside, but it affirms life and the world.
truth of our meeting,' says Buber,

Buddha as

.

'Loyal to the

'we can follow the

nr as this, but a step further would be dis-

loyalty to the reality of our life.'

(Ibid. p. 91

)

For,

for Buddhism the living of one’s role in the world is only
a means to an end. It is a means for leading man

from the "illusion of forms"

-

'apart

which for us,’ says Buber,

’is no illusion but rather the reliable world (and this

In spite of all subjective paradoxes in observation oonnec ted
V

h

i_t

for us

.

(Ibid. p. 9^) The involvement of the

Buddhist In the world Is superficial, that is, the self
is not bound up with the world but remains as detached
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from it as possible. And this can be
achieved only by
perfectly living one’s given role, since V is
will yield
complete mastery over one’s desires, rather,
it will briny,
about the elimination of all desires. The self
then,

after the complete liberation from all desires,
dissolves
into nothingness. (This appears so from the
standpoint
of the
at

1 Hastened

mind;

in reality the self never existed

all.) Buddhism too, thus, contains wrong disregard
for

the world and for lived reality.
To this disregard of the world, and especially to

the doctrine of the dissolution of the self, Buber is,

naturally , bitterly opposed. For the latter would mean
the death of any relation, since ’the real self appears

only when it enters into relation with the other. Where
this relation is rejected, the real self withers away.
( IT(J

p. 97)

The annihilation of the self would necessarily

remove any possibility of true dialogue.
Buber, however, feels sympathetic to Buddha for

another reason, namely, for the latter’s refuse! ’to
assert that unity exists or that it does not exist, thnt
he who passed all the tests of absorption exists aftei
death in unity or that he do

s

not exist in unity*’

(ITh p. 90) The Buddha does not ccrc.it himself to

a

pre-

carious doctrine of absorption, he does not fall into
the traps of a false gnosis. This 'noble silence' can
be explained, Buber feels, in term's of Buddha's belief

that fulfilment is beyond the categories of thought and
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expres3ion, and that one would, if one tried to describe
it,

'pull it into division, into the antlthetics of the

v/orld of It, where there is no life of salvation.'

elt,) Here the Buddha is very similar to

iiubor,

respect for the mystery of God and of Being. It
this in mind,

ontology

c an

I

(loo.

in his
is

with

feel, that Buber's relatively undeveloped

be accounted for.

salvation,' writes Buber,

'The primal condition of

'is undivided confrontation of

the undivided mystery.' (I bio. p. 91) Buddha makes only
one assertions that there

1b

an Unborn, neither become,

nor created, nor formed. And 'in the silent depth of his
being,'

iudsr feels, the

Juddha knew the 'saying of the

Thou to this primal cause,'

(Ibid. pp. 92-93) and stood

'related to it with his whole being,

'

(EG p. 28) although

he preserved silence shout it. The Buddha, Buber holds,
also knew the saying of the Thou to men, although ho
didn't teach it, although his 'innermost decision seem^ed/
to rest on the extinction of the ability to say Thou.'
(

I Tii p.

92)

CONCLUSION
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artin uuoor,

feel, can be considered one of

I

the most profound and penetrating
thinkers of our time,
He has introduced a completely novel
way of thinking -

novel not in the sense of ‘modified’ and
’extended’ but a radically new perspective on life,
its problems

"nd contradictions

.

one might most successfully sum

up this novel conception of thought and life as
the
philosophy of the ’narrow ridge,’ a philosophy
which
puts emphasis on those phases of human thought and
life

v.iiich

cannot be defined completely, where ’there

Is no jursij .?££!

expressible knowledge,

Oj

’

where undi-

vided mystery confronts man, where solutions are beyond man’s re? oh

-

there, where there Is only 'the cer-

tainty of meeting what regains undisclosed.

'

(BMM p. 184)

This attitude of the 'narrow ridge' is not one

tJr t

looks for a happy middle, but rather, one that holds
the life in a 'holy insecurity' to be the essential

life of man; a life of dialogue, in which men meets

unreduced reality, end in which he courageously res ends
to

with his whole being* what ever he meets, despite the paradoxes and contradictions that may be involved* The life
on the 'narrow ridge' means man's unquestioned accept?' nee
as paradoxical unities what are usually considered

irreconsilable alternatives and dichotomies, it means
n

defiance of the ©ither-or way of thought and life pre-

dominating in our age.
Accordingly, as for Buber good end evil are not
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opposites, but are essentially related to
one another,
ana accordingly as reality and truth are
only found In
the full meeting ci man with fellow-men and
the world
,

in all their otherness, mystery, and concreteness,

all dichotomies and either-or’s of our age are
inte-

grated in life
of

paradox,

-

even if this implied the acceptance

borne of

these dichotomies are;

I

versus

Thou, selfishness versus altruism, love versus justice,

dependence versus freedom, emotion and passion versus
i

er son,

moral autonomy versus mor: 1 heteronomy , morality

versus religion, love of God versus fear of God, trans-

cendence of God versus immanence of God, subjectivism
versus objectivism, personal and poetic truth versus

scientific truth. Individualism versus collectivism,

unity versus duality.

Almost all fields of human enterprise

tod- y

are

poisoned by some kind of elther-or proposition. Buber
poses his all-inclusive philosophy of the life of dialogue

-

ridge'

in which, man, although walking on the 'narrow
bet'-

sen all dichotomies, combines the two alter-

natives of the dichotomy

-

as a remedy for all the

detrimental and disrupting elther-or 's; he

.

c-sea

it

as a safeguard for nan's authentic existence with all its

concreteness, complexity, and problems; as a safeguard
of human truth, which is neither subjective nor objec-

tive, out which is existentially realized in dialogue.

Buber's writings ore wide In their scope. They
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are directed at the totality 0 f human
life. Despite
the

v

i

let;;

of thought, which is necessary if
one deals

eith so many aspects of human existence as
Buber has,
Buoer's writings are oervaded by a remarkable
unity.
It is a unity which c*n be achieved only by a
man who,

like Buber, has combined his own way of life with
his
thought, who has been as great as a person as as a
thinker.

Buber has honestly shared a life In dialogue himself;
he has lived with the responsibility of a true Thou.

And

t

s

such he addresses his reader in his books. For

thrt reason Buber cannot be understood only by lcglcal reformulation of his ideas, but through the full

acceptance of his writings, by an approach as a Thou.
To really understand Buaer, one must be ready to accept

his sharing, and to enter into relation as often es

possible in one's own life.

FOOTNOTES

In each of the three spheres man has at the seme time
a relation to God.
Km, thus. Is rerlly capable of
having relations with four kinds of Thcus.

This dlst notion Is very similar to M-rltain's distinction b t een ’individual* and ’person.’
For Plato it would be vice versa*
the et rnal idea of
the Good, the s< urce of all goodness would do the
bestowing and. the religious (the concrete), the
receiving.
A rigorous distinction between individualism *~nd
collectivism on the personal and on the socialpolitical level is v ry difficult, since they usually
go along together# Imply each other and ov r-lap*
Consequently neither can be thought of without the
other In many respects. Yet, they cannot be acid to
be equivalent; some kind of distinction cm be ra^de
between them. 3uber himself never explicitly distinguished between the to types of illusory confirmation on the p* rsonal and ocial level; however,
a distinction, it seems, is implied in his writings.

According to my understanding, and I think also In
agreement with Buber’s writings, the distinction
between personal and socic.1 individualism and between
personal nc social-political colxe tivlsra is roughly
as follows*
While individualism on the personal level refers to
people who are cut off from the relat on- with their
fellbw-men on account of lack of courage to face the
r allties of the world, thus s owing little positive
concern for the world around them, individualism on
the social level refers to copit li ts who actually
use the world on a large scale in order to appropriate
as much as possible.
Their individualism is not only
a.
lack of concern fox- the world like that of the
Single One in Kierkegaarc 's sense, but it Involves
the xsing and possessing of great ports of society.
Social Individualism, thus, comes to be a personal
Individualism In an extreme form and on o large scale,
characterized by the actual using an
fectlng of
a host of Individuals in r detrimental manner.

Accordingly os collectivism is, In my opinion, a more
complex concept tir n indivi ualism, a distinction
between personal and social collectivism is more
difficult. Collectivism on the personal level, in my
eyes, refers to single Individuals who conform

'

,
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completely to some outward standards, be this another
person or another group, be it with respect to his* whole
life or only one aspect of it, for example, art appreciation. Personal collectivism is thus what one
usually understands by conformism to social behaviour,
ait appreciation, values pertaining to everyday life,
etc.
It is of course possible that personal conformism
becomes collective — as it has to a large xtent in
t is country — (tills has come about especially because
of modern means of mass co unication). But even in
this case one would not talk In terms of collectivism
but rather, in terms of ‘conformity*.
'

'

.

'

If one uses th© term

collectivism* , on© usually refers
to what was termed ’social collectivism* above/ It
refers not to the conformity described oefore, but
to th controlling of a whole society by the State.
This control can do total or partial.
If it is toVl,
as seems to be the case in the Soviet Union, where
people are determined in all phases of life, personal collectivism n th: large scale - what I called
'conformity* - is n cesaarily included in the
totalitarian political collectivism - better, it is
turned into totalitarian social collectivism. Here
society is amalgamat d into the State completely.
But, as -1 ready mentioned, t; Is political collectivism
ne d not be total nd reaching into all spheres of life.
The United States is an exr npi© for partial social
collectivism* While there is freedom with respect to
social behaviour, art appreciation, and. the like,
(that the freedom with respect to these aspects of
life is not taken advantage cf, but replaced by
conformity on a lar *ejHs sod; however, - although
from a pragmatic vi:v;po!nt much alike to the collectivism in Russia with respect to these aspects of life the conformity In this country is essentially different
from that of Ru sia, since it Is 'voluntary from the
viewpoint of the State ^although maybe, forced upon
people in another vicious way - by mass co muni cat Ion/)
with respect to work (although from a pragmatic point
of view the freedom is often more or less theoretical
because- of the huge c pltalistio enterprises which
virtually force many 'little* in ividualists into a
'collective* job w 1 ch is dull and without fulfilment),
and with respect to political opinion, (at le at within
the domain of democracy), etc., there is, feels Buber,
collectivization and centralisation to a certain
extent - and this with respect to tho m< sures that
have eeen taken In order to maintain national security.
Che collectivist tendencies are shown with respect to
service in the army, guidance of many scientists as
to th ir field of work, amount of money that is used
for armament rather than social welfare, control of
*

:

*
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uolitlcr 1 opinion to the extent that Communist tendencies are exterminated, etc. This collectivisation
Is
of course necessary. The fact of Its necessity
hov/ever, remains a sad point.
l.hlle the

-ersonal collectivism, that la conformism
involves some kind of freedom to conform, (and thus*
can occur on a small or large ac^ le noth with respect
tc the number of conformists and the number of rs'ects
of life that ere conformed to by the single ind ividual), social collectivism means domination by the
State, leaving no (as in iusaia) or partial (as in
the West) freedom to be a person, or a true individualist (In mber's sense), or a personal conformist,
with, res ect to work
to mass-production, as found
in this country, I am not sure what kind of collectivism to ascribe to it. The control Is not political, yet
it is rather strong - though not absolute - by virtue
of the centralizing tendency of the big enterprises.
,

,

Personal and social collectivism, thus, can occur
in various forms, depending upon how many r sweets
of life are affected by It. They cannot be separated
completely, (at least not insofar as every social
collectivism must be originated by some persons,
thus being In part, with respect to these originators,
personal collectivism) and usually go together on
the social scale, although this latter concurrence
is not necessary.
,

One more difference between individualist and collectivism on the personal level end individualism and
collectivism on the social level seems to exist with
respect to the people concerned in the change from
individualism to collectivism, bile in personal
individualism the individualist himself finally
becomes r collectivist (conformist), on the social
level the capitalists do not, at least in most c ses,
become collectivists themselves, sther, collectivism
arises either as a reaction (like Karris; or Soviet
totalitarianism, where the bearer of collectivism is
not the former capitalist out the personal individualist
in atomized society threatened by capitalism), or
collectivism arises s a consequence insof r as capitalism forces m^ny people - by threatening their vital
and social security - into collectiv s (especially
with respect to work). There are, to he sure, c^ses in
which capitalists, on account of the insecurity
resulting from too powerful competition, also quit
business and end up In the collective.

b.

In the following ex losition of Buber’s theory of know-

b

.
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ledge I shall In part heavily rely on Mauri oe
Friedman's interpret tlon of Buber's epist mole
y
as presented in The
of Dialogue . pp. 161 -'i? 5 .
•

6,

The I -Thu u relationship with nature, similar to our
relationship to orfcs of art, is not s cor. plete as
the lrlogue between tvo persons, since it lacks the conscious
reciprocity of the latter. Hatur can say* something
to me, and can thus consciously become a Thou foi me,
hut because it doesn’t have the consciousness of a
self, I cannot become a 'Thou for nature in the same
'

mr oner.

Bub r co a not hold, however, that there is no reciprocity in c n
relation with nature at all. Even
in Inanimat nature - although there, most likely,
is no mutuality in consciousness - 'there ie a
reciprocity of the being itself, a reciprocity w ch
ie nothing but being in its course- ( be l end )
The
reciprocity is 'that of the pro* threshold! 1 of consciousness.
(ITh p. 126)
*

1

7*

Although Buber puts great emphasis. In his biologic"!
life, on the immediate sense experience, it would be
wrong to classify him as an empiricist after the order
of Wil icm James .
It is true that for Buber all true
relation must start with sense experience, and, if it
is to be perfect, must fu iy include it.
But it
would be misleading to think, that the relation is
exhausted by sense-experience* Rather, true relation
is 'the vital contact with El being, an ever-renei ed
ich the experience of
vital contact with it in
the senses only fits in as a factor*
(FW p. 84)
The I-Thou relation cannot be complete, if the senseexperience I have of my Thou Is being curtailed, but
Conseit is not made up of sense-experiences alone.
uently, Buber holds that the di logical life can continue - although not with full intensity - 'even when
2the I and. the Thou/ are separated in apace, as the
eonfnual potential presence of the one tc the other,
For
(EM! p. 97)
as an unexprea ed intercourse.'
1111am James, on the other hand, who hoi s that reality
is immediate a nse-exper ience, separation in spree
from any person or object would make impose! ;la the
nee of re lity in connection with them.
r
e
1

:

8.

difficulty arises especially with respect to the
estion !3i5 to w o creates the dialogical reality*
It was 8^ id earll r that two union beings, by entering
Ti ls ie right
into a i elation, create true r ality
dialogical
ting
me
elr
insofar as by virtue of t
K

.

1

»

.

:

unreality emerges. Yet it is wrong insofar r
s dielo ic ->l
reality
rg a only by virtue of the inclusion
of God
in true dialogue
&ue * However, it would be wrong to say
that the dialogical reality is part of
the Divine
i3e ing .
Yet according to Bulger, In dialogue
part -cipates in Divine Being* Tha situation man
.
seems to
° r paradoxical - the meeting is
partially a real! at ion
of Div ne Being, yet it is not part of
the Divine Being,

^

r

.

J

10 ,

See chapter on Epistemology
‘The Kay of
nowin* ’•
ELimintion of Tr ditionel Epistemological roolene
on the Basis of Epistemological Priority of
T-Tbou
over I- It’.
1

*

The closest affinities between Buber and hi teheed
are probably to be found in t eir doctrine of the
rel tionsrip between Goo and men.
Both men believe
in the concrete me ting of man and Goc
-nd that
redemption of evil results from the mutual love and
r 1 tion of God and the world.
Yet even here,
vhltehead differs from Buber in that he is relatively
unconcerned with man s relation to God, and more
concerned with the enerie rel-tion of God to man*
Conse uently, Kbit ahead' s God-man rel tionship is
1-Xt more than I -Thou •
It lacks the tension of
Buber's 'meeting' and ’over-againstness
(Fried p, 227)
'

,

‘

,

'

11.

Here one might object, that only Buddhism, but ot
Hinduism, cuts beneath this subst^nce-orocees
dichotomy, since Hinduism postulates as ultimate
reality a -or Id Soul, "nc thus seems to cling to the
belief in the reality
'spiritual substance*
However, whether this equating of brahman* with
'spiritual substance' is correct, I do not know.
To the extent, thus, as I am uncertain in this respect,
the statement ab ut Hindi ism as cutting beneath the
substance-process dichotomy is uncertain too.

)
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